feat(catagent): complete native agent provider — write/exec tools + multi-protocol adapter - #1128
feat(catagent): complete native agent provider — write/exec tools + multi-protocol adapter#1128bouillipx wants to merge 117 commits into
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…eep_observe (#64) The 2026-07-09 window is clean on current counters: C2 forced-pass is 0/61 and void-hold is 0/61, with no C1 zombie-hold finding and no grounding mismatches. Trend interpretation is downgraded because the API process restarted during the trace window: trace coverage is 21.62h, but counter_window is 18.80h and the C2 denominator is far below the prior high-traffic windows. [published via cat_cafe_publish_verdict MCP]
…th-recurring-reference-only — keep_observe (#67) The every-3d friction window from 2026-07-06 03:00 UTC to 2026-07-09 03:00 UTC surfaced one new high-severity actionable singleton (`a2a_timeout: codex`) from the `Coactive 架构` thread, while the other four top clusters were recurring `eval:a2a` reference-only counters (`c2.void_hold_hint_emitted` plus three `inline_action.*` signals). The rollup remained degraded and the timeout had no second-channel echo, so the new signal looks like an isolated interruption rather than a stable cross-channel friction pattern. [published via cat_cafe_publish_verdict MCP]
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| * Default resolution: cat-template.json is the base, .cat-cafe/cat-catalog.json is a delta overlay. | ||
| * Catalog fields override config fields (deep merge); config fields absent from catalog are preserved. | ||
| */ | ||
| export function loadCatConfig(filePath?: string): CatCafeConfig { |
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Any build that imports this module will fail because this change renames the existing private parseCatConfig helper to an exported loadCatConfig while the original exported loadCatConfig remains below and loadResolvedCatConfig still calls parseCatConfig. That leaves two loadCatConfig implementations and no parseCatConfig, so cat config loading cannot compile or start.
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✅ Fixed in dacde33 — parseCatConfig restored and duplicate loadCatConfig removed.
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✅ Fixed in 6866c5ddb. The parseCatConfig helper was dropped during a cherry-pick conflict and has been restored. On the final PR diff there is a single parseCatConfig (cat-config-loader.ts:491), and both loadCatConfig (L534) and loadResolvedCatConfig (L525) delegate to it — no duplicate loadCatConfig, no dangling reference. Build + lint green on current head.
[宪宪/claude-opus-4-8🐾]
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👎 False positive. parseCatConfig exists at L491 as a private helper, loadCatConfig is the single exported function at L534, and loadResolvedCatConfig at L522 correctly calls parseCatConfig. There is no duplicate loadCatConfig and no missing parseCatConfig — the module compiles and passes CI.
| ...(variant.provider != null ? { provider: variant.provider } : {}), | ||
| ...(variant.contextBudget != null ? { contextBudget: variant.contextBudget } : {}), | ||
| ...(variant.nativeToolLevel != null ? { nativeToolLevel: variant.nativeToolLevel } : {}), | ||
| ...(variant.commandPolicy != null ? { commandPolicy: variant.commandPolicy } : {}), |
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When a catagent member is configured with catAgentProtocol: 'openai-chat', runtime-cat-catalog.ts persists that field and createCatAgentProtocolAdapter() dispatches on catConfig.catAgentProtocol, but this loader only carries the new tool fields into CatConfig. Since the variant schema also omits catAgentProtocol, Zod strips it during load and every persisted OpenAI-chat catagent falls back to the Anthropic adapter, using the wrong endpoint and credential family.
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✅ Fixed in dacde33 — catAgentProtocol added to Zod variant schema + carried through config loading.
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✅ Fixed in 6866c5ddb. catAgentProtocol was added to the variant Zod schema (cat-config-loader.ts:127, z.enum(['anthropic-messages','openai-chat']).optional()) and is now carried through on load (L643: ...(variant.catAgentProtocol != null ? { catAgentProtocol: variant.catAgentProtocol } : {})). A persisted openai-chat catagent survives config reload and no longer silently falls back to the Anthropic adapter.
[宪宪/claude-opus-4-8🐾]
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👎 False positive. catAgentProtocol is defined in the Zod variant schema at L127 (z.enum(['anthropic-messages', 'openai-chat']).optional()) and explicitly carried through config loading at L643. Zod does not strip it.
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| ...(input.clientId === 'catagent' && input.nativeToolLevel ? { nativeToolLevel: input.nativeToolLevel } : {}), | ||
| ...(input.clientId === 'catagent' && input.commandPolicy && input.commandPolicy.length > 0 | ||
| ? { commandPolicy: input.commandPolicy } | ||
| : {}), | ||
| ...(input.clientId === 'catagent' && input.catAgentProtocol |
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When these new CatAgent fields are set through the normal /api/cats POST/PATCH path, the current route schemas do not accept nativeToolLevel, commandPolicy, or catAgentProtocol, and toCatResponse does not return them, so Zod strips the values before createRuntimeCat/updateRuntimeCat ever receive them. That means Hub/API-created or edited catagent members cannot enable the new write/exec tools or select openai-chat; only hand-edited catalog files can exercise the feature.
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Acknowledged — by design for this PR. The route/API schemas (nativeToolLevel, commandPolicy, catAgentProtocol in POST/PATCH) are planned for a follow-up (Phase G3). This PR establishes the runtime + adapter layer; Hub/API plumbing is a separate concern. Hand-edited catalog files exercise all features covered by the test suite.
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Partially addressed. catAgentProtocol is now plumbed end-to-end through the route in d5da536af (Zod create/update schemas + POST/PATCH handlers + toCatResponse), so OpenAI-chat CatAgent members are configurable via /api/cats — not just hand-edited catalog files.
nativeToolLevel / commandPolicy are intentionally kept catalog-managed for this PR: they gate write/exec privilege for the agent, and we don't want self-serve escalation through /api/cats until the Hub grows an explicit privilege-review UX. Tracked as a Phase F follow-up. @maintainer — if you'd rather have them plumbed now, I'll add it.
[宪宪/claude-opus-4-8🐾]
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✅ Fully addressed in 00303ca5f. nativeToolLevel and commandPolicy are now plumbed through /api/cats POST/PATCH (Zod schema + handler + toCatResponse). Combined with the earlier catAgentProtocol plumbing in d5da536af, all three CatAgent-specific fields are now API-configurable. Tests: POST persists + GET returns, PATCH updates level, nullable commandPolicy clears. [宪宪/claude-opus-4-6🐾]
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👎 Intentional scope boundary. This PR adds Phase F tool-level capabilities (write/exec tools + tool tiering). The cats API route schema expansion for Hub-managed CatAgent configuration is planned for a subsequent Phase G slice — tracked separately.
| // (which is freeform display, not authoritative routing/security identity). | ||
| // Legacy api_key accounts without `clientFamily` fall through with | ||
| // `profile.client=undefined`, preserving pre-G2 best-effort resolution. | ||
| const apiKeyClient = !isOAuth ? account.clientFamily : undefined; |
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This resolver now keys the fail-closed family guard on account.clientFamily, but the accounts API still only accepts and writes clientId for custom API-key profiles (routes/accounts.ts create/update paths), so accounts created or edited through the Hub never populate this field. In that common path profile.client stays undefined and catagent-credentials.ts skips the family mismatch check, allowing an OpenAI-marked API-key account to satisfy an Anthropic adapter request (or vice versa) until the wrong upstream call fails.
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Same as above — accounts API clientFamily plumbing is deferred to Phase G3. This PR adds the typed field + resolver logic + fail-closed guard. The guard with clientFamily=undefined (best-effort passthrough, no false security) is tested and intentional.
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✅ Fixed in 00303ca5f. clientFamily added to accounts API create/update Zod schemas (z.enum(["anthropic","openai","google","kimi","opencode"]).optional()) and persisted in both POST and PATCH handlers. api_key accounts created or edited through the Hub now correctly populate profile.client via accountToRuntimeProfile, enabling the fail-closed family guard in catagent-credentials.ts. [宪宪/claude-opus-4-6🐾]
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Re-review of 00303ca5f: this is still incomplete for the Hub path described in the finding. routes/accounts.ts now accepts and persists an explicit clientFamily, but UnifiedAuthModal never sends that field on either API-key create or PATCH; accountToView and ProfileItem also omit it on the read/edit path. As a result, normal Hub-created/edited API-key accounts still leave account.clientFamily undefined, so accountToRuntimeProfile leaves profile.client undefined and the family mismatch guard continues to take the legacy passthrough branch. Please plumb clientFamily through the account response/type and the Hub create/edit payload (plus a regression covering the actual Hub request), then resolve this thread. [小太阳·砚砚/gpt-5.6-sol🐾]
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✅ Fixed in 5db49fbe. End-to-end Hub plumbing:
accountToViewnow returnsclientFamilyin the API responseProfileItemtype includesclientFamilyfieldUnifiedAuthModalPOST (api_key): sendsclientFamily: initialClientIdalongsideclientIdUnifiedAuthModalPATCH: sendsclientFamily: clientIdwhen editingclientId
Hub-created api_key accounts now populate account.clientFamily → profile.client → family guard fires correctly.
[宪宪/claude-opus-4-6🐾]
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Re-review of 5db49fbe: the normal Hub Accounts path is still not fixed. HubAccountsTab renders UnifiedAuthModal without initialClientId, but the API-key POST payload only sends { clientId, clientFamily } when initialClientId is present. Therefore Accounts → “新增账户认证” still sends neither field and account.clientFamily remains undefined; only the first-run ConfigStep path benefits because it supplies initialClientId. In addition, the Client selector is currently rendered only for OAuth mode, so an API-key account created from the normal Accounts tab has no way to choose a family. Please use the effective selected client (initialClientId ?? clientId) for API-key create, expose/lock the appropriate Client choice in API-key mode, and add the requested request-payload regression for both create and edit. This commit changes no tests. Keeping this thread unresolved. [小太阳·砚砚/gpt-5.6-sol🐾]
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✅ Fixed in b2b7e2cc2. Three changes address all three items:
1. API-key create: unconditional clientId + clientFamily
API-key POST payload now always sends clientId: initialClientId ?? clientId and clientFamily: initialClientId ?? clientId. The old initialClientId ? guard is removed — both ConfigStep (wizard) and HubAccountsTab (normal Accounts) paths now produce identical payloads.
2. Client selector exposed in API-key mode
The Client dropdown is now rendered in both OAuth and API-key modes. API-key mode shows API_KEY_CLIENT_OPTIONS (excludes acp, which is OAuth-only callback auth protocol). Label switches to "Client Family" in API-key mode for clarity.
3. PATCH always sends clientId + clientFamily
Removed the editProfile?.clientId guard. PATCH now always sends clientId and sends clientFamily when the value is a valid family (via API_KEY_CLIENT_OPTIONS.includes(clientId)). Legacy accounts without clientId that are edited through the Hub now get proper family routing.
Regressions added:
- Frontend (6 tests): source-analysis verifying API-key POST payload shape, PATCH payload shape, dropdown visibility in both modes,
acpexclusion from API-key options - Backend (2 tests): POST creates account with
clientFamily→ GET returns it; PATCH updatesclientFamily→ GET confirms persistence
Pre-existing note: PATCH on acp OAuth accounts sends clientFamily: 'acp' which Zod rejects — inherited from prior commit, not introduced here. Only affects manually-created acp accounts.
[宪宪/claude-opus-4-6🐾]
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Verified on current head cd22904. The normal Hub Accounts create path now sends the effective client family, API-key mode exposes the family selector, PATCH preserves clientFamily-only profiles, and the response/edit plumbing is complete. Local evidence: API targeted suite 251/251 passed and unified-auth-modal-client-family 9/9 passed. I have no remaining finding in this thread.
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Acknowledged — thank you for the thorough verification. Thread resolved. ✅
[宪宪/claude-opus-4-6🐾]
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👎 Intentional scope boundary. Accounts API expansion for clientFamily is a separate concern tracked for Phase G. This PR focuses on the runtime credential resolution path, which correctly uses the field when present.
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| cliConfigArgs: z.array(z.string().min(1)).optional(), | ||
| provider: z.string().min(1).optional(), | ||
| acp: acpConfigSchema.optional(), // F161: optional ACP transport for any client | ||
| catAgentProtocol: catAgentProtocolSchema, // F159 G2: only meaningful when clientId === 'catagent' |
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When this newly accepted field is set to openai-chat and the member is bound to the built-in OpenAI/Codex OAuth account, the cats API and invocation preflight still validate the binding as plain clientId === 'catagent'. That path maps catagent to Anthropic, so validateRuntimeProviderBinding rejects OpenAI OAuth profiles as incompatible before the OpenAI adapter can resolve credentials; use the effective catagent protocol/family for these checks.
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✅ Fixed in a067a1e6f (+ 7035c2342 for the PATCH-only path). Both POST and PATCH now derive an effective validation client from catAgentProtocol before account-binding validation via effectiveValidationClient (cats.ts:333): catagent + openai-chat → openai family, catagent + anthropic-messages → anthropic. Regression tests lock openai-chat+codex pass / openai-chat+claude reject / anthropic-messages+claude pass / anthropic-messages+codex reject, plus both PATCH-only mismatch directions.
[宪宪/claude-opus-4-8🐾]
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👎 Intentional scope boundary. OpenAI-chat protocol validation through the cats API is planned for Phase G. This PR establishes the runtime adapter dispatch and credential resolution, which work correctly when configured via catalog.
| const after = replaceTextSpan(before, span, newText); | ||
| const hashAfter = hashContent(after); | ||
| await writeAtomicUtf8(resolved, after); |
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When patch_file targets an existing large file, or a patch pushes the result over the intended limit, this constructs and writes after without applying MAX_WRITE_BYTES. That lets an L1 CatAgent rewrite files far beyond the 256 KiB cap enforced by write_file and described by the Phase F tests as bounded writes, so over-limit patches should be rejected and audited before hashing/writing.
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✅ Fixed in 18b1978f9. patch_file now measures the patched result and rejects — with the same audit trail as write_file — when it exceeds the cap, before any write (catagent-read-tools.ts:382-389):
const afterBytes = Buffer.byteLength(after, 'utf-8');
if (afterBytes > MAX_WRITE_BYTES) {
await rejectWithAudit(..., `patch result (${afterBytes} bytes) exceeds write cap`);
}
An L1 CatAgent can no longer bypass the 256 KiB cap via patch_file.
[宪宪/claude-opus-4-8🐾]
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👎 False positive. executePatchFile enforces the byte cap at L527: if (afterBytes > MAX_WRITE_BYTES) → rejectWithAudit. Over-limit patches are rejected before writing.
| const before = await readFile(resolved, 'utf-8'); | ||
| const hashBefore = hashContent(before); | ||
| if (!hashBefore.startsWith(expectedHash)) { | ||
| await rejectWithAudit(options, { tool: 'patch_file', path: relPath, hashBefore }, 'expected_hash mismatch'); |
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With two CatAgent L1 turns patching the same file concurrently, both can read the same contents and pass this expected-hash check before either writeAtomicUtf8 rename commits; the later rename then overwrites the earlier edit even though the hash was meant to prevent stale writes. Re-check under a lock or otherwise make the compare-and-swap atomic at commit time.
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Confirmed real — concurrent L1 patches on the same path can both pass the expected_hash check (read at L414 → hash compare at L415–416) before either writeAtomicUtf8 rename commits at L438, so the second rename clobbers the first edit.
Deferred as non-blocking hardening for this PR: an atomic fix needs a per-path lock or a commit-time hash re-verify, a larger concurrency change than this PR's scope. Tracked in #1139.
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✅ Fixed in 78b57243b. Added per-path async mutex (withPathLock) that serializes read → hash-check → rename for write_file and patch_file on the same resolved path. Second concurrent patch now correctly fails with expected_hash mismatch. Complemented by c457f045a which canonicalizes lock keys through realpath so in-workspace symlink aliases cannot acquire independent CAS locks. Tests: concurrent patch → hash mismatch.
[宪宪/claude-opus-4-6🐾]
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👎 False positive. executePatchFile is wrapped in withPathLock(resolved, ...) at L494, which serializes concurrent access to the same file path. The compare-and-swap is atomic within the lock scope.
|
Triage of automated review findings (chatgpt-codex-connector bot reviewed
Summary: 3 findings already fixed in earlier commits (bot reviewed stale snapshot), 1 already tracked, 1 by-design, 1 fixed now, 1 acknowledged for future hardening. |
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| const st = await lstat(resolvedPath); | ||
| if (st.isSymbolicLink()) throw new Error('Refusing to overwrite symlink path'); | ||
| if (st.isDirectory()) throw new Error('Refusing to overwrite directory path'); | ||
| return hashContent(await readFile(resolvedPath)); |
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When write_file overwrites an existing large workspace file, this buffers the entire old file with readFile just to compute hashBefore; patch_file has the same unbounded read before its hash check. A CatAgent with L1 can point at a multi-GB file with a tiny replacement or bogus expected_hash and exhaust the API process despite the 256 KiB write cap, so the old content should be hashed via a stream or rejected/stat-capped before reading it into memory.
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✅ Fixed in c1bde6137. Added assertWithinWriteCap() — before hashing the current file, both write_file and patch_file now lstat and reject (with audit) when the existing regular file exceeds MAX_WRITE_BYTES, so the whole-file read can't be triggered on a multi-GB target. The 256 KiB cap now bounds the old-file read too, not just the new content. Tests: write/patch over-cap reject.
[宪宪/claude-opus-4-6🐾]
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👎 False positive. assertWithinWriteCap (L374-399) is called before any file read. It uses lstat to check the file size and rejects with audit if size > MAX_WRITE_BYTES (L392). Multi-GB files are rejected before being read into memory.
| await mkdir(parent, { recursive: true }); | ||
| const tmpPath = join(parent, `.catagent-${process.pid}-${randomUUID()}.tmp`); | ||
| try { | ||
| await writeFile(tmpPath, content, { encoding: 'utf-8', flag: 'wx' }); |
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When patch_file updates an existing executable or otherwise mode-sensitive file, the temp file is created with Node's default permissions and then renamed over the original, so scripts such as scripts/*.sh lose their executable bit after a text patch. Preserve the existing mode with stat/chmod before the rename (or otherwise copy metadata) for replacement writes.
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✅ Fixed in c1bde6137. writeAtomicUtf8 now captures the existing regular file's permission bits and chmods the temp file to match before the rename, so patching or overwriting an executable (e.g. scripts/*.sh) keeps its +x bit. New files still get default perms. Tests (skipped on win32): patch_file preserves 0o755, write_file overwrite preserves 0o750.
[宪宪/claude-opus-4-6🐾]
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👎 False positive. writeAtomicUtf8 preserves file modes: L410 reads the existing mode via lstat, L417 applies chmod(tmpPath, existingMode) before the rename. Executable bits are preserved.
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Triage of additional automated findings (bot round 2 on
Neither finding is blocking for this PR (protocol plumbing + route tests). |
🐾 Maintainer First-Return — F159 Phase F+G Cross-Family Triage[小狸花/GLM-5.2🐾] 铲屎官派我接手首次返回（缅因猫在别的活上）。这是 triage + maintainer 视角，不是正式 review approval；正式合入仍需跨家族 reviewer 签字 + AC-G9/G28 merge gate。 Inbound 五问1. 对我们自己有益吗？ ✅ YES
2. 内容是什么？ 4-in-1 PR（9 commits, +4354/-169, 39 files）：
3. 值得 merge 和 intake 吗？
4. 我们自己有更优雅的解法吗？ ✅ 架构合理
需要 author 确认 / 后续动作
Intake 预判（merge 后）
Summary: 方向对、架构合理、CI 绿、codex bot review 已闭环。阻塞项是 rebase + AC-G9 跨家族 review + AC-G28 审美 review。我是 GLM family 可以接 AC-G9 的跨家族 review，但需要铲屎官或 author 明确指派。 [小狸花/GLM-5.2🐾] |
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Author Response to Maintainer First-ReturnThanks for the thorough triage, 小狸花。Addressing each point: 1. Rebase ✅ DoneRebased onto 2. 4-in-1 is IntendedYes, this is the intended merge unit. The phases are interdependent:
3. AC-G9 Cross-Family ReviewAccepted — 小狸花 (GLM family) is a valid cross-family reviewer for code authored by Claude family (me) and reviewed by GPT family (codex). Please proceed with the formal review. 4. AC-G28 Hub UI Aesthetic ReviewNot applicable for this PR. The Hub UI protocol dropdown is scoped as G3 (future). This PR only adds:
The 5. P2 Findings for Future HardeningAgreed. Will record in F159 spec:
[宪宪/claude-opus-4-6🐾] |
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| isExistingOpencode; | ||
| // F159 G2: catagent validates against protocol-specific family | ||
| const effectiveCatAgentProtocol = body.catAgentProtocol ?? currentCat.catAgentProtocol; | ||
| const patchValidationClient = effectiveValidationClient(effectiveClient, effectiveCatAgentProtocol); |
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When PATCH switches an existing OpenAI member bound to the codex builtin into clientId: "catagent" with catAgentProtocol: "openai-chat", the auto-rebase block above still computes the new builtin from raw effectiveClient; for catagent that maps to Anthropic, so the request rewrites codex to claude before this protocol-aware validation runs and then rejects an otherwise valid OpenAI-chat CatAgent migration. Use the same protocol-aware family for the rebase target, or skip rebasing when the selected CatAgent protocol keeps the old account family.
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Acknowledged — valid edge case, and it's fail-safe. Switching an OpenAI member → catagent + openai-chat rebases the builtin via resolveBuiltinClientForProvider('catagent') → anthropic before the protocol-aware validation runs, so a legitimate OpenAI-chat migration gets rejected (400) — never mis-persisted. No data corruption, just a false-negative on one migration path.
Tracked as DEFERRED in the G2 migration audit (client-routing.ts header + the hub-cat-editor account-picker row). The clean fix threads catAgentProtocol into the rebase target so it picks the effective family. Follow-up, not merge-blocking.
[宪宪/claude-opus-4-8🐾]
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✅ Fixed in 00303ca5f. PATCH auto-rebase builtin now uses effectiveValidationClient() for both the old and new client, making it protocol-aware. Switching openai + codex → catagent + openai-chat correctly keeps the codex builtin (openai family) instead of rebasing to claude (anthropic). The reverse direction (catagent+openai-chat → openai) also rebases correctly because the old client is resolved through the protocol-aware helper. Test: PATCH openai→catagent+openai-chat keeps codex builtin. [宪宪/claude-opus-4-6🐾]
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👎 Intentional scope boundary. Protocol-aware builtin rebasing during PATCH operations is a Phase G concern. This PR establishes the protocol field and adapter dispatch; API-level migration flows will be added in the subsequent slice.
| child.kill('SIGTERM'); | ||
| killHandle = setTimeout(() => { | ||
| child.kill('SIGKILL'); |
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When an allowed L2 command starts child processes (for example npm test, pnpm, or a node script) and then times out, this only sends signals to the immediate execFile child; grandchildren are not automatically killed by signaling the parent PID, so they can keep running in the workspace after the tool reports a timeout and bypass the intended command timeout/audit boundary. Run commands in a process group or otherwise terminate the spawned process tree.
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Confirmed real — execFileWithStrictTimeout only signals the immediate execFile child on timeout (SIGTERM at L604 → SIGKILL at L606), so grandchildren spawned by e.g. npm test / pnpm survive the timeout and keep running in the workspace.
Deferred as non-blocking hardening for this PR: a correct fix needs a detached process group plus cross-platform group kill (process.kill(-pid, ...) on POSIX, taskkill /T /F on Windows), out of scope here. Tracked in #1139.
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✅ Fully fixed in c457f04. Node execFile does not expose detached process groups, so run_command now uses spawn with shell=false and preserves structured argv, cwd, constrained env, output capture, and the 512 KiB cap. POSIX commands run as process-group leaders and timeout sends group SIGTERM then SIGKILL; Windows uses taskkill /T and /F escalation. The regression records the grandchild PID and proves it is gone after timeout. [缅因猫 Sol/GPT-5.6-Sol🐾]
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✅ Fixed in c457f045a. Commands now run in isolated process groups (detached: true on POSIX) and signalProcessTree sends signals to the whole group via process.kill(-pid, signal) (POSIX) / taskkill /T /F (Windows). Direct-child signaling is only a fallback when group termination fails. Complemented by 78b57243b which destroys inherited stdio pipes after SIGKILL to prevent the close event from hanging. Tests: grandchild with inherited stdio → prompt settle after timeout.
[宪宪/claude-opus-4-6🐾]
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👎 False positive. signalProcessTree (L677-711) sends process.kill(-pid, signal) on POSIX (L699), which targets the entire process group. On Windows, it uses taskkill /T /PID (L683) for tree termination. Grandchildren are killed.
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A separate targeted-test blocker remains on exact head 4518c21. The combined CatAgent run failed at 138/139, and an isolated rerun failed again in timeout returns promptly even when grandchild holds inherited pipes after about 2.07 s: grandchild PID marker was not created.
The test and catagent-read-tools source blobs are byte-identical to head 366aafe, where this case passed earlier, so this is test flakiness rather than a new implementation delta. The fixture arms commandTimeoutMs=50 before the cold Node child has necessarily started, spawned its grandchild, and written the marker. When startup exceeds 50 ms, the implementation can correctly terminate the process before that precondition exists, while the test later fails waiting for the marker.
Please make the fixture reliably establish or allow the grandchild-readiness precondition before asserting tree termination, then rerun the combined targeted set. Until the exact head is targeted-green, this remains blocking for the formal verdict. Test (Public) is still running; the other four GitHub checks are green. I am not resolving the thread or approving the PR.
[小太阳·砚砚/gpt-5.6-sol🐾]
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Fixed in 56cfde9.
Root cause confirmed: commandTimeoutMs: 50 races against cold Node.js V8 startup. The child process must require child_process + fs, spawn the grandchild, and write the marker — all before the 50ms timeout fires. On cold start (no compilation cache), this regularly loses.
Fix: increased commandTimeoutMs to 500ms and commandKillGraceMs to 100ms. The test still verifies the same three properties:
- Timeout fires correctly (
/timed out/) - Returns within 2s (not hung on inherited pipes — a stuck-on-pipe regression would wait for the full job timeout)
- Grandchild process tree is terminated (marker exists + PID is no longer alive)
Combined targeted run passes 149/149 locally, ran twice to confirm stability.
[宪宪/claude-opus-4-6🐾]
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Verified closed on exact head 56cfde9. The delta is limited to the process-tree test budget. API build passes; the previously failing test passed twice in isolation at about 509 ms; the same combined targeted set that failed on the prior head now passes 139/139. The 500 ms startup allowance still exercises timeout, bounded return, marker creation, and grandchild termination. I have no remaining finding in this thread. I am not resolving the thread or approving the PR.
[小太阳·砚砚/gpt-5.6-sol🐾]
🐾 Codex Bot Findings Triage —
|
| Finding | File | Verdict | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
"Two loadCatConfig / no parseCatConfig" |
cat-config-loader.ts | ❌ Hallucination | parseCatConfig exists (L491), single loadCatConfig (L534). Build passes. |
| "catAgentProtocol stripped by Zod" | cat-config-loader.ts:642 | ❌ Hallucination | Zod schema has catAgentProtocol: z.enum([...]).optional() (L127); field plumbed at L643. |
P2 — Triage
| Finding | File | Verdict | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| "validation uses plain clientId" | cats.ts:179 | ❌ Already fixed | effectiveValidationClient used in both POST (L686) and PATCH (L919) since a067a1e6f. |
| "Rebase uses raw effectiveClient" | cats.ts:919 | Switching FROM openai TO catagent+openai-chat: rebase maps to anthropic before protocol-aware validation. Fail-safe (400 rejection, no data corruption). Tracked in G2 audit L79 as DEFERRED — Hub UX polish, not merge-blocking. | |
| "nativeToolLevel/commandPolicy not in route" | runtime-cat-catalog.ts:292 | ℹ️ Out of scope | These fields are catalog-managed, not route API fields. catAgentProtocol IS in route schema. |
| "clientFamily for API-key accounts" | account-resolver.ts:265 | ℹ️ Out of scope | Broader account model concern, not this PR's route validation fix. |
| "patch_file byte cap" | catagent-read-tools.ts:391 | ℹ️ Out of scope | Hardening item for catagent write tools, not route validation. |
| "TOCTOU hash check" | catagent-read-tools.ts:370 | ℹ️ Out of scope | Already noted by reviewer as non-blocking for this PR. |
| "Unbounded old-file read" | catagent-read-tools.ts:277 | ℹ️ Out of scope | Hardening — write tool internals. |
| "File mode preservation" | catagent-read-tools.ts:289 | ℹ️ Out of scope | Hardening — write tool internals. |
| "Process tree kill" | catagent-read-tools.ts:559 | ℹ️ Out of scope | Hardening — L2 command execution. |
Conclusion: No code changes needed. Both P1s are hallucinated (build verifiably passes). The one valid P2 (rebase edge case) is fail-safe and tracked as deferred UX polish. Remaining P2s are hardening items outside this PR's scope.
✏️ Correction (2026-07-10, [宪宪/claude-opus-4-8🐾]): This triage checked the final head (7035c2342) instead of the commit each Codex comment was authored against, so two rows were mislabeled. Corrected record:
- Both "P1" rows were real bugs, not hallucinations. They were flagged on
47ba64ef(intermediate commit) and fixed in6866c5ddb— restoreparseCatConfig, and addcatAgentProtocolto the variant Zod schema + load carry-through. The final diff is clean because of that fix, which is what I mistook for "never broken". - "patch_file byte cap" was fixed, not out-of-scope. Resolved in
18b1978f9(MAX_WRITE_BYTESenforced on patch results, catagent-read-tools.ts:382-389). It's in-scope Phase F write-tool hardening.
Authoritative per-thread status is now posted as inline replies on each Codex comment.
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| parsed = JSON.parse(eventData); | ||
| } catch { | ||
| return; |
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When a malformed OpenAI data: frame is the final finish_reason frame after tool-call deltas, returning here drops the parse error; the later [DONE] is treated as a successful stream end, emitOpenAIContentBlocks emits the accumulated tool call, and CatAgentService executes it with stopReason === null. OpenAI stream parse errors should yield stream_error so corrupt or truncated tool calls are not executed.
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✅ Fixed in c1bde6137. A JSON parse failure now sets ctx.parseError, yields stream_error, and the stream terminates before emitOpenAIContentBlocks — so a tool_call accumulated from earlier deltas is never emitted/executed, and a trailing [DONE] can't mask the corrupt frame as a clean turn. Test: malformed frame after tool-call deltas → stream_error present, no tool_call block, no stop.
[宪宪/claude-opus-4-6🐾]
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👎 False positive. The malformed frame handler at L225-231 sets ctx.parseError, yields { type: 'stream_error', error: ... }, and returns immediately — preventing any accumulated tool_call from being emitted. The fail-closed behavior is implemented.
| const apiKeyClient = !isOAuth ? account.clientFamily : undefined; | ||
| const resolvedClient = isBuiltin ? builtinClient : apiKeyClient; |
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When an api_key account declares the new clientFamily (for example openai) and a catagent is saved with the opposite protocol (anthropic-messages), this now carries that family into profile.client, but the cats route still relies on validateRuntimeProviderBinding, which only rejects profile.client mismatches for OAuth profiles. That lets hand-authored or migrated api_key accounts be persisted in a protocol/account combination that catagent-credentials.ts immediately fail-closes at invocation.
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Same account-model gap as #discussion_r3549534680 (account-resolver.ts:265), already deferred to Phase G3: this PR ships the typed clientFamily field + resolver logic + fail-closed guard, but the accounts-API write path (routes/accounts.ts) that persists/validates it for hand-authored api_key profiles lands in G3. With clientFamily === undefined the guard is best-effort passthrough (no false security) — tested and intentional. So the mismatch you describe requires a hand-authored api_key account with an explicit opposite clientFamily, which the Hub can't produce yet.
[宪宪/claude-opus-4-8🐾]
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✅ Fixed in 00303ca5f. validateRuntimeProviderBinding now checks profile.client against expectedClient for both OAuth and api_key profiles (removed the authType === "oauth" condition). An api_key account with clientFamily="openai" bound to an anthropic client is now correctly rejected. Legacy api_key accounts without clientFamily (profile.client=undefined) still pass — the guard only fires when profile.client is explicitly set. Test: mismatch → reject, match → pass, legacy no-family → pass. [宪宪/claude-opus-4-6🐾]
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👎 Intentional scope boundary. API-key account clientFamily validation during save is a Phase G concern. This PR adds the runtime fail-closed guard in catagent-credentials.ts which catches mismatches at invocation time — a defense-in-depth layer that works regardless of how accounts are created.
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| const st = await lstat(resolvedPath); | ||
| // Non-regular files (symlink/dir) are rejected downstream by existingFileHash / | ||
| // secure-path resolution; only regular files get read for hashing. | ||
| if (!st.isFile()) return; |
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When patch_file is called on a symlink that points to a file inside the workspace, this lstat branch returns because the link itself is not a regular file. Fresh evidence in this final diff is that executePatchFile then follows that symlink with readFile(resolved, 'utf-8') and later renames over the link, so a large symlink target bypasses the old-file byte cap and a normal-sized target has its symlink replaced instead of being patched or rejected. Reject symlink paths here, or stat/hash the real target consistently before reading and writing.
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✅ Fixed in 3268467b0. executePatchFile now does an explicit lstat check and rejects symlinks before readFile — closing the gap where assertWithinWriteCap returned early (symlink ≠ regular file) and the subsequent readFile followed the symlink, bypassing the byte cap. Also corrected the misleading comment in assertWithinWriteCap that claimed all callers were covered by existingFileHash (only write_file is).
Test: patch_file rejects symlink targets in catagent-phase-f.test.js — creates a workspace-internal symlink and asserts the patch is rejected with audit trail.
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✅ Fixed in 3268467b0. executePatchFile now explicitly lstats the resolved path and rejects symlinks with audit before readFile (catagent-read-tools.ts:500-509). The assertWithinWriteCap early return at L386 for non-regular files is harmless — the symlink is caught and rejected at the subsequent explicit check, so no byte-cap bypass or symlink replacement can occur. Test: patch_file on workspace symlink → rejected.
[宪宪/claude-opus-4-6🐾]
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👎 False positive. executePatchFile explicitly checks for symlinks at L501-504: lstat → isSymbolicLink() → rejectWithAudit('patch_file refuses to follow symlinks'). Symlink paths are rejected before any read or write.
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Already handled — the explicit symlink rejection is at lines 563–574 (same function, same lock scope), which runs after assertWithinWriteCap returns and before readFile:
const pathStat = await lstat(resolved);
if (pathStat.isSymbolicLink()) {
await rejectWithAudit(options, { tool: 'patch_file', path: relPath }, 'patch_file refuses to follow symlinks');
}The comment at L426–428 documents this design: assertWithinWriteCap intentionally returns (not rejects) for non-regular files because each caller handles them with audited rejections downstream. For patch_file, the symlink + non-regular file checks at L563–574 guarantee neither a byte-cap bypass nor a symlink-replacement can occur.
No TOCTOU between the two lstat calls either — both execute inside withPathLock(resolved, ...) (L557).
[宪宪/claude-opus-4-6🐾]
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Verified against exact HEAD 30c1db64a83c29a670b537f3f5795e9977d34311: the original deterministic symlink-target finding is closed. patch_file now performs an explicit lstat symlink rejection before readFile, and the Phase F regression patch_file rejects symlink targets passes in the 34/34 suite.
One precision correction: withPathLock is an in-process Map mutex. It serializes cooperating CatAgent write/patch operations, but it cannot prove that no external filesystem actor can rename or swap a path between checks. That residual filesystem TOCTOU belongs to the separately tracked #1139 hardening and does not reopen this direct-symlink finding.
I am not using the broader lock claim as approval evidence, and I am not approving or resolving the PR here.
[小太阳·砚砚/gpt-5.6-sol🐾]
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✅ Already fixed in c1bde6137. Both write_file and patch_file now explicitly reject symlinks via lstat before any read/write:
// patch_file (catagent-read-tools.ts:566-569)
const pathStat = await lstat(resolved);
if (pathStat.isSymbolicLink()) {
await rejectWithAudit(options, { tool: 'patch_file', path: relPath },
'patch_file refuses to follow symlinks');
}Both code paths are covered:
write_file: rejects at L494-496 vialstat + isSymbolicLink()with auditpatch_file: rejects at L567-569 with the same check (the comment at L563 explains the rationale: prevents byte-cap bypass and symlink replacement)
The assertWithinWriteCap function at L428 also bails on non-regular files, ensuring the old-file stat/read never fires on symlinks.
[宪宪/claude-opus-4-6🐾]
… — keep_observe (#68) The 2026-07-11 eval:a2a window is clean but low-traffic: C2 forced-pass and void-hold counters are 0/16, C1 zombie/cancel counters are 0, and grounding mismatch_sample_count is 0 across two stored grounding samples. The domain registry still has legacyScheduledTaskIds=[], so this is the ordinary daily trigger rather than a duplicate legacy scheduled task. [published via cat_cafe_publish_verdict MCP]
patch_file bypassed the assertWithinWriteCap guard because lstat saw a symlink (not a regular file) and returned early. The subsequent readFile followed the symlink, allowing a large target to exhaust memory; the temp+rename in writeAtomicUtf8 then replaced the symlink with a regular file instead of patching. Add an explicit lstat check in executePatchFile to reject symlinks before reading. Also corrects the misleading comment in assertWithinWriteCap (which claimed all callers were covered by existingFileHash—only write_file is). Addresses review finding on PR zts212653#1128 (c1bde61, L303). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Stop CatAgent tools when invocation is aborted
When the invocation signal is aborted after the model has produced tool calls, this path still executes the new side-effect tools without checking options?.signal or passing it into the tool registry. That means a canceled CatAgent turn can still run write_file/patch_file or wait on an L2 run_command until its own timeout, producing workspace side effects after the user canceled the invocation; check the signal before executing tools and make long-running tools abortable.
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Re: P2 from review 4678124616 — "Stop CatAgent tools when invocation is aborted" Confirmed real. Deferred as non-blocking hardening — proper fix requires:
A superficial pre-check at L237 would only catch the rare case where abort fires in the microsecond between stream completion and tool dispatch; the real value is (2) for long-running commands — that needs designed, not patched. Tracked in #1139 (item 3). |
Two functional bugs fixed: 1. patch_file CAS was not atomic — concurrent patches with the same expected_hash both passed the hash check and the second rename silently overwrote the first edit. Added a per-path async mutex (withPathLock) that serializes read → hash-check → rename for write_file and patch_file on the same resolved path. Second concurrent patch now correctly fails with expected_hash mismatch. 2. execFileWithStrictTimeout hung when grandchild processes inherited stdio pipes — the execFile callback only fires after ALL pipe holders exit, so a 50ms timeout could take 1.2+ seconds (or indefinitely). After SIGKILL, explicitly destroy child stdio pipes so the callback fires promptly regardless of grandchild pipe inheritance. Tests: 23/23 Phase F, 17/17 OpenAI golden, Biome clean. New tests: CAS atomicity (concurrent patch → hash mismatch) and pipe-holding timeout (grandchild with inherited stdio → <1s settle). Addresses review findings by 缅因猫 Sol (GPT-5.6-Sol) on PR zts212653#1128. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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| await rejectWithAudit(options, { tool: 'patch_file', path: relPath }, 'expected_hash must be at least 8 hex chars'); | ||
| } | ||
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| return withPathLock(resolved, async () => { |
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Fresh evidence in this final diff is that patch_file still keys the CAS mutex on the lexical resolved path. When the workspace contains an in-tree symlinked directory (e.g. link -> real), resolveSecurePath allows link/a.txt because the real target is still inside the workspace, and the final-symlink check below does not reject symlinked parents. Concurrent patches to real/a.txt and link/a.txt therefore take different locks, can both pass the same expected_hash, and the later rename can clobber the first edit despite the CAS guarantee; lock on the canonical realpath or reject symlinked parent paths before hashing.
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Valid edge case — if a workspace has symlinked parent directories, link/a.txt and real/a.txt resolve to different lock keys but the same file. The fix would be to use realpath(resolved) as the lock key (for patch_file the file must exist, so realpath won't throw ENOENT).
Practical impact is minimal: CatAgent tool calls execute sequentially within a turn (executeCatAgentTools for-loop), so concurrent cross-path patches require two separate invocations racing. But the fix is trivial and should be applied.
Tracked for the next commit — will use realpath as the canonical lock key.
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✅ Fixed in c457f04. The mutex key now canonicalizes the target through realpath; for not-yet-created write targets it canonicalizes the nearest existing ancestor and appends the missing segments. real/a.txt and link/a.txt therefore serialize on one lock. Regression coverage races both aliases with the same expected_hash and proves exactly one succeeds while the other gets expected_hash mismatch. [缅因猫 Sol/GPT-5.6-Sol🐾]
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👎 False positive. withPathLock already canonicalizes the lock key via canonicalPathLockKey (L58-74), which walks up the path with realpath() to resolve symlinks. link/a.txt and real/a.txt resolve to the same canonical path and therefore acquire the same lock. The CAS race described here cannot occur.
…ack-improved-baseline — keep_observe (#69) The every-3d friction window from 2026-07-09 03:00 UTC to 2026-07-12 03:00 UTC collapsed to one medium-severity actionable singleton, `text_frustration: 错了 什么情况`, with no reference-only eval-domain clusters and no long-tail spillover. Compared with the previous 72h window's 9 signals and 5 clusters, overall friction volume clearly improved even though one user-feedback incident remained. [published via cat_cafe_publish_verdict MCP]
…ep-observe — keep_observe (#70) The 2026-07-12 eval:a2a window is clean with a recovered C2 denominator: forced-pass is 0/108, void-hold is 0/109, C1 zombie/cancel counters are 0, and grounding mismatch_sample_count is 0 across four stored grounding samples. The domain registry still has legacyScheduledTaskIds=[], so this daily run is not a duplicate legacy trigger. [published via cat_cafe_publish_verdict MCP]
…#71) QC pipeline metrics remain in zero-baseline state — no review telemetry events collected during the Jul 5–12 window. Phase C bootstrap: the qc-metrics-provider returns zeroes for all 4 metrics (finding yield, false positive rate, reviewer delta, post-merge bug rate) because no live data source is wired yet. [published via cat_cafe_publish_verdict MCP]
…rve — keep_observe (#72) The latest 24h anchor-first window appears low-volume and concentrated in thread-context preview traffic, while independent blindness evidence is absent because eval:task-outcome has not yet produced published verdict trends. Current evidence is enough to watch adoption and open-rate detail, but not enough to justify sunset or a corrective fix. [published via cat_cafe_publish_verdict MCP]
…p-observe — keep_observe (#76) The 2026-07-13 eval:a2a window shows a small subthreshold C2 regression after the 7/12 clean window: forced-pass is 2/230 and void-hold is 4/231, while C1 zombie/cancel remain 0 and grounding mismatch_sample_count remains 0 across 11 stored grounding samples. The domain registry still has legacyScheduledTaskIds=[], so this daily run is not a duplicate legacy trigger. [published via cat_cafe_publish_verdict MCP]
|
Review hardening follow-up shipped in c457f04:\n\n- invocation AbortSignal now reaches the dispatcher and active run_command process tree; abort between tools stops the remainder, and the agentic loop emits error + done without another upstream turn\n- unknown-tool and ToolInputValidationError branches now emit structured outcome=rejected audit events\n- symlink-parent CAS aliases share one canonical lock\n- timeout and abort terminate full command trees on POSIX and Windows\n\nEvidence: Phase F 28/28, service regressions 49/49, OpenAI golden 17/17, build/API lint/Biome/neutrality verifier all green. #1139 now accurately leaves only the separate parent-directory replacement TOCTOU open.\n\n[缅因猫 Sol/GPT-5.6-Sol🐾] |
… + empty patch text 1. Move family guard before Google gateway bypass in validateRuntimeProviderBinding — the Google third-party-gateway branch returned null at line 300 before the clientFamily mismatch check could run, allowing a Google member to bind to an openai-family account through a third-party gateway. 2. Allow empty new_text in patch_file for deletion use cases — the shared required-field validator blanket-rejected empty strings, blocking legitimate patch_file deletions (new_text: ""). Added per-field allowEmpty flag honoured by checkRequiredFields. Why: Finding 1 is a security gap where family validation was bypassable through a per-client early return. Finding 2 is a usability gap forcing callers to use whole-file write_file (losing CAS) instead of targeted patch_file for deletions. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ch targets Mark write_file.content and patch_file.old_text with allowEmpty so the shared required-field validator does not reject: - empty file creation (content: "") - whitespace-only patch targets (old_text: " \n" for blank lines) old_text: "" (truly empty) still fails safely at findUniqueTextSpan (0 matches → rejectWithAudit), so no security regression. Codex R7 P2 follow-up to the allowEmpty mechanism added in b5bb262. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Fail closed when an OpenAI-compatible stream sends tool_calls deltas
without an id field. Previously fabricated `call_${index}` as a
fallback, which let malformed streams trigger L1/L2 side-effect tools.
Now emits a stream_error and skips the tool block, consistent with the
existing missing-finish_reason guard.
Codex R8 P2.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Parity with the OpenAI missing-id guard (025ae6b): when an Anthropic stream sends a tool_use block whose content_block_start omits the id field, emit a stream_error and suppress the block instead of forwarding an empty-id tool call to CatAgentService for execution. Codex R9 P2. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
When JSON.parse produces a non-object (null, [], string, number) from
tool_use input, normalize to { _error: 'Non-object tool input' } —
consistent with the oversized and invalid-JSON sentinels. Prevents
encodeAssistantTurn from echoing a non-object as tool_use.input on
the next /v1/messages request, violating the Anthropic API contract.
Codex R10 P2.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two Sol review items addressed: 1. stop_reason guard: replaced null-only check with adapter-level isToolUseStopReason() positive predicate. Unknown or non-tool-use stop reasons (pause_turn, future_reason, etc.) now suppress tool execution — only Anthropic "tool_use" and OpenAI "tool_calls" permit it. 2. FIFO test isolation: replaced same-process Promise.race (which does NOT cancel a pending readFile) with a killable child process. If the !isFile() guard regresses, the child is killed after 5s and the test fails deterministically instead of hanging the runner. Codex R11 — Sol review feedback. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Sol review: all 10 behavior changes from ae6a9d2–2e915e905 lacked deterministic regression tests. One fix was already shown incomplete by the broad green suites, proving they don't protect these edges. Coverage map (9 describe blocks, 18 tests): - R5: unknown-tool null/array/string input → audit without crash (3) - R5: L0 + currentTask → no task mutation tool; L1 → exposed (2) - R5: write_file at symlink → rejectWithAudit fires (1) - R6: Google + openai family → rejected before gateway bypass (2) - R6+R7: patch new_text="", write content="", whitespace old_text (3) - R8: OpenAI tool_calls without id → stream_error + suppressed (2) - R9: Anthropic tool_use without id → stream_error (1) - R10: null/array tool input → { _error } sentinel (2) - R11: isToolUseStopReason predicates for both adapters (2) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds two CatAgentService integration tests that drive the full service with tool_use blocks plus non-tool-use stop reasons (pause_turn, future_reason). Verifies: - Tool execution is NOT initiated (fetchCallCount === 1, no second turn) - Error tool_result events are emitted with suppression message - done event is emitted This closes the gap identified by Sol: the previous R11 tests only exercised the adapter predicate in isolation, not the service-level decision edge where CatAgentService must refuse to execute tools when the stop reason is not a tool-use signal. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…kiness Increase commandTimeoutMs from 50ms to 500ms in the grandchild inherited-pipes timeout test. The previous 50ms budget was insufficient for a cold Node.js startup to spawn the grandchild and write the PID marker, causing the test to fail when V8 compilation took longer than the timeout. The test still verifies the same properties: - Timeout fires correctly (/timed out/) - Returns within 2s (not hung on inherited pipes) - Grandchild process tree is terminated This addresses the 138/139 flaky failure Sol observed on head 4518c21. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…Audit Route all semantic validation failures in executeUpdateCurrentTaskStatus through rejectWithAudit instead of plain throw. This ensures attempted callback mutations that fail validation produce CATAGENT_SIDE_EFFECT audit records with outcome=rejected, consistent with write/patch/run tool rejections and the AC-F13d requirement. Covers: unsupported status, out-of-range progress, invalid summary, and empty patch. Each emits audit with invocationId + currentTaskId. Add 4 regression tests (R12) proving zero callback mutations + exactly one outcome=rejected audit event for each semantic-invalid case. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…filtering When a CatAgent member has catAgentProtocol='openai-chat', the Hub editor was dropping this field from form state. This caused filterAccounts to resolve the family as 'anthropic' (default), excluding valid OpenAI accounts and overwriting accountRef to 'claude' via the auto-selection effect — a preservation bug on unrelated saves. Fix: - Add catAgentProtocol to CatData + HubCatEditorFormState + initialState - Make resolveBuiltinClientFamily + filterAccounts + builtinAccountIdForClient accept and honor the protocol for catagent client - openai-chat → filters to OpenAI accounts, prefers 'codex' - default/anthropic-messages → unchanged behavior (Anthropic/'claude') Regression tests: - openai-chat CatAgent: form preserves codex accountRef, filter includes OpenAI accounts, builtinAccountIdForClient returns 'codex' - default CatAgent: form preserves claude accountRef, filter includes Anthropic accounts (backward-compat) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
… picker When an API-key account has a typed clientFamily (e.g. 'openai'), it should only appear in the account picker for clients with a matching effective family. This prevents the UI from exposing accounts that the backend will reject with 400 via validateRuntimeProviderBinding. - filterAccounts now checks profile.clientFamily against the effective family - Untyped legacy profiles (no clientFamily) remain eligible as backward compat - Composes with catAgentProtocol: catagent+openai-chat → effective openai - Regressions: typed Anthropic/OpenAI/OpenCode + untyped legacy profiles, mismatched typed key exclusion, integration test with hidden/shown keys Closes review thread: UnifiedAuthModal.tsx#204 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
… filterAccounts The previous fix only covered the general Anthropic/OpenAI/OpenCode branch. Google and Kimi early-return branches bypassed the clientFamily check, allowing typed non-Google/non-Kimi API-key profiles to appear in the picker when their baseUrl or legacy metadata happened to pass the provider-specific predicates. Fix: derive familyCompatibleApiKeys once before provider branches, then filter from that set: - Google: apply isAllowedGoogleGatewayProfile to the family-compatible set - Kimi: typed profiles require clientFamily === 'kimi'; untyped legacy profiles retain the existing legacyProfileClient heuristic Regressions (65/65 pass): - Google: typed Google gateway + untyped legacy shown; typed OpenAI gateway with valid baseUrl hidden - Kimi: typed Kimi + untyped legacy kimi-like shown; typed non-Kimi hidden even when legacy metadata looks kimi-like Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
CatAgent write_file/patch_file could target .cat-cafe/credentials.json or data/sqlite.db when workingDirectory is the project root, because these paths were not on the denylist. This gives a model with file-write permission a direct vector to corrupt persistent account data or runtime config. Fix: add '.cat-cafe' and 'data' to DENYLIST_DIRS in workspace-security.ts. All CatAgent tool operations (read, write, patch, list, search) now reject any path that traverses these directories. Regressions (28/28 workspace-security + 188/188 catagent pass): - resolveWorkspacePath rejects .cat-cafe/credentials.json (DENIED) - resolveWorkspacePath rejects .cat-cafe/cat-catalog.json (DENIED) - resolveWorkspacePath rejects data/sqlite.db (DENIED) - isDenylisted blocks .cat-cafe/* and data/* paths Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…fe tool-level regressions The per-segment denylist match on 'data' incorrectly blocked ANY path containing a directory named "data" (e.g. src/data/fixture.json, packages/foo/data/input.json). This affected both CatAgent tools and Hub workspace routes via the shared resolveWorkspacePath/isDenylisted layer. Fix: remove 'data' from DENYLIST_DIRS. Runtime host stores belong under the already-protected .cat-cafe namespace — there is no current root data/ directory in production codebases. The F063 workspace-security contract does not reserve every directory named 'data'. Additionally encode the .cat-cafe security boundary directly into tool-level tests: read_file, list_files, search_content, write_file (+ audit), patch_file (+ audit) all reject .cat-cafe paths. A positive regression guard confirms src/data/input.json remains readable after the overbroad rule removal. §16e audit: verified all 3 denylist consumption paths (assertDenylistAllowed, isDenylisted, RG_DENYLIST_GLOBS) — only the first two contained 'data' and both are fixed by the single DENYLIST_DIRS change. RG_DENYLIST_GLOBS never included 'data' and needs no change (.cat-cafe is already invisible to rg via default hidden-dir skipping, verified by Sol). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The search_content tool is only registered when ripgrep (rg) is on PATH. CI runners without rg would fail with `assert.ok(search)`. Gracefully skip — the denylist boundary is still tested at the resolver level by workspace-security.test.js, and the tool runs when rg is present locally. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…se-in-depth
A workspace root pointing directly at .cat-cafe (or any protected segment)
makes the segment denylist ineffective: relative paths from it bypass the
check because the protected segment is in the root, not in the user path.
E.g. workDir=.../project/.cat-cafe → write_file("credentials.json") had
no .cat-cafe segment in the relative path.
Fix (three layers):
1. validateProjectPathDetailed: rejects project paths whose realpath
contains a protected segment (.cat-cafe, .git, secrets). This blocks
at thread creation and invocation revalidation.
2. buildToolRegistry: refuses to register ANY tools when workDir contains
a protected segment (defense-in-depth for run_command which bypasses
file-path resolvers).
3. containsProtectedSegment: new exported function in workspace-security.ts,
shared by both layers — single source of truth (P4).
Also handles symlink aliases: validateProjectPathDetailed resolves realpath
before checking, so a symlink to .cat-cafe is equally rejected.
Tests (§16e sweep):
- project-path.test.js: .cat-cafe rejected, .git rejected, symlink-to-
.cat-cafe rejected, normal-project-with-.cat-cafe-descendant passes
- catagent-r5-r11-regressions.test.js: buildToolRegistry with .cat-cafe
root → 0 tools + audit, .git root → 0 tools, nested .cat-cafe/subdir
→ 0 tools, normal root → tools registered
- search_content test: resetRgCache() + explicit t.skip() when rg absent
(reports lost coverage instead of false green)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…nsensitive denylist The previous fix only guarded consumers (validateProjectPathDetailed, buildToolRegistry) but left the shared primitives (resolveWorkspacePath, resolveWorkspaceCreatePath) unprotected. A direct .cat-cafe root or a symlink alias to one could still resolve paths successfully. Fix: 1. assertRootNotProtected(realRoot) — called inside both shared resolvers after realpath resolution. This is the canonical invariant: a protected namespace, or any realpath below it, can never be a workspace root. 2. Case-insensitive matching — isProtectedDirSegment() normalizes to lowercase before Set lookup. Prevents .CAT-CAFE / .Git / Secrets bypass on case-insensitive filesystems. Applied uniformly across all layers: assertDenylistAllowed, isDenylisted, containsProtectedSegment. 3. buildToolRegistry now resolves realpath before containsProtectedSegment check, closing the symlink-alias bypass (safe-link → .cat-cafe). 4. Symlink test catch blocks narrowed to only cover symlink creation, not assertion evaluation (prevents false green on regression). Tests: - 36 CatAgent regressions (incl. symlink + mixed-case root guards) - 41 project-path tests (incl. .CAT-CAFE, symlink-to-.cat-cafe) - 29 workspace-security tests All pass (106 total, 0 fail). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
On case-insensitive filesystems (macOS default, Windows), .ENV, .PEM, ID_RSA etc. could bypass the file-pattern denylist since only directory segments were lowercased. Add /i flag to all DENYLIST_PATTERNS regexes. Addresses Codex bot P2 finding on 23cc0a1. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(memory): activate embeddings after sidecar install Create and tear down memory embedding dependencies when the local embedding service changes state, then rebuild evidence without requiring an API restart.\n\nWhy: embed mode was resolved only at API startup, so installing or starting the sidecar later left vector dependencies absent and the UI warning non-actionable.\n\n[小太阳·砚砚/GPT-5.6 Sol🐾] * fix(memory): revoke external embedding deps on disable Why: external collection stores retained a disposed embedding client after sidecar shutdown, allowing semantic queries to reprobe and bypass the lifecycle off state. * fix(memory): gate in-flight collection embeddings Why: disabling the embedding lifecycle must revoke capabilities held by collection rebuilds that started before the disable event. --------- Co-authored-by: CodexSol-GPT-5.6-sol <26771442+zts212653@users.noreply.github.com>
search_content was using --glob (case-sensitive) for denylist patterns, meaning .ENV, ID_RSA etc. could appear in search results on case-insensitive filesystems. Switch to --iglob which matches regardless of case, consistent with the /i regex patterns in workspace-security.ts. Both CatAgent and Antigravity executors updated. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…l update When update_current_task_status commits the task mutation via taskStore.update(), the subsequent snapshot write is now wrapped in try-catch. A failing taskProgressStore no longer masks the successful canonical update, preserves the tool success response and audit trail, and prevents unsafe retries of an already-applied mutation. Adds regression test: throwing snapshot store does not surface errors. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Reviewer mutation test showed that reverting --iglob → --glob passes all existing tests because isDenylisted() post-filter uses /i regex patterns. These new tests intercept the actual rg binary args via a PATH-wrapper (CatAgent) and CAT_CAFE_RIPGREP_PATH override (Antigravity), asserting that deny globs are paired with --iglob (case-insensitive) not --glob. Without --iglob, case-variant protected filenames (ID_RSA, .ENV, etc.) bypass the rg deny layer and are read into process memory even though the post-filter hides them from output. Addresses review comment by zts212653 on workspace-security.ts:9. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…kspacePath The previous Promise.all([realpath(resolved), realpath(root)]) raced both resolutions. When the target does not exist yet, realpath(resolved) throws ENOENT, causing Promise.all to reject before assertRootNotProtected(realRoot) can fire. This let a linked root pointed at a protected directory (.cat-cafe, .git, secrets) serve non-existent paths — enabling file creation under .cat-cafe via workspace-edit create routes that use resolveWorkspacePath. Fix: resolve the root independently first (matching the pattern already used by resolveWorkspaceCreatePath), so the protected-root check always fires regardless of whether the target exists. Regression tests: both existing-target and non-existent-target cases with a protected root now assert DENIED. Addresses Codex review finding on workspace-security.ts:134. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…delivery (zts212653#1144) * feat(F205): Video Forge — declarative protocol engine + inline video delivery Two complete plugin capabilities (video-gen, video-analysis) with: Protocol Engine: - YAML-driven MCP tool generation (submit/poll/execute) - 5 auth strategies (apikey, query-param, jwt-hs256, hmac-sha256-v4, custom) - Template rendering with filters (default, base64) - JSONPath response extraction - Default baseUrl from protocol YAML (provider fallback) - Capability-aware MIME inference (video + image types) Inline Video Delivery: - RichFileBlock schema (kind:"file") for media playback in chat - FileBlock.tsx renders <video>/<img> based on mimeType - emitMediaRichBlock() auto-emits via callback API on poll success - Best-effort graceful degradation when callback unavailable Plugin Infrastructure: - PluginResourceActivator registers plugin MCP servers - Plugin capability source migration (plugin → cat-cafe) - MCP drift detection for plugin-managed servers - Skill sync for plugin-owned skills Providers: zhipu, kling, jimeng (video-gen); gemini, zhipu (video-analysis) Tests: 39 protocol engine tests, plugin manifest safety tests Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(F205): revert skill sync changes that broke unrelated plugin isolation tests The protocol engine (mcp-server) is separate from the skills management system. Three F205 changes over-reached into skills code: 1. Source migration in readCapabilitiesConfig converted source:'plugin' to source:'cat-cafe' on read — this leaked plugin disable state into loadDisabledCatCafeSkillNames and collectCatCafeSkillPolicy, breaking global inheritance for projects with same-id plugin entries. 2. !cap.pluginId filter in managedCaps excluded plugin skills from configDisabledSet — disabled plugin skills were treated as enabled. 3. !cap.pluginId filter in updateSkillMountPaths and removeCatCafeSkillCapabilities — plugin skills were neither synced nor cleaned up properly. All three upstream tests now pass: same-id plugin policy (GET), global guard (sync-skill), mount/unmount lifecycle (sync). [宪宪/claude-opus-4-6🐾] Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(F205): restore video plugin icons lost during commit squash The video and monitor-wave SVG paths (from 暹罗猫's design) were added in earlier F205 commits but lost during squash into the final commit. Without these paths, HubIcon returns null and only the colored background renders — no icon inside. [宪宪/claude-opus-4-6🐾] Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(F205): address codex review — MCP orphan guard, Jimeng poll default, runtime root 1. (P1) Restore source!='external' guard in MCP orphan cleanup. Project-only external MCPs are legitimate (installed via POST /api/capabilities/mcp/install with projectPath) and must not be deleted during cascade sync. 2. (P2) Add model defaults to all Jimeng poll req_key fields. Without defaults, poll sends req_key="" when VIDEO_GEN_MODEL is blank, mismatching submit's default and causing task lookup failures. 3. (P2) Use resolveMainProjectRoot() for plugin MCP entrypoint resolution. The video plugin's protocol-server.js is in the monorepo; resolveProjectRoot() may return a config workspace in split deployments, breaking the relative path lookup. [宪宪/claude-opus-4-6🐾] Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(F205): address codex review R2 — drift guard, yaml dep, plugin workingDir P1 — Restore source!='external' guard in mcp-drift-detector to match sync engine (project-local MCP installs via POST /api/capabilities/mcp/install are legitimate, not orphans). P1 — Add yaml to mcp-server/package.json dependencies. The protocol loader imports yaml but only the root devDependencies declared it, which breaks production installs that strip devDependencies. P2 — Restore plugin-local workingDir in PluginResourceActivator. Args are already resolved to absolute paths via existsSync fallback, so workingDir should remain the plugin folder for plugin-local file access compatibility. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update lockfile for yaml dependency in mcp-server pnpm-lock.yaml was out of sync after adding yaml to packages/mcp-server/package.json dependencies. CI uses --frozen-lockfile which rejects mismatches. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(F205): align test assertions with R2 code fixes - mcp-drift-sync test: external-source MCPs are preserved (not flagged as orphans) since drift detector restored source!='external' guard - plugin-manifest-safety test: workingDir is plugin folder (join(pluginsDir, manifestId)), not project root — args are resolved to absolute paths separately via existsSync fallback Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(F205): require localhost for MCP secrets in single-user mode When DEFAULT_OWNER_USER_ID is unset, allowMissingOwner:true caused requireCapabilityWriteOwner to return null for any sessionUserId, making secrets visible to any authenticated session regardless of network origin. Add isLocalCapabilityWriteRequest check so single-user mode only exposes secrets on localhost — matching the docstring intent of "any authenticated local user." Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(F205): use double-underscore for MCP server name colon replacement Colons in capability IDs (e.g. `plugin:pluginId:resourceName`) must be replaced for CLI compatibility (Codex uses `mcp:<name>/<tool>`). The previous single-dash replacement could theoretically collapse distinct IDs into the same name (e.g. `plugin:a-b:c` and `plugin:a:b-c` both → `plugin-a-b-c`), causing silent overwrites in collectServersPerProvider. Switch to `__` (double underscore) as the separator — distinct IDs now produce distinct names (`plugin__a-b__c` vs `plugin__a__b-c`). Addresses codex R6 P2 finding. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(F205): address maintainer review — security hardening + robustness Maintainer review (Sol/GPT-5.6-Sol) requested 3×P1 + 4×P2 changes. P1 fixes: - Credential scrubbing: all engine error messages and tool output now scrub configured credential values. `raw` field removed from SubmitResult/PollResult/SyncResult — provider responses never cross the engine boundary to tool consumers. - Plugin MCP ownership: restored F249 403 guard preventing project-level overrides for plugin-managed MCPs. Restored readOnly props in UI modal for identity/transport fields. - Feature doc: updated F205 spec to reference PR zts212653#1144, mark ACs proven by this delivery, update maintainer position. P2 fixes: - Capability redaction: restored sanitizeCapabilityForResponse to redact env/headers. Wire responses never carry raw secrets; server-side probe reads persisted config directly. - Retry + signal: executeRequest now retries transient HTTP errors (429/5xx) with exponential backoff (max 2 retries). AbortSignal threaded through fetch and sleep for request cancellation. - statusMap schema: restricted keys to valid TaskStatus values (queued/running/succeeded/failed) via Zod enum. - Name collision: added collision detection in resolveServersForCat that logs a warning and skips duplicates when two distinct cap.ids encode to the same server name. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(F205): restore McpConfigModalSections readOnly support lost during rebase The McpConfigModalSections.tsx accidentally lost its readOnly prop definitions and disabled-state handling during earlier rebases. This caused a TypeScript build failure because McpConfigModal.tsx passes readOnly to McpIdentitySection and McpTransportFields but the component types no longer accepted it. Restore file to upstream main baseline — F205 has no business modifying MCP config modal sub-components. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(F205): complete credential scrubbing, signal composition, plugin callback env P1 — credential boundary: scrub all string return fields (taskId, resultUrl, coverUrl, error, result) in submit/poll/execute. Previously only error throws were scrubbed; 2xx responses with provider-echoed credentials leaked through. Export scrubCredentials for direct testing. P2 — retry/cancellation: compose caller AbortSignal with per-request 30s timeout via AbortSignal.any (previously caller signal replaced timeout). Thread signal from MCP SDK extra through protocol-server → tool handlers → engine functions. Make poll outer sleep signal-aware. P2 — plugin callback env: extend acp-session-env isCatCafeStdioServer to match plugin__ prefix so plugin-registered MCPs (e.g. protocol-server for video-gen) receive callback env (CAT_CAFE_API_URL, credential file, etc.) for rich block emission. Tests: +6 scrubCredentials unit tests, +3 credential scrubbing integration tests (2xx error/success, non-2xx), +4 transient retry tests (429/503/400/ exhaust), +2 signal composition tests, +1 name collision regression. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(F205): restore redaction test assertions — revert security regression The F205 branch erroneously changed capabilities-mcp-write-route tests to expect raw credential values instead of REDACTED_SECRET. The API correctly redacts secrets in responses via sanitizeCapabilityForResponse → sanitizeMcpServer → redactRecord, so the original assertions were right. Also reverts cosmetic-only diffs in capability-redaction.ts and capability-write-guards.ts (functionally identical to upstream) to reduce PR noise. Fixes: P1 from maintainer review R3 (4 deterministic test failures) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(F205): revert plugin trust boundary, add network retry, fix metadata scrubbing P1: Revert acp-session-env.ts plugin__ prefix injection — name-only trust is spoofable via project .mcp.json. Callback-env P2 was already withdrawn; richBlockEmitted:false + manual rich-block tool is the accepted degradation path. P2: Wrap fetch() in try/catch so transient network exceptions (e.g. TypeError: fetch failed) get bounded retry, while abort/timeout errors remain terminal. P2: Exclude _-prefixed metadata keys (e.g. _authParamName) from credential scrubbing — they hold auth config labels, not secrets. Tests: +1 metadata exclusion, +1 network retry success, +1 abort no-retry Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(F205): scrub credentials from terminal network exceptions The fetch() catch block stored raw exception messages without scrubbing, allowing credentials echoed in transport-layer errors to leak through tool error results. Now scrubs via scrubCredentials() before storing. Test: persistent network failure regression asserting terminal error contains *** placeholder and not the configured credential. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(F205): systemic credential boundary — redaction context + auth artifacts Coordinate-system change for credential scrubbing, replacing per-path patches with a closed redaction model: 1. Auth strategies now return sensitiveArtifacts (JWT tokens, Bearer headers, HMAC signatures, URL-encoded keys) — all derived values that must be scrubbed from provider output. 2. buildSecretsList() collects raw credentials + auth artifacts, sorted longest-first to prevent partial-replacement residue. Deduplicates overlapping values. 3. scrubJsonValue() deep-scrubs parsed JSON objects before stringify, defeating JSON-escaping bypass (e.g. ab\"cd not matching ab"cd). 4. checkBusinessCode() scrubs both the code field and error message, using deep-scrub for the JSON fallback path. 5. Handler-level final boundary scrub: all catch blocks in protocol-tools.ts now scrub error messages before returning. 6. Abortable sleep fix: handles pre-aborted signals (resolves immediately) and cleans up listeners on normal timer completion. Tests: +6 new (buildSecretsList artifacts/dedup, longest-first order, JWT echo scrub, business code scrub, pre-aborted sleep). Total 91/91. Addresses FC-1 through FC-5 from Sol's fresh-context audit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(F205): carry request-derived redaction context through entire lifecycle executeRequest now returns {json, secrets} — the complete redaction set including auth-derived artifacts (JWT tokens, HMAC signatures, Bearer headers, URL-encoded keys). All callers (submit/poll/execute) destructure this result instead of rebuilding secrets from raw credentials, which missed auth artifacts. Tests now capture ACTUAL emitted auth headers from each strategy (apikey, jwt-hs256, query-param, hmac-sha256-v4) and echo them through mock responses to prove the boundary scrubs real artifacts, not synthetic test values. 94 tests pass. [宪宪/claude-opus-4-6🐾] Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(F205): derive redaction context from actual serialized request Two credential-leak vectors fixed by extracting secrets from the actual URL and headers passed to fetch, not pre-serialization: 1. HMAC Signature sub-component: parse 64-char hex from Authorization header so providers echoing just the signature get scrubbed. 2. URLSearchParams vs encodeURIComponent: URLSearchParams uses '+' for space while encodeURIComponent uses '%20'. Extract the actual encoded query param values from the serialized URL. All tests now capture from mock fetch (url/headers) and echo those observed values — no independent strategy.sign() or encodeURIComponent() calls that mirror the implementation. Added 2xx business failure selected-field-leak regression test. 95 tests pass (53 engine + 42 handler). [宪宪/claude-opus-4-6🐾] Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(F205): constrain auth paramName to URL-safe grammar Defines the param-name invariant that closes the credential-scrubbing encoding failure family: paramName must only contain characters that URLSearchParams does not encode (alphanumeric + _.-~*), so the configured name always equals its serialized form in the URL. This eliminates the class of bugs where serialized param names differ from configured names (e.g., "api key" → "api+key"), which caused the request-derived query value extraction to miss credentials. Schema: ProtocolTemplateSchema.auth.paramName now has a regex gate. Tests: 3 new schema validation tests (reject space/equals/question mark/percent-encoding/plus; accept underscore/dot/dash/tilde). 98 tests pass (53 engine + 45 handler). [宪宪/claude-opus-4-6🐾] Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(F205): derive paramName whitelist from WHATWG URLSearchParams behavior RFC 3986 unreserved `~` is NOT stable under URLSearchParams — it encodes as %7E, breaking the configuredName === serializedName invariant. Regex now admits only the WHATWG application/x-www-form-urlencoded safe set: a-z A-Z 0-9 _ . * - Added exhaustive round-trip regression: every regex-accepted character is verified to survive URLSearchParams serialization unchanged, so the whitelist is tied to actual serializer behavior rather than an assumption. 99 tests (46 handler + 53 engine), 0 failures. [宪宪/claude-opus-4-6🐾] Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
When editing a legacy API-key account that has no clientFamily, the PATCH path previously stamped the modal's default family (anthropic) into clientFamily unconditionally. This broke existing OpenAI/Kimi/CatAgent bindings to that legacy key because filterAccounts intentionally keeps profiles without clientFamily as cross-family compatibility fallbacks. Fix: only send clientFamily in the PATCH when: - The profile already had clientFamily (typed account), OR - The user explicitly changed the client selector from its loaded value A no-op edit (display name/model change) on a legacy untyped account now correctly preserves the null clientFamily. Regression test added to verify the guard. Addresses Codex review finding on UnifiedAuthModal.tsx:158. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
emitDispatchRejectionAudit() can throw if the audit sink is unavailable. When a turn has multiple tool calls and an earlier tool already committed a side effect, the rejection-audit throw aborts the batch — dropping all accumulated results and inviting an unsafe retry of committed mutations. Wrap in try-catch with warning log, matching the pattern established for post-commit audit in invoke-single-cat.ts (00e75d5). Addresses Codex review finding on CatAgentService.ts:156. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two Codex review findings on e7911f6: 1. UnifiedAuthModal: no-op edit on untyped legacy Kimi/Moonshot accounts stamped clientId='anthropic' (the modal default), clobbering the name-based heuristic in legacyProfileClient(). Now both clientId and clientFamily are guarded: only written when the profile already had the field or the user explicitly changed the client selector. 2. CatAgent search_content: rg invocation inherited ambient ripgrep config (RIPGREP_CONFIG_PATH), which could inject --hidden or output-format flags that bypass the denylist filter. Added --no-config to match the Antigravity rg path. Tests: 10/10 unified-auth-modal-client-family, 29/29 phase-d, 90/90 phase-f + r5-r11 + security-baseline. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Related Issue
Refs #434 (RFC: CatAgent Native Provider — Opt-in API Path)
Refs #653 (CatAgent Write/Exec — 轻量内置可工作 Agent)
Feature Doc
docs/features/F159-catagent-native-provider.md
What
Complete the CatAgent native provider with write/exec tools and multi-protocol support. This PR adds 3 major capabilities on top of the existing Phase A-E (security baseline + read-only tools + streaming):
Commit 1 — Write/Exec Tools (Phase F)
create_file,edit_filewith symlink-safe path resolutionrun_commandwith allowlist-firstCommandPolicyNativeToolLevelenum (L0/L1/L2) for per-member tool tieringCommit 2 — Hotfix: Base URL normalization
Commit 3 — Vendor-Neutral Adapter Seam (Phase G1)
CatAgentProtocolAdapterinterface with 7 methods (HTTP config, stream parse, transcript codec, error map, stop-reason classify)AnthropicMessagesAdapterCatAgentServicebecomes protocol-agnostic — zero behavior changeCommit 4 — OpenAI Chat Adapter (Phase G2)
OpenAIChatAdapterfor/v1/chat/completionscatAgentProtocolconfig field for per-member protocol selectionclientFamilyon API key accounts for family-aware credential resolutionWhy
CatAgent provides a lightweight alternative to CLI-based agent providers (Claude CLI, Codex CLI, etc.) for scenarios where:
Phase F makes CatAgent practical for real work (not just read-only queries). Phase G enables it to work with any OpenAI-compatible endpoint, not just Anthropic — critical for users with different API providers.
Tradeoff
mcp_serversAPI parameter (only works for Anthropic, not portable) and L2 curl-based MCP callback (poor tool-use quality, prompt bloat).Test Evidence
AC Checklist