Fix a few TLS compliance issues

.wolfssl_known_macro_extras

@@ -1031,6 +1031,7 @@ WOLFSSL_TI_CURRTIME
 WOLFSSL_TLS13_DRAFT
 WOLFSSL_TLS13_IGNORE_AEAD_LIMITS
 WOLFSSL_TLS13_IGNORE_PT_ALERT_ON_ENC
+WOLFSSL_TLS13_NULL_CIPHER_IN_DEFAULT
 WOLFSSL_TLS13_SHA512
 WOLFSSL_TLS13_TICKET_BEFORE_FINISHED
 WOLFSSL_TLSX_PQC_MLKEM_STORE_PRIV_KEY

src/internal.c

@@ -3731,6 +3731,15 @@ static word16 InitSuites_Tls13(Suites* suites, word16 idx, int tls1_3,
 #endif
 
 #ifdef HAVE_NULL_CIPHER
+    /* RFC 9150 integrity-only (zero-confidentiality) TLS 1.3 suites.
+     * These provide authentication and integrity but no confidentiality, so
+     * they are NOT advertised in the default cipher preference list. A caller
+     * that genuinely needs them (e.g. constrained/IoT deployments) must opt in
+     * explicitly with a cipher list, for example:
+     *     wolfSSL_set_cipher_list(ssl, "TLS13-SHA256-SHA256");
+     * Define WOLFSSL_TLS13_NULL_CIPHER_IN_DEFAULT to restore the legacy
+     * behaviour of including them in the default list. */
+    #ifdef WOLFSSL_TLS13_NULL_CIPHER_IN_DEFAULT
     #ifdef BUILD_TLS_SHA256_SHA256
         if (tls1_3 && haveNull) {
             suites->suites[idx++] = ECC_BYTE;
@@ -3744,6 +3753,7 @@ static word16 InitSuites_Tls13(Suites* suites, word16 idx, int tls1_3,
             suites->suites[idx++] = TLS_SHA384_SHA384;
         }
     #endif
+    #endif /* WOLFSSL_TLS13_NULL_CIPHER_IN_DEFAULT */
 #endif
 
     return idx;
@@ -32682,16 +32692,41 @@ static void MakePSKPreMasterSecret(Arrays* arrays, byte use_psk_key)
         if (ssl->options.resuming && ssl->session->ticketLen > 0) {
             SessionTicket* ticket;
 
-            ticket = TLSX_SessionTicket_Create(0, ssl->session->ticket,
+#if !defined(WOLFSSL_NO_TICKET_EXPIRE) && !defined(NO_ASN_TIME)
+            /* RFC 5077 Section 3.3 / RFC 8446 Section 4.6.1: a client SHOULD
+             * NOT use a ticket whose lifetime has expired. Drop the expired
+             * ticket and fall back to a full handshake. Skip the check when
+             * bornOn is 0 or a secret callback is set (session is managed
+             * externally, e.g. hostap). */
+            if (ssl->session->bornOn != 0 &&
+            #ifdef HAVE_SECRET_CALLBACK
+                ssl->sessionSecretCb == NULL &&
+            #endif
+                LowResTimer() >=
+                    (ssl->session->bornOn + ssl->session->timeout)) {
+                WOLFSSL_MSG("Stored session ticket expired; full handshake");
+                ssl->options.resuming = 0;
+                /* Send an empty SessionTicket extension (NULL ticket) so the
+                 * client still requests a new ticket from the server without
+                 * sending the stale one. */
+                ret = TLSX_UseSessionTicket(&ssl->extensions, NULL, ssl->heap);
+                if (ret != WOLFSSL_SUCCESS)
+                    return ret;
+            }
+            else
+#endif
+            {
+                ticket = TLSX_SessionTicket_Create(0, ssl->session->ticket,
                                              ssl->session->ticketLen, ssl->heap);
-            if (ticket == NULL) return MEMORY_E;
+                if (ticket == NULL) return MEMORY_E;
 
-            ret = TLSX_UseSessionTicket(&ssl->extensions, ticket, ssl->heap);
-            if (ret != WOLFSSL_SUCCESS) {
-                TLSX_SessionTicket_Free(ticket, ssl->heap);
-                return ret;
+                ret = TLSX_UseSessionTicket(&ssl->extensions, ticket,
+                                            ssl->heap);
+                if (ret != WOLFSSL_SUCCESS) {
+                    TLSX_SessionTicket_Free(ticket, ssl->heap);
+                    return ret;
+                }
             }
-
             idSz = 0;
         }
 #endif /* HAVE_SESSION_TICKET */
@@ -36928,6 +36963,7 @@ static int DoSessionTicket(WOLFSSL* ssl, const byte* input, word32* inOutIdx,
     {
         switch (err) {
             case WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(BUFFER_ERROR):
+            case WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(BUFFER_E):
                 return decode_error;
             case WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(EXT_NOT_ALLOWED):
             case WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(PEER_KEY_ERROR):

src/ssl.c

@@ -3326,6 +3326,16 @@ int wolfSSL_export_keying_material(WOLFSSL *ssl,
         return WOLFSSL_FAILURE;
     }
 
+    /* RFC 8446 Section 7.5 / RFC 5705: keying-material exporters derive from
+     * exporter_master_secret, which exists only after the handshake is
+     * complete. Refuse the export until the handshake has completed so that
+     * a premature call cannot derive material from an uninitialised
+     * exporterSecret buffer. */
+    if (ssl->options.handShakeDone == 0) {
+        WOLFSSL_MSG("Handshake not complete; refusing keying-material export");
+        return WOLFSSL_FAILURE;
+    }
+
     /* Sanity check contextLen to prevent integer overflow when cast to word32
      * and to ensure it fits in the 2-byte length encoding (max 65535). */
     if (use_context && contextLen > WOLFSSL_MAX_16BIT) {

tests/api.c

@@ -2512,21 +2512,44 @@ static int test_wolfSSL_set_cipher_list_exclusions(void)
     wolfSSL_free(ssl);
     ssl = NULL;
 
-    /* OpenSSL compat: "ALL" is "all but eNULL" - it does not generate NULL
-     * suites, but it is not a delete directive, so a following "eNULL"
-     * re-enables them. (The earlier sticky excludeNull-for-ALL wrongly kept
-     * them disabled; only "!eNULL"/"DEFAULT" should.) */
+    /* By default the RFC 9150 integrity-only TLS 1.3 suites are
+     * zero-confidentiality and are treated as SSL_NOT_DEFAULT:
+     * they are never produced by the generic cipher-string directives ("ALL",
+     * "eNULL", ...) and are kept out of the default preference list, so they
+     * must be requested by explicit suite name.
+     *
+     * Defining WOLFSSL_TLS13_NULL_CIPHER_IN_DEFAULT restores the legacy
+     * behaviour where the "eNULL" directive re-enables them via the generated
+     * list. "ALL" on its own never generates NULL ciphers in either mode. */
     ExpectNotNull(ssl = wolfSSL_new(ctx));
     ExpectIntEQ(wolfSSL_set_cipher_list(ssl, "ALL"), WOLFSSL_SUCCESS);
     ExpectIntEQ(test_suites_contains(ssl, ECC_BYTE,
                 TLS_SHA256_SHA256), 0); /* ALL alone: no NULL generated */
     wolfSSL_free(ssl);
     ssl = NULL;
 
+    {
+#ifdef WOLFSSL_TLS13_NULL_CIPHER_IN_DEFAULT
+        const int eNullExpectsSuite = 1;
+#else
+        const int eNullExpectsSuite = 0;
+#endif
+        ExpectNotNull(ssl = wolfSSL_new(ctx));
+        ExpectIntEQ(wolfSSL_set_cipher_list(ssl, "ALL:eNULL"),
+                    WOLFSSL_SUCCESS);
+        ExpectIntEQ(test_suites_contains(ssl, ECC_BYTE, TLS_SHA256_SHA256),
+                    eNullExpectsSuite);
+        wolfSSL_free(ssl);
+        ssl = NULL;
+    }
+
+    /* Explicit suite name remains the supported opt-in and works in both
+     * modes. */
     ExpectNotNull(ssl = wolfSSL_new(ctx));
-    ExpectIntEQ(wolfSSL_set_cipher_list(ssl, "ALL:eNULL"), WOLFSSL_SUCCESS);
+    ExpectIntEQ(wolfSSL_set_cipher_list(ssl, "TLS13-SHA256-SHA256"),
+                WOLFSSL_SUCCESS);
     ExpectIntEQ(test_suites_contains(ssl, ECC_BYTE,
-                TLS_SHA256_SHA256), 1); /* "eNULL" after "ALL" re-enables NULL */
+                TLS_SHA256_SHA256), 1);
     wolfSSL_free(ssl);
     ssl = NULL;
 #endif /* BUILD_TLS_SHA256_SHA256 */

tests/test-dtls13.conf

@@ -270,23 +270,3 @@
 -u
 -v 4
 -l TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
-
-# server DTLSv1.3 Integrity-only SHA256
--u
--v 4
--l TLS13-SHA256-SHA256
-
-# client DTLSv1.3 Integrity-only SHA256
--u
--v 4
--l TLS13-SHA256-SHA256
-
-# server DTSv1.3 Integrity-only SHA384
--u
--v 4
--l TLS13-SHA384-SHA384
-
-# client DTLSv1.3 Integrity-only SHA384
--u
--v 4
--l TLS13-SHA384-SHA384

tests/test-tls13.conf

@@ -213,19 +213,3 @@
 # client TLSv1.3 Send Ticket explicitly
 -v 4
 -l TLS13-AES128-GCM-SHA256
-
-# server TLSv1.3 Integrity-only SHA256
--v 4
--l TLS13-SHA256-SHA256
-
-# client TLSv1.3 Integrity-only SHA256
--v 4
--l TLS13-SHA256-SHA256
-
-# server TLSv1.3 Integrity-only SHA384
--v 4
--l TLS13-SHA384-SHA384
-
-# client TLSv1.3 Integrity-only SHA384
--v 4
--l TLS13-SHA384-SHA384