fix: stop swallowing the client-certificate error

[xrl]

When an EtcdCluster requests TLS, fetchAndValidateState provisions the operator's client certificate via createClientCertificate. That error was logged and then ignored, so reconciliation proceeded even though the credential the TLS data path depends on was never created — the failure is invisible and surfaces later as a more confusing downstream error.

This returns a requeue with backoff (the existing requeueDuration, matching the sibling error paths in the same function) on failure, so provisioning is retried instead of silently swallowed.

Adds a unit test that drives fetchAndValidateState with a fake client whose scheme omits the cert-manager types (forcing the certificate lookup to fail) and asserts a non-zero RequeueAfter with no reconcileState returned (reconcile does not proceed past cert provisioning).

Refs #370

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PR series — operability fixes & TLS

Small single-purpose PRs from live kind-cluster testing of the operator. Each stands alone unless an After is listed. → = this PR.

	PR	Lands	After
	Reviewable now — small, any order
🟢→	#374	Requeue instead of swallowing the client-cert provisioning error	—
🟢	#391	Grant events.k8s.io RBAC so operator Events are actually recorded	—
🟢	#392	Correlate members[]/leaderID from one health snapshot (consistent leader)	—
🟢	#393	Propagate user-supplied altNames.ipAddresses into certificates	—
🟢	#394	Accept day-suffix validityDuration (365d, 100d12h) as documented	—
🟢	#395	Surface early reconcile errors as a Degraded condition (was empty status)	—
🟢	#379	Configurable reconcile worker pool (--max-concurrent-reconciles)	—
🟢	#369	kind-based stress/scale e2e harness (1/3/7 members, churn, quorum watcher)	—
	TLS stack — in order
🟢	#376	Independent spec.tls.{peer,client} surfaces (breaking alpha API)	—
⚪	#377	TLSReady condition + TLS lifecycle Events	#376
⚪	#378	Multi-member TLS quorum e2e + PeerCANotShared	#377
	Parked as drafts pending #363
⚪	#382	Per-cluster domain metrics on the operator /metrics endpoint	—
⚪	#384	EtcdCluster admission webhooks (consolidating with #328)	#363
⚪	#386	EtcdBackup CR → object storage (S3/GCS)	#363
⚪	#387	Automatic quorum-loss disaster recovery (bootstrap-latch guarded)	#363

🟢 ready · ⚪ draft

[k8s-ci-robot]

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Hi @xrl. Thanks for your PR.

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