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Add Claude Code GitHub Workflow #59

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1c9ef98
"Claude PR Assistant workflow"
z8dn May 4, 2026
fbd810e
"Claude Code Review workflow"
z8dn May 4, 2026
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44 changes: 44 additions & 0 deletions .github/workflows/claude-code-review.yml
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
name: Claude Code Review

on:
pull_request:
types: [opened, synchronize, ready_for_review, reopened]
# Optional: Only run on specific file changes
# paths:
# - "src/**/*.ts"
# - "src/**/*.tsx"
# - "src/**/*.js"
# - "src/**/*.jsx"

jobs:
claude-review:
# Optional: Filter by PR author
# if: |
# github.event.pull_request.user.login == 'external-contributor' ||
# github.event.pull_request.user.login == 'new-developer' ||
# github.event.pull_request.author_association == 'FIRST_TIME_CONTRIBUTOR'

runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
contents: read
pull-requests: read
issues: read
id-token: write
Comment on lines +22 to +26

@coderabbitai coderabbitai Bot May 4, 2026

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⚠️ Potential issue | 🟠 Major

🧩 Analysis chain

🏁 Script executed:

cat -n .github/workflows/claude-code-review.yml

Repository: z8dn/advanced-android-project-view

Length of output: 1819

🌐 Web query:

anthropics/claude-code-action permissions documentation

💡 Result:

Anthropic/Claude Code Action “permissions” documentation is split into two related areas: 1) Claude Code (the local/IDE agent) permission system - Official docs: https://docs.anthropic.com/en/docs/claude-code/permissions - These define fine-grained tool permissions and permission modes (e.g., default, acceptEdits, plan, auto, dontAsk, bypassPermissions), including rules precedence (deny → ask → allow) and how permissions are configured/managed. 2) anthropics/claude-code-action (the GitHub Action that runs Claude Code for PRs/issues) - Official docs live in the repository: https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code-action - Security/access control docs for the Action are here: https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code-action/blob/main/docs/security.md Key points stated there: - Repository Access: the Action can only be triggered by users with write access to the repository. - Bot/User controls: - By default, GitHub Apps/bots cannot trigger it; you can enable specific bots via allowed_bots. - “allowed_bots” matches bots even if they do not have repo permissions (and on public repos, external parties could trigger events that invoke the Action if allowed_bots is '*', so scope workflow permissions to minimum). - Non-write user bypass (risky): allowed_non_write_users can bypass the write requirement (only works with github_token input, and is described as a significant security risk). - Token scoping: the Claude Code GitHub app receives a short-lived token scoped to the repository, with no cross-repo access. - GitHub App permissions requested by the Action include (currently used): Contents (Read & Write), Pull Requests (Read & Write), Issues (Read & Write), with additional permissions noted for future features. - FAQ for common permission/auth issues (including workflow “write permissions” requirement and OIDC id-token write): https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code-action/blob/main/docs/faq.md - The Action’s configuration inputs (including additional_permissions like actions: read) are also reflected in the repo docs and action.yml; see the Action repository root for the full setup/usage guides. If you meant “Claude Code Action permissions” specifically for the GitHub Action, start with the repo security.md + faq.md links above. If you meant “Claude Code permission rules” for the agent itself (allowed/deny/ask modes and tool-level rules), start with the Anthropic Claude Code permissions docs link above.

Citations:

🌐 Web query:

anthropics/claude-code-action official examples pull-requests write

💡 Result:

The official GitHub repository for Anthropic's Claude Code Action is https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code-action. It provides a general-purpose action for GitHub PRs and issues where Claude can answer questions, perform code reviews, and implement code changes, including creating pull requests. Official examples are in the /examples directory (e.g., https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code-action/blob/main/examples/claude.yml) and detailed solutions in /docs/solutions.md (https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code-action/blob/main/docs/solutions.md). To write pull requests: 1. Set up a workflow in .github/workflows/ (e.g., claude.yml) using anthropics/claude-code-action@v1 with permissions: contents: write, pull-requests: write, issues: write. 2. Require ANTHROPIC_API_KEY secret. 3. Trigger on issue_comment, issues opened/assigned, etc., with if condition checking for '@claude'. 4. Example basic workflow (from examples/claude.yml): name: Claude Code on: issue_comment: types: [created] pull_request_review_comment: types: [created] issues: types: [opened, assigned] pull_request_review: types: [submitted] jobs: claude: if: | (github.event_name == 'issue_comment' && contains(github.event.comment.body, '@claude')) || (github.event_name == 'pull_request_review_comment' && contains(github.event.comment.body, '@claude')) || (github.event_name == 'pull_request_review' && contains(github.event.review.body, '@claude')) || (github.event_name == 'issues' && (contains(github.event.issue.body, '@claude') || contains(github.event.issue.title, '@claude'))) runs-on: ubuntu-latest permissions: contents: write pull-requests: write issues: write id-token: write actions: read steps: - name: Checkout repository uses: actions/checkout@v6 with: fetch-depth: 1 - name: Run Claude Code id: claude uses: anthropics/claude-code-action@v1 with: anthropic_api_key: ${{ secrets.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY }} 5. Usage: In an issue or PR comment, say "@claude Please implement a new API endpoint for user preferences following existing patterns." Claude will edit files, commit, push to a new branch, and create a PR (requires contents:write, pull-requests:write permissions). For automation without @claude (e.g., auto doc sync on API changes), use 'prompt' input with specific instructions and trigger on pull_request paths. See Anthropic docs: https://docs.anthropic.com/en/docs/claude-code/github-actions

Citations:

Change pull-requests: read to pull-requests: write to align with official action examples.

The official examples from the Anthropic Claude Code Action repository (https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code-action) specify permissions: contents: write, pull-requests: write, issues: write. The GitHub App requested by the action includes Read & Write permissions for Pull Requests. While the action uses a custom OAuth token (CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN) rather than GITHUB_TOKEN, the workflow permissions define the baseline access level for all steps in the environment. Changing to write eliminates potential fallback failures and matches the reference configurations provided by Anthropic.

-      pull-requests: read
+      pull-requests: write
📝 Committable suggestion

‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.

Suggested change
permissions:
contents: read
pull-requests: read
issues: read
id-token: write
permissions:
contents: read
pull-requests: write
issues: read
id-token: write
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents 
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.

In @.github/workflows/claude-code-review.yml around lines 22 - 26, Update the
workflow permissions block so the pull-requests permission is set to write
instead of read: locate the permissions mapping (the permissions: block
containing contents, pull-requests, issues, id-token) and change the
pull-requests entry from pull-requests: read to pull-requests: write to match
the Anthropic Claude Code Action examples and allow the workflow full PR write
access.


steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
fetch-depth: 1

- name: Run Claude Code Review
id: claude-review
uses: anthropics/claude-code-action@v1
with:
claude_code_oauth_token: ${{ secrets.CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN }}
plugin_marketplaces: 'https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code.git'
plugins: 'code-review@claude-code-plugins'
prompt: '/code-review:code-review ${{ github.repository }}/pull/${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}'
# See https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code-action/blob/main/docs/usage.md
# or https://code.claude.com/docs/en/cli-reference for available options

Comment on lines +29 to +44

@coderabbitai coderabbitai Bot May 4, 2026

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⚠️ Potential issue | 🟠 Major

🧩 Analysis chain

🏁 Script executed:

git ls-remote https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code-action refs/tags/v1
git ls-remote https://github.com/actions/checkout refs/tags/v4

Repository: z8dn/advanced-android-project-view

Length of output: 186

🏁 Script executed:

# Check if the file exists and examine the relevant lines
find . -name "claude-code-review.yml" -type f

Repository: z8dn/advanced-android-project-view

Length of output: 121

🏁 Script executed:

# Verify the v4.2.2 tag for actions/checkout to explain the SHA discrepancy
git ls-remote https://github.com/actions/checkout refs/tags/v4.2.2

Repository: z8dn/advanced-android-project-view

Length of output: 136

🏁 Script executed:

# Also check for the plugin marketplace tag information
git ls-remote https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code refs/tags/v1

Repository: z8dn/advanced-android-project-view

Length of output: 60

🏁 Script executed:

# Read the workflow file to verify the actual code
cat -n ./.github/workflows/claude-code-review.yml | sed -n '25,50p'

Repository: z8dn/advanced-android-project-view

Length of output: 997

🏁 Script executed:

# Check available refs in anthropics/claude-code-action repo
git ls-remote https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code-action

Repository: z8dn/advanced-android-project-view

Length of output: 50390

Pin both third-party actions and the plugin marketplace to specific commits

Both actions/checkout@v4 (line 30) and anthropics/claude-code-action@v1 (line 36) use mutable floating tags. The claude-code-action step has id-token: write access with the OAuth token in scope. A tag force-push to a malicious commit would execute arbitrary code with those privileges.

plugin_marketplaces: 'https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code.git' (line 39) resolves to the HEAD of main at runtime. Pinning the marketplace URL to a specific commit ref or tag prevents unreviewed upstream changes from silently altering what plugin code runs in your CI.

Recommended approach 
      - name: Checkout repository
-       uses: actions/checkout@v4
+       uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2

      - name: Run Claude Code Review
        id: claude-review
-       uses: anthropics/claude-code-action@v1
+       uses: anthropics/claude-code-action@8c196b2f61a66bfdf93322bde3a3e668669089ed # v1
        with:
          claude_code_oauth_token: ${{ secrets.CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN }}
-         plugin_marketplaces: 'https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code.git'
+         plugin_marketplaces: 'https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code.git@<ref-or-sha>'
🧰 Tools
🪛 YAMLlint (1.38.0)

[error] 44-44: too many blank lines (1 > 0)

(empty-lines)

🤖 Prompt for AI Agents 
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.

In @.github/workflows/claude-code-review.yml around lines 29 - 44, The workflow
uses mutable tags and an unpinned plugin marketplace URL; update the actions and
marketplace to immutable refs: replace uses: actions/checkout@v4 and uses:
anthropics/claude-code-action@v1 with specific commit SHAs or immutable release
tags (pin the claude-code-action and checkout action to exact commit SHAs), and
change plugin_marketplaces from the bare repo URL to the repository URL pinned
to a commit ref (e.g., the full git+https URL or the repo URL that includes the
specific commit/tag), ensuring the claude-code-action step still passes
claude_code_oauth_token and retains the same inputs but references the pinned
marketplace ref to avoid executing unreviewed upstream changes.

50 changes: 50 additions & 0 deletions .github/workflows/claude.yml
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
name: Claude Code

on:
issue_comment:
types: [created]
pull_request_review_comment:
types: [created]
issues:
types: [opened, assigned]
Comment on lines +8 to +9

@coderabbitai coderabbitai Bot May 4, 2026

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⚠️ Potential issue | 🟡 Minor | ⚡ Quick win

issues: assigned re-triggers Claude for pre-existing @claude body mentions

The assigned type fires every time the issue is (re)assigned. The if: condition evaluates github.event.issue.body, which is the original issue body — not the assignment action itself. Any issue that was originally opened with @claude in its body or title will re-invoke Claude on every subsequent assignment, including routine triage operations.

The action exposes a trigger_assignee parameter for issue assignment use-cases, which would fire only when the issue is assigned to the Claude bot, avoiding unintended re-invocations. If the intent is only to allow @claude mentions in the issue body to trigger once on open, remove assigned from the event types:

   issues:
-    types: [opened, assigned]
+    types: [opened]
📝 Committable suggestion

‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.

Suggested change
issues:
types: [opened, assigned]
issues:
types: [opened]
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents 
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.

In @.github/workflows/claude.yml around lines 8 - 9, The workflow currently
lists issues.types: [opened, assigned], which causes pre-existing issues
containing “@claude” in github.event.issue.body to re-trigger on every
reassignment; fix by either removing "assigned" from issues.types so only issue
opens trigger the run, or, if you need assignment-based runs, replace the
generic assigned trigger with the action's trigger_assignee usage and an if:
guard that checks the assignment target (use the action's trigger_assignee
parameter instead of relying on github.event.issue.body) so the job fires only
when the issue is assigned to the Claude bot.

pull_request_review:
types: [submitted]

jobs:
claude:
if: |
(github.event_name == 'issue_comment' && contains(github.event.comment.body, '@claude')) ||
(github.event_name == 'pull_request_review_comment' && contains(github.event.comment.body, '@claude')) ||
(github.event_name == 'pull_request_review' && contains(github.event.review.body, '@claude')) ||
(github.event_name == 'issues' && (contains(github.event.issue.body, '@claude') || contains(github.event.issue.title, '@claude')))
Comment on lines +15 to +19

@coderabbitai coderabbitai Bot May 4, 2026

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⚠️ Potential issue | 🔴 Critical | ⚡ Quick win

🔐 Critical: Any GitHub user can trigger the workflow — OAuth secret is exposed to unauthorized actors

The if: condition has no author_association check, so on public repositories any user who can open an issue or leave a comment containing @claude can trigger the workflow. Because CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN is passed unconditionally once the if: guard passes, the Claude Code GitHub App — which has read and write access to code, issues, and pull requests — is reachable by any unauthenticated commenter. This drains API credits at minimum and at worst enables arbitrary users to request repository writes through Claude.

The recommended fix is to add author_association checks to every event branch in the if: block to restrict invocations to OWNER, MEMBER, and COLLABORATOR:

🔒 Proposed fix — add author_association guard to each event branch 
     if: |
-      (github.event_name == 'issue_comment' && contains(github.event.comment.body, '@claude')) ||
-      (github.event_name == 'pull_request_review_comment' && contains(github.event.comment.body, '@claude')) ||
-      (github.event_name == 'pull_request_review' && contains(github.event.review.body, '@claude')) ||
-      (github.event_name == 'issues' && (contains(github.event.issue.body, '@claude') || contains(github.event.issue.title, '@claude')))
+      (github.event_name == 'issue_comment' && contains(github.event.comment.body, '@claude') && contains(fromJSON('["OWNER","MEMBER","COLLABORATOR"]'), github.event.comment.author_association)) ||
+      (github.event_name == 'pull_request_review_comment' && contains(github.event.comment.body, '@claude') && contains(fromJSON('["OWNER","MEMBER","COLLABORATOR"]'), github.event.comment.author_association)) ||
+      (github.event_name == 'pull_request_review' && contains(github.event.review.body, '@claude') && contains(fromJSON('["OWNER","MEMBER","COLLABORATOR"]'), github.event.review.author_association)) ||
+      (github.event_name == 'issues' && (contains(github.event.issue.body, '@claude') || contains(github.event.issue.title, '@claude')) && contains(fromJSON('["OWNER","MEMBER","COLLABORATOR"]'), github.event.issue.author_association))
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents 
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.

In @.github/workflows/claude.yml around lines 15 - 19, The workflow’s if:
condition allows any commenter to trigger the run and thus expose
CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN; update each branch that checks github.event_name (the
branches containing github.event.comment.body, github.event.review.body,
github.event.issue.body, github.event.issue.title) to also require
github.event.comment.author_association (or
github.event.review.author_association / github.event.issue.author_association
as appropriate) to be one of OWNER, MEMBER, or COLLABORATOR so the secret is
only passed for trusted actors; ensure the final combined boolean for each
branch includes that author_association check before the secret is used.

runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
contents: read
pull-requests: read
issues: read
id-token: write
actions: read # Required for Claude to read CI results on PRs
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
fetch-depth: 1

- name: Run Claude Code
id: claude
uses: anthropics/claude-code-action@v1
with:
claude_code_oauth_token: ${{ secrets.CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN }}
Comment on lines +35 to +37

@coderabbitai coderabbitai Bot May 4, 2026

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⚠️ Potential issue | 🟠 Major

🧩 Analysis chain

🏁 Script executed:

git ls-remote https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code-action refs/tags/v1
git ls-remote https://github.com/actions/checkout refs/tags/v4

Repository: z8dn/advanced-android-project-view

Length of output: 186

🏁 Script executed:

cat -n .github/workflows/claude.yml

Repository: z8dn/advanced-android-project-view

Length of output: 2314

Pin anthropics/claude-code-action and actions/checkout to commit SHAs to prevent supply-chain compromise

@v1 and @v4 are mutable floating tags. If force-pushed to a malicious commit, the runner executes that code with id-token: write permission and CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN already in the environment.

🔒 Recommended approach 
      - name: Checkout repository
-       uses: actions/checkout@v4
+       uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad13914f8d5 # v4.2.2

      - name: Run Claude Code
        id: claude
-       uses: anthropics/claude-code-action@v1
+       uses: anthropics/claude-code-action@8c196b2f61a66bfdf93322bde3a3e668669089ed # v1
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents 
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.

In @.github/workflows/claude.yml around lines 35 - 37, The workflow currently
uses mutable tags for third-party actions (uses:
anthropics/claude-code-action@v1 and uses: actions/checkout@v4); pin both
actions to their specific commit SHAs instead of floating tags to prevent
supply‑chain risks: locate the uses entries in the workflow and replace the
`@v1/`@v4 suffixes with the corresponding full commit SHA for
anthropics/claude-code-action and actions/checkout (ensure the SHAs come from
the official repos/tags), then verify the workflow still runs and that secrets
like CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN and id-token permissions are unchanged.


# This is an optional setting that allows Claude to read CI results on PRs
additional_permissions: |
actions: read
# Optional: Give a custom prompt to Claude. If this is not specified, Claude will perform the instructions specified in the comment that tagged it.
# prompt: 'Update the pull request description to include a summary of changes.'

# Optional: Add claude_args to customize behavior and configuration
# See https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code-action/blob/main/docs/usage.md
# or https://code.claude.com/docs/en/cli-reference for available options
# claude_args: '--allowed-tools Bash(gh pr *)'

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