fix: multiple memmove and memcpy calls in the core s... in...#670
Open
orbisai0security wants to merge 1 commit into
Open
fix: multiple memmove and memcpy calls in the core s... in...#670orbisai0security wants to merge 1 commit into
orbisai0security wants to merge 1 commit into
Conversation
Automated security fix generated by Orbis Security AI
✅ Deploy Preview for splinterdb canceled.
|
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
Summary
Fix critical severity security issue in
src/routing_filter.c.Vulnerability
V-001src/routing_filter.c:624Description: Multiple memmove and memcpy calls in the core storage engine do not verify that the source data length fits within the destination buffer before copying. In routing_filter.c:624, the variable encoding_size is used directly as the copy length without checking it against the allocated size of hdr->encoding. In routing_filter.c:803, MAX_FILTERS * sizeof(uint32) bytes are copied from fp_start without verifying the source region is at least that large. A caller supplying crafted key/value data or filter metadata can trigger heap buffer overflows, overwriting adjacent heap memory and corrupting internal data structures.
Changes
src/routing_filter.cVerification
Automated security fix by OrbisAI Security