Please report security issues privately via GitHub's private vulnerability reporting rather than opening a public issue. We aim to acknowledge reports promptly and will coordinate a fix and disclosure timeline with you.

Access to the Openterface nodes (/dev/ttyACM* for the CH9329 input bridge and /dev/video* for the MS2109 capture) is granted with least privilege by the shipped udev rules (packaging/udev/60-openterface.rules):

• uaccess (preferred). The rules tag the nodes with uaccess, so the user logged in on the local seat receives an ACL from systemd-logind. No standing group membership is required on a desktop session.
• Dedicated-group fallback. For headless/SSH/VM use (no active seat), the nodes are owned by a dedicated openterface group with mode 0660. This is intentionally not MODE="0666" (world access) and not the broad dialout/video groups, which would expose unrelated serial/video devices.

See permissions & udev for setup.

openterface-rs forwards keyboard and mouse input to an attached target computer and captures its screen. Keep these properties in mind:

• Input injection is a trust boundary. The tool can type and click on the target. The closed-loop test harness deliberately restricts automated injection to non-destructive mouse moves because the target screen is uncontrolled and may be a lock screen (typing could lock an account). Destructive harness verbs (type/click/key) are manual-only: they require both KVM_ALLOW_DESTRUCTIVE=1 and an explicit acknowledgement flag, print a loud warning, and fail closed otherwise.
• Injection targets are VID/PID-verified. Auto-detection only drives a serial node confirmed to be a CH9329 (1A86:7523/1A86:FE0C); it will not inject into an arbitrary /dev/ttyACM*//dev/ttyUSB*.
• Device permissions. Granted via the least-privilege udev model above.
• No secrets in logs. Diagnostic/--debug output must not include captured screen contents or injected keystrokes/typed strings. Captured frames may contain sensitive content and are never uploaded by CI.
• Supply chain. Dependencies are checked in CI with cargo-deny (advisories, licenses, bans, sources). unsafe/FFI boundaries (serialport, v4l2, libudev, wgpu) are reviewed. Release artifacts ship a SHA256SUMS and install.sh verifies downloads before installing.

During pre-1.0 development, only the latest main is supported.