A clean-slate Rust operating system built around capabilities, objects, and native services.
Not Unix in new clothes. Not Windows rewritten. A fresh standalone OS path, built carefully from the first boot.

Implementation Plan | Release Plan | Security Controls | Security

Aesynx

Aesynx is a Rust no_std operating-system project with a clean-slate goal: a standalone OS that does not begin by copying Unix, Linux, or Windows. Its native model is built around explicit capabilities, per-core ownership, service queues, driver isolation, an immutable object graph, structured userspace, and AI-ready telemetry from day one.

The long-term goal is a different kind of general-purpose system, not a compatibility skin over old assumptions. Paths, processes, packages, drivers, snapshots, and automation should be native Aesynx concepts first. Unix or Linux compatibility can exist later as an isolated service, but it must not define the kernel, userspace, or security model.

Aesynx is also explicitly not planned as one huge OS binary: components should remain separately identified, signed, versioned, updateable, and rollback-capable.

The first major milestone is a serious x86_64 QEMU release with a coherent security model, clear non-claims, and release gates that block tagging until checks and pentest evidence are complete. The project is early, but the direction is intentionally standalone.

Aesynx is licensed under the European Union Public Licence 1.2.

What Works Today

v0.15.0 is the current page-table-mapper implementation candidate. It builds a release-profile freestanding x86_64-unknown-none kernel ELF, packages it into a Limine ISO, records build and boot tool versions in the image manifest, boots it in QEMU, normalizes Limine handoff metadata into Aesynx BootInfo, verifies kernel-owned serial markers, installs basic x86_64 descriptor and interrupt tables, remaps and masks the legacy PIC, detects whether the local APIC is present, publishes checked IRQ vector allocation, handles a returning breakpoint exception, and can run opt-in deliberate panic and page-fault smoke tests with redacted CR2 presence/page-offset, CR3 low-bit, RFLAGS, interrupt-state, and decoded page-fault diagnostics. Normal boot now emits a checked physical memory report with total, usable, reserved, kernel, bootloader, framebuffer, ACPI, bad, and frame-count accounting before [TEST] memory-map=ok, then initializes a bounded early bitmap frame allocator from a usable boot-map window and verifies one-frame allocation/free, contiguous allocation/free, debug state, and double-free detection before [TEST] frame-allocator=ok, then exercises a bounded x86_64-shaped page-table mapper model with map, contiguous range map/protect/unmap, typed and checked root-table identity, audit-backed permission lookup, contiguous range lookup, audit-backed permission change, audit-backed unmapped/mapped range checks, read-only mapping visit, checked status accounting, checked byte-range translation, fail-closed single-address translation, virtual range permission verification, page-presence checks, mapped-range checks, kernel-only policy checks, kernel high-half user-access guard checks, user low-half kernel-privilege guard checks, kernel/user non-empty address-space candidate preflights, audit-backed kernel-range policy checks, user-range policy checks, write-protected range checks, non-executable range checks, executable range checks, normal-memory range checks, no-executable address-space policy checks, no-writable address-space policy checks, no-device address-space policy checks, no-global address-space policy checks, no-physical-alias policy checks, redacted mapping summaries, redacted page-table debug output, fail-closed leaf decoding for lookup/protect/unmap, consistency audit, empty-table reclamation, and explicit TLB flush targets before [TEST] page-table=ok. Single-address translation returns typed errors for unmapped, invalid, or corrupt mapper state. The opt-in timer smoke path installs a checked IRQ0 handler, programs the legacy PIT for QEMU, observes three controlled timer ticks, converts ticks into monotonic nanosecond values, wakes a bounded sleep request for a delayed log event, acknowledges each interrupt, and then disables the smoke IRQ.

Area	Status	Notes
Rust workspace	Active	Modular crate layout with no root src/ implementation pile.
Toolchain	Active	Stable Rust 1.96.0, edition 2024, resolver 3, and x86_64-unknown-none for the first boot ELF.
Kernel crate policy	Active	Crates under crates/ must be no_std, deny unsafe by default, and avoid external dependencies without exceptions.
Capability model	Model active	Private non-copy authority values, permission validation, audited derive/grant paths, generation/epoch validation, and revoke authority checks.
Memory model	Model active	Page flags make writable+executable and user-global mappings unrepresentable; long-term memory should become object-native, purpose-tagged, capability-scoped, and snapshot-aware.
OS world model	Planned	Kernel-stamped facts should feed a native world service so Aesynx can explain boot, memory, packages, drivers, capabilities, snapshots, and policy decisions without putting a database in ring 0.
IPC model	Model active	Kernel-stamped message headers, caller requests, and bounded inline payloads.
Bytecode model	Model active	Fuel limit and capability-typed permission checks.
Logging model	Model active	Bounded single-record log messages.
Build path	Active	x86_64 target metadata, linker script, Cargo config validation, stable freestanding kernel ELF build, and an optional nightly custom-target probe.
QEMU first boot	Active	cargo xtask image creates a release-profile Limine ISO and cargo xtask qemu verifies [TEST] irq=ok, [TEST] exception=ok, [TEST] memory-map=ok, [TEST] frame-allocator=ok, [TEST] page-table=ok, [TEST] bootinfo=ok, and [TEST] boot=ok from Rust _start.
BootInfo normalization	Tagged	Limine memory map, executable address, HHDM, RSDP, and framebuffer metadata normalize into dependency-free aesynx-boot structures.
Early diagnostics	Tagged	Boot phase tracking and cargo xtask qemu --panic-smoke verify readable panic output with [TEST] panic=ok.
GDT and TSS	Tagged	Early x86_64 boot installs an Aesynx-owned GDT, TSS, and double-fault IST stack, verified with [TEST] gdt=ok.
IDT and exceptions	Tagged	Early x86_64 boot installs an IDT, handles breakpoint, page-fault, and double-fault vectors, and verifies [TEST] exception=ok.
Fault decoding	Tagged	v0.9.0; page-fault smoke prints redacted CR2 presence/page offset, CR3 low bits, public RFLAGS, interrupt state, and decoded error bits.
Interrupt controller baseline	Tagged	v0.10.0; remaps/masks legacy PIC IRQs, detects local APIC presence, defines checked IRQ vectors, and exposes an EOI path.
Timer ticks	Tagged	v0.11.0; opt-in QEMU timer smoke programs PIT IRQ0, records a tick counter, and verifies timer tick 1..3 plus [TEST] timer=ok.
Monotonic time and sleeps	Tagged	v0.12.0; converts timer ticks into monotonic instants, schedules a bounded sleep request, and verifies timer delayed-log, [TEST] sleep=ok, and [TEST] timer=ok.
Physical memory map	Tagged	v0.13.0; rejects invalid/overlapping regions and reports checked total/usable/reserved bytes, frame counts, and kernel/bootloader reserved accounting with [TEST] memory-map=ok.
Bitmap frame allocator	Tagged	v0.14.0; safe aesynx-mm bitmap allocator model plus QEMU smoke for bounded early alloc/free, contiguous allocation, debug states, double-free detection, and atomic failure behavior with [TEST] frame-allocator=ok.
Page table mapper	Active candidate	v0.15.0; safe bounded aesynx-mm page-table mapper model with x86_64-shaped tables, mapper-issued typed root-table identity, checked root-table identity, checked status accounting, non-empty kernel and user address-space candidate preflights, audit-backed map/unmap/protect, fail-closed translation, checked contiguous byte-range translation, audit-backed permission lookup, contiguous range map/protect/unmap plus lookup, upfront range validation, bounded range walks, audit-backed unmapped range checks, audit-backed mapped-range checks, page-presence checks, kernel-only policy checks, kernel high-half user-access guard checks, user low-half kernel-privilege guard checks, no-user-space policy checks, no-executable policy checks, no-writable policy checks, no-device policy checks, no-global policy checks, no-physical-alias policy checks, audit-backed kernel-range policy checks, audit-backed user-range policy checks, write-protected range checks, non-executable range checks, executable range checks, normal-memory range checks, local range checks, high-half kernel-space checks, low-half user-space checks, read-only mapping visit, redacted mapping summaries, redacted page-table debug output, virtual range permission verification, fail-closed leaf decoding, permission lookup/change, consistency audit, empty-table reclamation, explicit TLB flush targets, conservative TLB flush merging, and QEMU smoke with [TEST] page-table=ok.
Native snapshots	Planned	Content-addressed object roots make snapshots and rollback object-layer primitives rather than path-first filesystem features.
Native package manager	Planned	Content-addressed package objects, declarative generations, explicit tracks, SBOM/provenance, and capability manifests.
Future bootloader	Planned	Limine is current; a future Rust UEFI bootloader should be a minimal security gateway for signed/measured Aesynx boot capsules.
Post-quantum readiness	Planned	Crypto-agile boot, package, update, and identity metadata with room for hybrid classical plus post-quantum validation.
Supply-chain checks	Active	cargo deny, cargo audit, SBOM generation, Dependabot, SHA-pinned GitHub Actions, and CodeQL default Rust workflow.
Release gate	Active	Tags require local checks, SBOM, CodeQL on GitHub, and a passing pentest report for the exact commit.

Planned Next

Area	Status	Target
Kernel mapping policy	Planned	v0.16.0; apply real kernel text/rodata/data/stack/direct-map permission policy.
Real arch mechanisms	Planned	Core identity, timestamp, production page tables, and CPU setup.
Capability services	Planned	Concrete revocation epoch store, audit backend, object registry, and authenticated call paths.
Native userspace	Planned	aesh, structured pipelines, WASM components, and capability-scoped command execution.
OS world service	Planned	Signed/versioned facts, branchable worlds, policy-aware queries, context packs, and AI-safe explanations over deterministic OS evidence.
Package manager	Planned	aepkg/aepkgd roadmap for search, install, update, rollback, repair, and future store UI.
Post-quantum readiness	Planned	Crypto-agile signature envelopes and trust policy before signed boot capsules, package registries, or update metadata.

Local Checks

Run the full repository gate:

scripts/checks.sh

Generate the source SBOM:

scripts/generate-sbom.sh

Validate the current kernel build path:

cargo xtask build-kernel

Create and smoke-test the v0.15 Limine QEMU image:

cargo xtask image
cargo xtask qemu

Run the full v0.15 QEMU smoke suite:

cargo xtask qemu-suite

Run the deliberate panic diagnostics smoke:

cargo xtask qemu --panic-smoke

Run the deliberate exception smoke:

cargo xtask qemu --exception-smoke

Run the controlled timer smoke:

cargo xtask qemu --timer-smoke

These commands require Limine 12.3.2 or newer, xorriso, and qemu-system-x86_64. The generated manifest records the exact Rust, Limine, xorriso, and QEMU version banners.

Try the documented custom-target experiment when a nightly toolchain is available:

cargo xtask build-kernel --custom-target-probe

After a pentest report is completed for a tag:

cargo xtask release-ready v0.15.0

Security Posture

Aesynx treats boot, memory, capabilities, IPC, driver authority, userspace ABI, WASM execution, telemetry, AI policy, build tooling, GitHub workflows, and dependency metadata as high-risk. The project prefers internal kernel primitives, narrow unsafe boundaries, no ambient authority, explicit capabilities, and small modules that can be reviewed and tested.

Every release tag is blocked until the exact commit being tagged has a passing pentest report in security/pentest/<tag>.md.

Documentation

• Implementation Plan
• Userspace Vision
• Memory Model Roadmap
• OS World Roadmap
• Package Manager Roadmap
• Driver Roadmap
• Release Plan
• Architecture Decisions
• Build Skeleton
• QEMU Image Skeleton
• First Serial Boot
• BootInfo Normalization
• Early Diagnostics
• v0.7.0 Release Candidate Notes
• v0.8.0 Release Candidate Notes
• v0.9.0 Release Candidate Notes
• v0.10.0 Release Candidate Notes
• v0.11.0 Release Candidate Notes
• v0.12.0 Release Candidate Notes
• v0.13.0 Release Candidate Notes
• v0.14.0 Release Candidate Notes
• v0.15.0 Release Candidate Notes
• Bootloader Roadmap
• Storage Roadmap
• Hosted Execution Roadmap
• Post-Quantum Readiness
• Security Policy
• Threat Model
• Security Controls
• Supply-Chain Security
• Kernel Engineering Policy
• Unsafe Policy
• Modularity Policy
• Licensing Notes
• License
• Initial Idea