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[codex] clarify Vertex AI env vars#493

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huangyiyang89 wants to merge 2 commits into
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huangyiyang89:codex/clarify-vertex-env-vars
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[codex] clarify Vertex AI env vars#493
huangyiyang89 wants to merge 2 commits into
usestrix:mainfrom
huangyiyang89:codex/clarify-vertex-env-vars

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What changed

  • clarify that Strix reads Vertex AI project and location through LiteLLM's VERTEXAI_PROJECT and VERTEXAI_LOCATION variables
  • call out that VERTEX_AI_PROJECT and VERTEX_AI_LOCATION are not recognized
  • point users who see Could not resolve project_id back to the variable names

Why

The Vertex provider page already documents the supported variable names, but the
LiteLLM naming differs from the common VERTEX_AI_* spelling. A user can reach
Vertex AI successfully with Google Cloud credentials and still have Strix fail its
LiteLLM warm-up with a project resolution error when the unsupported spelling is
used.

Validation

  • git diff --check

sandiyochristan and others added 2 commits May 20, 2026 21:45
* feat: add HTTP request smuggling skill

Add a new vulnerability skill covering HTTP request smuggling (HRS)
across CL.TE, TE.CL, H2.CL, and H2.TE desync variants. HRS is absent
from the existing skill set despite being a distinct, high-impact
vulnerability class frequently present in any architecture using a
reverse proxy or CDN in front of an application server.

Coverage:
- CL.TE: front-end uses Content-Length, back-end uses Transfer-Encoding
- TE.CL: front-end uses Transfer-Encoding, back-end uses Content-Length
- H2.CL: HTTP/2 front-end downgrades to HTTP/1.1 with injected Content-Length
- H2.TE: Transfer-Encoding header injection through HTTP/2 desync
- Transfer-Encoding obfuscation techniques (tab, space, duplicate, xchunked)
- Front-end security control bypass via smuggled prefix
- Cross-user request capture for session token theft
- Response queue poisoning and WebSocket handshake hijacking
- Timing-based and differential response detection methodology
- HTTP/2 specific probing techniques

Includes raw HTTP examples for each variant, step-by-step testing
methodology, exploitation PoCs, false-positive conditions, and
infrastructure topology guidance.

* fix: correct TE.CL probe, pseudo-header terminology, PoC Content-Length values, \x20 representation

Four reviewer findings addressed:

P1 — TE.CL timing-probe description inverted: previous text said
'Content-Length set to fewer bytes than the chunk content' which
describes socket-poisoning behavior (differential response), not a
timeout. Corrected to: send a complete chunked body with CL set to MORE
bytes than provided so the back-end waits for data that never arrives.
Also corrected Testing Methodology step 3 to match.

P2 — pseudo-header terminology: 'content-length' is a regular HTTP/2
header, not a pseudo-header (pseudo-headers are exclusively :method,
:path, :authority, :scheme). Fixed the H2.CL explanation (line 75),
HTTP/2-specific detection bullet, and Pro Tip usestrix#4 which referred to
':content-length pseudo-header'.

P2 — PoC Content-Length values: outer Content-Length in the bypass PoC
corrected from 116 to 100 (actual byte count of the body shown); capture
PoC corrected from 129 to 120.

P2 — \x20 representation: replaced the \x20 escape sequence in the code
block (which renders as a literal four-character string, not a space byte)
with an explanatory comment and actual whitespace characters so the intent
is unambiguous.

* Update strix/skills/vulnerabilities/http_request_smuggling.md

Co-authored-by: greptile-apps[bot] <165735046+greptile-apps[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: greptile-apps[bot] <165735046+greptile-apps[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
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2 participants