API security hardening#100
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Token handling:
- Session JWTs and email verification/reset tokens share one signing key
with no type discriminator, so a 15-minute email token — which users
forward to each other by design in the join-organization flow — worked
as a full login cookie. Both token families now carry and require their
own audience (bdk-app / bdk-email); cross-type replay is rejected and
pinned by tests. Outstanding sessions are invalidated once (re-login).
- Email-token expiry was minted from naive local time, which PyJWT reads
as UTC — on any host west of UTC the tokens were born expired. Expiry
is now timezone-aware UTC.
- Disabled (or deleted) users now lose API access immediately: every
authenticated request re-checks the user row instead of letting the
cookie ride out its 7-day expiry.
- The session cookie is HttpOnly in dev as well as prod (no frontend code
reads it), and production refuses to boot with a JWT secret shorter
than 32 bytes.
Input validation:
- update_profile coerced missing JSON fields through str(), so posting {}
renamed the organization to "None" and changed the account email to
"None" (unverifying it). Fields are now applied only when present, email
changes are format- and uniqueness-checked, and internal error strings
are no longer echoed to the client.
- register validates the email format and rejects empty passwords.
The session rode in a cookie with SameSite=Lax as the only cross-site protection. Login/register now set flask-jwt-extended's cookie pair — the HttpOnly session token plus a JS-readable csrf_access_token — and every mutating /api request must echo the latter in an X-CSRF-TOKEN header (double-submit), enforced server-side. The frontend covers all call sites with one global fetch wrapper installed at app startup; tests use an equivalent test-client. Logout and the admin panel's impersonation start/stop use the same cookie helpers so the csrf cookie stays in lockstep with the session. Existing sessions are invalidated once (tokens minted before this change lack the csrf claim); users just log in again.
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Letting Claude take the wheel for a security review. Seemed like reasonable changes and the site seems to still work.