security: pin third-party GitHub Actions to commit SHAs + least-privilege permissions#81
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…lege permissions Pin all third-party actions to full 40-char commit SHAs (version comments retained) and add a top-level least-privilege 'permissions: contents: read' block to pure-CI workflows. dtolnay/rust-toolchain gains an explicit 'toolchain: stable' input so the SHA pin preserves channel selection. From the 2026-06-22 workspace GitHub Actions security audit. Assisted-With: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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What
Supply-chain hardening of GitHub Actions workflows:
# versioncomment for readability.permissions: contents: readblock to pure-CI workflows that have no existing top-level permissions block and use no privileged features.First-party
actions/*andgithub/*actions are intentionally left tag-pinned per group convention.Why
Pinning third-party actions to immutable commit SHAs protects against tag-hijacking / mutable-tag supply-chain attacks. Least-privilege default permissions limit the blast radius of a compromised action. From the 2026-06-22 workspace GitHub Actions security audit.
Pins applied
prefix-dev/setup-pixi@v0.9.65185adfbffb4bd703da3010310260805d89ebb11peter-evans/create-pull-request@v85f6978faf089d4d20b00c7766989d076bb2fc7f1pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish@release/v1cef221092ed1bacb1cc03d23a2d87d1d172e277b(v1.14.0)(4 occurrences total across 3 files: setup-pixi appears in all three files — twice in
package.yml.)Permissions
unittest.yml— added top-levelpermissions: contents: read(pure CI, no privileged features).package.yml— not modified (release pipeline usesid-token,anaconda upload,gh-action-pypi-publish); keeps its existing job-levelid-token: write.update-lockfiles.yml— not modified (already has a top-levelpermissions:block and usespeter-evans/create-pull-request).Notes
dtolnay/rust-toolchainortaiki-e/install-actionusages exist in this repo, so those special-case rules did not apply.🤖 Assisted with Claude Code