feat(core): M5.1 — plugin subprocess + JSON-RPC bridge + token+env-strip#15
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What ships
----------
- plugins/runtime/subprocess.ts (~270 lines)
· PluginSubprocess class — spawn plugin's index.js as separate node process
· JSON-RPC stdio bridge — newline-framed, request/response correlated by id
· Capability methods exposed to plugin (via plugin → host RPC):
- fs_read(path) / fs_write(path, content)
- bash(command)
- fetch(url, opts)
- log(msg)
· Token validation on every RPC (defense against unauthorized callers)
· DEEPSEEK_API_KEY / DEEPSEEK_AUTH_TOKEN env vars STRIPPED in child env
(plugin cannot exfil host credentials)
· spawnAllPlugins(plugins, host) / shutdownAllPlugins() bulk helpers
· generatePluginToken() — collision-resistant token generator
What's exposed in @deepcode/core
- PluginSubprocess / spawnAllPlugins / shutdownAllPlugins /
generatePluginToken (+ RpcRequest/Response, SpawnAllOpts types)
Tests (5 new, 321 total)
------------------------
- starts subprocess + clean shutdown
- plugin can request fs_read via RPC, host bridge fires + returns
- wrong token rejected (host bridge NOT fired)
- generatePluginToken yields unique values
- DEEPSEEK_API_KEY env var stripped in plugin process
Verified
--------
pnpm typecheck → green
pnpm test → 313 passed / 8 skipped / 0 failed (was 308)
What's intentionally NOT in this PR (per docs/design/plugin-security.md)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
- OS-level sandbox wrapping (bwrap/sandbox-exec around plugin process):
M5.1-ext. Currently the plugin can still e.g. open arbitrary network
connections — the token + env-strip protects host CREDENTIALS but not
the broader threat surface.
- GitHub URL install ("gh:user/repo")
- npm install
- Marketplace ed25519 signature verification
- Revoke list pull/enforcement
- Wiring spawned plugins into the live ToolRegistry / hook chain — currently
the subprocess infrastructure exists but the REPL doesn't yet spawn-and-
register installed plugins. That last-mile wire-up is M5.2.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Summary
PluginSubprocessspawns plugin in a separate node process with JSON-RPC stdio bridge. Host implements fs_read/fs_write/bash/fetch/log on plugin's behalf, gated by per-instance token. DEEPSEEK_API_KEY and DEEPSEEK_AUTH_TOKEN env vars stripped from child env so plugins can't exfil host credentials.5 new tests · 313 passed / 8 skipped / 0 failed (was 308).
Deferred to M5.1-ext / M5.2
OS sandbox wrap around plugin process; gh:/npm install; marketplace signatures; revoke list; live ToolRegistry wire-up of spawned plugins.
Release notes
release-notes:featureCo-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) noreply@anthropic.com