[Aikido] Fix 72 security issues in litellm, aiohttp, fickling and 8 more#66
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[Aikido] Fix 72 security issues in litellm, aiohttp, fickling and 8 more#66aikido-autofix[bot] wants to merge 1 commit into
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Closed by Aikido: a new AutoFix has been created → #70 |
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Upgrade dependencies to fix critical RCE vulnerabilities in litellm (JWT cache bypass), aiohttp (null byte injection), pillow (heap leak/ASLR bypass), and protobuf, plus DoS and authentication bypass issues.
✅ 72 CVEs resolved by this upgrade, including 4 critical 🚨 CVEs
This PR will resolve the following CVEs:
auto_mapdynamic modules during model resolution withouttrust_remote_codevalidation allows arbitrary code execution at server startup if an attacker can control the model repo/path.trust_remote_code=True, bypassing user's security settings and enabling remote code execution (RCE) via malicious model repositories even when explicitly disabled.nparameter values to trigger Denial of Service by blocking the asyncio event loop and causing Out-Of-Memory crashes due to lack of upper bound validation.POST /prompts/testendpoint renders unsandboxed user-supplied prompt templates, allowing authenticated users to execute arbitrary code within the proxy process and potentially access environment secrets or execute host commands.uuid,_osx_support,_aix_support) that enable arbitrary command execution through subprocess/os.system calls, allowing malicious pickles to bypass safety checks and achieve RCE.pickle.loads,_pickle.loads, and_pickle.loaddespite global safety mode being enabled, bypassing runtime protection. This enables remote code execution for applications relying onalways_check_safety()as a security guard.platformmodule functions bypasses safety checks and executes subprocess commands with attacker-controlled arguments or reads arbitrary files during deserialization, enabling file probing and information disclosure.UPLOAD_DIRandUPLOAD_KEEP_FILENAME=Trueconfiguration options through crafted filenames.set_key()andunset_key()functions during.envfile rewriting. This vulnerability allows arbitrary file write/modification through a crafted symlink when a cross-device rename fallback is triggered.extract_zipped_paths()utility function uses predictable filenames when extracting zip archives to the temp directory, allowing local attackers to pre-create malicious files that get loaded instead of legitimate ones, resulting in arbitrary code execution._url_to_size()helper allowed attackers to bypass SSRF validation by resolving to a public IP during validation and a private IP during fetch, enabling blind probing of internal services. The response body is not exposed to callers, limiting practical impact to timing-based inference attacks.