iClaw is pre-1.0. Only the latest commit on the main and dev branches receives security fixes.

iClaw is a local-only UI binding to a local OpenClaw Gateway. The intended deployment is:

• Bound to 127.0.0.1 (loopback) on the user's own machine
• Accessed only from the same machine via http://localhost:3000
• Token-authenticated upstream against OpenClaw

If you expose iClaw on a network beyond loopback, you are responsible for adding your own authentication, TLS, and access controls in front of it.

• Path traversal, XSS, SSRF, prototype pollution, SQL injection in our code
• Bugs that leak OpenClaw bearer tokens, session keys, or chat content outside the local machine
• Crashes triggered by crafted user input or gateway responses

• Anything that requires the attacker to already have local OS-level access to your machine — at that point they can read ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json directly
• Vulnerabilities in OpenClaw itself — report those upstream at https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw
• Missing rate limiting on a single-user local app

Please do not open a public issue for security problems. Instead:

1. Open a private security advisory on GitHub: https://github.com/iClawApp/iClaw/security/advisories/new
2. Or contact the maintainers via the email listed on the GitHub profile

Please include:

• A description of the issue and its impact
• Steps to reproduce
• Affected version / commit SHA
• A proposed fix if you have one

We aim to acknowledge reports within 72 hours and to publish a fix within 14 days for confirmed issues. A coordinated disclosure window can be arranged on request.

• The gateway bearer token is read from ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json (mode 0600)
• SQLite database is at ./data/iclaw.db, no encryption-at-rest by default
• All chat history is stored locally; iClaw never sends it anywhere except OpenClaw