Update dependency soupsieve to v2.8.4 [SECURITY]

[renovate]

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
soupsieve	==2.7 → ==2.8.4

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Soup Sieve: Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via Selector Parser

CVE-2026-49477 / GHSA-836r-79rf-4m37

More information

Details

Summary

The CSS selector parser in soupsieve (the CSS selector engine for Beautiful Soup 4) contains a regular expression vulnerable to catastrophic backtracking. When processing an attribute selector with an unterminated quoted value, the VALUE regex pattern in css_parser.py enters exponential backtracking. A payload of only 300 bytes causes the regex engine to hang for over 3 seconds, enabling a trivial Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) attack.

To be completely transparent, AI tools helped surface this issue. However, this was independently reproduced and carefully validated.

Any application that passes untrusted CSS selector strings to soupsieve.compile() or Beautiful Soup's .select() / .select_one() is affected.

Details

Affected code: soupsieve/css_parser.py, line ~121 - RE_VALUES / VALUE regex pattern

The soupsieve CSS parser uses a compiled regular expression to tokenise attribute selector values. This pattern matches both quoted strings ("value" or 'value') and unquoted identifiers. The regex contains alternation branches for:

1. Double-quoted strings: "[^"\\]*(?:\\.[^"\\]*)*"
2. Single-quoted strings: '[^'\\]*(?:\\.[^'\\]*)*'
3. Unquoted identifiers

When an attribute selector contains an unterminated quoted value - e.g., [a="xxxx... (opening " but no closing ") -” the regex engine attempts to match the quoted-string branch. After that branch fails (no closing quote), the engine backtracks and attempts to match the remaining input against subsequent alternation branches and parent patterns. The structure of the pattern causes catastrophic backtracking where the number of backtracking steps grows exponentially with the length of the content between the opening quote and the end of the string.

Root cause: The regex pattern does not anchor or guard against the case where a quoted string is never terminated. The overlapping character classes across alternation branches create exponential backtracking when the quoted-string branch fails on long input.

Key characteristics:

• Input size: Only 300 bytes are needed to trigger a >3 second hang
• Amplification: Each additional character approximately doubles the backtracking time
• No memory impact: The attack consumes CPU only (regex backtracking is compute-bound)

Proof of Concept

import time
import soupsieve as sv

PAYLOAD_LEN = 300

##### Control: well-formed selector with terminated quote (completes instantly)
well_formed = '[a="' + ('x' * PAYLOAD_LEN) + '"]'
start = time.perf_counter()
try:
    sv.compile(well_formed)
except Exception:
    pass
control_time = time.perf_counter() - start
print(f"Well-formed selector ({len(well_formed)} bytes): {control_time:.4f}s")

##### Exploit: unterminated quote triggers catastrophic regex backtracking
malformed = '[a="' + ('x' * PAYLOAD_LEN)
start = time.perf_counter()
try:
    sv.compile(malformed)  # WARNING: This will hang for >3 seconds
except Exception:
    pass
exploit_time = time.perf_counter() - start
print(f"Malformed selector ({len(malformed)} bytes): {exploit_time:.4f}s")

slowdown = exploit_time / max(control_time, 1e-9)
print(f"Slowdown: {slowdown:.0f}x")

##### Expected output:

##### Well-formed selector (306 bytes): ~0.001s
##### Malformed selector (304 bytes): >3.0s (may need to be killed)

##### Slowdown: >3000x
#

##### NOTE: On some systems the malformed selector may hang indefinitely.
##### Use a timeout mechanism (signal.alarm, threading.Timer) when testing.

Safe testing variant with timeout:

import signal
import soupsieve as sv

def timeout_handler(signum, frame):
    raise TimeoutError("ReDoS confirmed: regex backtracking exceeded timeout")

PAYLOAD_LEN = 300
malformed = '[a="' + ('x' * PAYLOAD_LEN)

signal.signal(signal.SIGALRM, timeout_handler)
signal.alarm(3)  # 3-second timeout

try:
    sv.compile(malformed)
    print("Selector compiled (not vulnerable)")
except TimeoutError as e:
    print(f"VULNERABLE: {e}")
except Exception as e:
    print(f"Other error: {e}")
finally:
    signal.alarm(0)  # Cancel the alarm

Impact

Severity: High

An attacker can cause CPU exhaustion on any server-side Python application that compiles user-supplied CSS selectors via soupsieve. The attack is particularly dangerous because:

1. Tiny payload: Only 300 bytes are needed - well within typical URL parameter, form field, or API request limits
2. No special characters: The payload consists entirely of printable ASCII characters ([a="xxx...)
3. Exponential scaling: Each additional byte approximately doubles the backtracking time, making the attack easily tuneable
4. Thread blocking: The regex engine blocks the calling thread with no opportunity for interruption (except via OS signals)

Parameter	Value
Input size	300 bytes
CPU time consumed	>3 seconds (exponential with payload length)
Memory consumed	Negligible (CPU-only attack)
Authentication required	None
User interaction required	None

Deployment impact: In threaded or async web applications, a single malicious request blocks a worker thread for the duration of the backtracking. An attacker can submit multiple concurrent requests to exhaust all available workers, causing complete service denial. The small payload size makes the attack easy to deliver and difficult to detect via request size limits.

Downstream exposure: soupsieve is an automatic dependency of beautifulsoup4, one of the most widely installed Python packages. Any web application, API, or service that accepts CSS selectors from users is potentially affected.

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Credit

The vulnerability was discovered by a security research team from the University of Sydney, whose focus is detecting open source software vulnerabilities.
Liyi Zhou: https://lzhou1110.github.io/
Ziyue Wang: https://zyy0530.github.io/
Strick: https://str1ckl4nd.github.io/
Maurice: https://maurice.busystar.org/
Chenchen Yu: https://7thparkk.github.io/

Severity

• CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

References

• https://github.com/facelessuser/soupsieve/security/advisories/GHSA-836r-79rf-4m37
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-836r-79rf-4m37

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

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Soup Sieve has Memory Exhaustion via Large Comma-Separated Selector Lists

CVE-2026-49476 / GHSA-2wc2-fm75-p42x

More information

Details

Summary

The CSS selector parser in soupsieve (the CSS selector engine for Beautiful Soup 4) allocates unbounded memory when compiling large comma-separated selector lists. An attacker who can supply a crafted CSS selector string to soupsieve.compile() or Beautiful Soup's .select() / .select_one() can cause the application to allocate hundreds of megabytes of heap memory from a relatively small input, leading to memory exhaustion and denial of service.

To be completely transparent, AI tools helped surface this issue. However, it was independently reproduced and carefully validated. Researchers follow responsible disclosure practices and originally shared this report privately.

A 500 KB selector string triggers allocation of approximately 244 MB of heap memory - a 488x— amplification ratio**.

Details

Affected code: soupsieve/css_parser.py, lines ~204, 925, 1106

The soupsieve CSS parser splits comma-separated selector lists and creates one CSSSelector object per list item. Each CSSSelector object contains parsed selector data structures including SelectorList, Selector, and associated tag/attribute/pseudo-class metadata.

When a selector string such as a,a,a,... (with 250,000 comma-separated items) is passed to sv.compile(), the parser:

1. Tokenises the entire string and identifies each comma-delimited segment (line ~1106)
2. Parses each segment into a full Selector object with all associated metadata (line ~925)
3. Stores all parsed selectors in a SelectorList (line ~204)

Root cause: No limit is enforced on the number of selectors in a comma-separated list. The parser will attempt to parse and store an arbitrary number of selectors, with each selector object consuming approximately 976 bytes of heap memory. The total allocation scales linearly with the number of list items, but the amplification ratio (output memory / input bytes) is extremely high because each single-character selector like a expands into a complex object graph.

Attack surface: Any application that passes user-supplied CSS selectors to soupsieve.compile() or Beautiful Soup's .select() / .select_one().

Proof of Concept

import tracemalloc
import soupsieve as sv

tracemalloc.start()

##### Build a 500 KB selector string: "a,a,a,...,a" (250,000 items)
count = 250_000
selector = ",".join("a" for _ in range(count))
print(f"Selector string size: {len(selector):,} bytes ({len(selector) / 1024:.0f} KB)")

##### Compile the selector — this allocates ~244 MB
compiled = sv.compile(selector)

current, peak = tracemalloc.get_traced_memory()
tracemalloc.stop()

print(f"Compiled selector count: {len(compiled.selectors):,}")
print(f"Current memory: {current / 1024 / 1024:.1f} MB")
print(f"Peak memory: {peak / 1024 / 1024:.1f} MB")
print(f"Amplification ratio: {peak / len(selector):.0f}x")

##### Expected output:

##### Selector string size: 499,999 bytes (488 KB)
##### Compiled selector count: 250,000

##### Current memory: ~244 MB
##### Peak memory: ~244 MB

##### Amplification ratio: ~488x

Impact

Severity: High

An attacker can exhaust available memory on any server-side Python application that compiles user-supplied CSS selectors via soupsieve. This can cause:

• OOM kills in containerised deployments (Kubernetes pods, Docker containers) with memory limits
• Swap thrashing on bare-metal servers, degrading performance for all co-located processes
• Process termination via Python's MemoryError exception if the system runs out of addressable memory

Parameter	Value
Input size	~500 KB selector string
Memory allocated	~244 MB
Amplification ratio	~488×
Per-object overhead	~976 bytes per selector
Authentication required	None
User interaction required	None

Scalability of attack: The memory allocation scales linearly - doubling the selector count doubles memory usage. An attacker can tune the payload to exactly exhaust a target's memory limits. Multiple concurrent requests multiply the effect.

Downstream exposure: soupsieve is an automatic dependency of beautifulsoup4, one of the most widely installed Python packages. Any web application accepting CSS selectors from users (e.g., web scraping APIs, content filtering tools, CMS preview features) is potentially affected.

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Credit

Discovered by a security research team from the University of Sydney, focused on detecting open source software vulnerabilities.
Liyi Zhou: https://lzhou1110.github.io/
Ziyue Wang: https://zyy0530.github.io/
Strick: https://str1ckl4nd.github.io/
Maurice: https://maurice.busystar.org/
Chenchen Yu: https://7thparkk.github.io/

Severity

• CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

References

• https://github.com/facelessuser/soupsieve/security/advisories/GHSA-2wc2-fm75-p42x
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2wc2-fm75-p42x

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

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Release Notes

facelessuser/soupsieve (soupsieve)

v2.8.4

Compare Source

2.8.4

• FIX: Fix another inefficient attribute pattern (@​mauriceng98).
• FIX: Limit total number of selectors processed in a pattern to prevent massive selector requests (@​mauriceng98).

v2.8.3

Compare Source

2.8.3

• FIX: Fix inefficient attribute pattern.

v2.8.2

Compare Source

2.8.2

• FIX: Ensure custom selectors or namespace dictionaries reject non-string keys (@​mundanevision20).
• FIX: Fix handling of :in-range and :out-of-range with end of year weeks (@​mundanevision20).
• FIX: Fix a potential infinite loop in the pretty printing debug function (@​mundanevision20).

v2.8.1

Compare Source

2.8.1

• FIX: Changes in tests to accommodate latest Python HTML parser changes.

v2.8

Compare Source

2.8

• NEW: Drop support for Python 3.8.
• NEW: Add support for Python 3.14.
• NEW: Deploy with PyPI's "Trusted Publisher".

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