Proposal: Switch security reporting to GitHub private vulnerability reporting#292
Conversation
b9fc0b0 to
1aedd73
Compare
5d7b0f1 to
d93490e
Compare
…ty reporting Co-authored-by: Vadim Bauer <vb@container-registry.com> Co-authored-by: Orlin Vasilev <orlin@orlix.org> Co-authored-by: Prasanth Baskar <bupdprasanth@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Orlin Vasilev <orlin@orlix.org> Signed-off-by: Vadim Bauer <vb@container-registry.com> Signed-off-by: Prasanth Baskar <bupdprasanth@gmail.com>
d93490e to
e740938
Compare
OrlinVasilev
left a comment
There was a problem hiding this comment.
it was about time to improve here! +1
| @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ | |||
| # Proposal: Switch Security Reporting to GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting | |||
There was a problem hiding this comment.
There was a problem hiding this comment.
hmm... Wonder if such cases exist? Since people need to have access to GitHub in the first place to be able to conduct their research and find out about the reporting process in security.md..
My concern with that approach is, if we offer a possibility with minimal resistance, people will use it.
And then we have two processes in parallel, defeating the purpose.
As a compromise, I would suggest the following:
We keep our mailing list and set an autoreply telling people where and how to submit.
Moreover, we monitor the mailing list for complaints about the new process or the case where people cannot use GitHub... If we see something legitimate, we can act case by case.
There was a problem hiding this comment.
It's fine to have this limitation, just we should explicitly mention it in the documentation. Not a blocker for me.
|
|
||
| 1. **Governance sign-off** (maintainers / CNCF liaison): agree to the switch and to decommissioning the list; name the org owners / security managers who own the config. | ||
| 2. **Enable private reporting** (org owners / security managers): org-level security configuration across public repos, defaulted for new repos. | ||
| 3. **Define the workflow** (security team): triage ownership, SLA, labels, per-advisory scoping, CVSS usage, private-fork process, in-band CVE request. |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Currently, I don't think Harbor has such a security team.
There was a problem hiding this comment.
(security team) --> (maintainer)
| 2. **Enable private reporting** (org owners / security managers): org-level security configuration across public repos, defaulted for new repos. | ||
| 3. **Define the workflow** (security team): triage ownership, SLA, labels, per-advisory scoping, CVSS usage, private-fork process, in-band CVE request. | ||
| 4. **Update docs** (maintainers): rewrite `SECURITY.md`; note the GitHub-account requirement and any fallback. | ||
| 5. **Pilot** (security team): run one or two reports end-to-end (report → draft → fork → CVE → publish) before cutover. |
|
@bupd Im good to go, however, please resolve the above comments. |
|
love the proposal +1 |
Implements the reference version of goharbor/community#292 on harbor-next: - SECURITY.md: supported-versions table, concrete response targets (ack 3 business days, triage 7 days, critical fix 14 business days, disclosure within 90 days), reporter expectations (advisory collaboration, CVE, credit), fallback for reporters without a GitHub account, and a known-CVE deflection rule. - docs/security-process.md: maintainer runbook covering intake, triage with CVSS severity ladder, embargoed fix in a temporary private fork, in-band CVE request via GitHub as CNA, coordinated disclosure, release-note conventions, and a per-advisory checklist. - .github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/bug_report.yml: warning at the top telling reporters not to file security vulnerabilities as public issues. - .github/workflows/codeql.yml: CodeQL scanning for Go and TypeScript (build-mode none, security-extended queries). - .typos.toml: allow the CNA acronym. Signed-off-by: aloui ikram <ikram@container-registry.com>
…ting Replace the cncf-harbor-security mailing list with GitHub private vulnerability reporting as the intake channel for security reports, per goharbor/community#292. Private vulnerability reporting is enabled on the repository. - SECURITY.md: point reporters at the Security tab / Report a vulnerability form; describe the advisory-based triage, CVSS, in-band CVE request, and temporary private fork workflow; keep the mailing list only as a fallback for reporters without a GitHub account and for distributor list membership requests - Add issue template contact link routing vulnerability reports to the private advisory form - Add a security warning to the bug report template Signed-off-by: Vadim Bauer <vb@container-registry.com>
Proposal to replace the CNCF groups.io security mailing list (
cncf-harbor-security@lists.cncf.io) with GitHub private vulnerability reporting and repository security advisories as Harbor's vulnerability intake and handling workflow.Why
The mailing-list process is manual and fragmented: CVE requests are filed out-of-band with MITRE, fix PRs get developed in the public repo before embargo lifts, and email is a hurdle for reporters and maintainers.
Highlights
cncf-harbor-distributors-announce) and disclosure timing are unchangedDiscussion: Harbor community meeting 8 July 2026