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🛡️ Sentinel: [security improvement] Add missing deserialization functions to core taint propagation mapping #114

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🛡️ Sentinel: [security improvement] Add missing deserialization functions to core taint propagation mapping #114

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2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion src/wardline/scanner/rules/untrusted_to_deserialization.py
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ def _has_literal_true_kw(call: ast.Call, name: str) -> bool:
" obj = pickle.loads(blob)\n return blob",
# numpy.load without allow_pickle=True is safe by default (no object unpickling).
"@external_boundary\ndef read_raw(p):\n return p\n"
"@trusted(level='ASSURED')\ndef f(p):\n return numpy.load(read_raw(p))",
"@trusted(level='ASSURED')\ndef f(p):\n numpy.load(read_raw(p))\n return p",
),
)

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13 changes: 13 additions & 0 deletions src/wardline/scanner/taint/variable_level.py
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Expand Up @@ -67,6 +67,19 @@
"tomllib.load",
"tomli_w.dumps",
"tomli_w.dump",
"dill.dumps",
"dill.dump",
"dill.loads",
"dill.load",
"jsonpickle.encode",
Comment on lines +70 to +74
"jsonpickle.decode",
"joblib.dump",
"joblib.load",
"torch.save",
"torch.load",
"numpy.save",
Comment on lines +76 to +80

@chatgpt-codex-connector chatgpt-codex-connector Bot Jul 17, 2026

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P2 Badge Do not mark write-only save calls as raw returns

For trusted wrappers that return the result of these write-side APIs, _resolve_call now reports UNKNOWN_RAW just because the callee is in _SERIALISATION_SINKS; however joblib.dump(...) returns filenames and torch.save(...)/numpy.save(...) return no serialized data. This turns otherwise clean patterns such as return torch.save(obj, path) or return joblib.dump(obj, path) into PY-WL-101/downstream taint defects, so the write-only APIs should either be excluded from this return-taint set or modeled with their real return taint.

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"numpy.load",
Comment on lines +79 to +81

@chatgpt-codex-connector chatgpt-codex-connector Bot Jul 17, 2026

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P2 Badge Apply safe-loader gates before tainting returns

When numpy.load is called without literal allow_pickle=True, or torch.load is called with weights_only=True, PY-WL-106 explicitly treats the call as safe and suppresses it. Adding these names to the unconditional _SERIALISATION_SINKS set makes _resolve_call return UNKNOWN_RAW before any keyword gate, so a trusted producer like return numpy.load(read_raw(x)) or return torch.load(read_raw(x), weights_only=True) now raises PY-WL-101/downstream taint even though the deserialization rule is silent. Please either keep these gated APIs out of the unconditional set or mirror the same gates in variable-level tainting.

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"shelve.open",
}
)

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