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docs(docker): warn that mounting host ~/.claude leaks a billable token; note scoped-credential direction#107

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OGtwelve merged 1 commit into
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docs/docker-no-host-claude-mount-100
Jun 30, 2026
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docs(docker): warn that mounting host ~/.claude leaks a billable token; note scoped-credential direction#107
OGtwelve merged 1 commit into
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docs/docker-no-host-claude-mount-100

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@OGtwelve OGtwelve commented Jun 30, 2026

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Summary

Addresses the documentation/safety half of #100. docs/docker.md currently presents bind-mounting a human operator's ~/.claude as the standard auth method, with no warning that this shares a billable OAuth bearer token into the container (the agent runs as — and bills — that person, and the token can't be scoped or rotated per consumer).

Changes

  • docs/docker.md — adds a prominent warning at the Quick Start and the Claude Credentials section, and a new Authentication direction subsection documenting the target: authenticate unattended/multi-consumer deployments through a central Claude proxy with a scoped, rotatable per-consumer credential — never a human's subscription token. The bind-mount is reframed as a local-only stopgap.

Note

Removing the bind-mount outright (and wiring the scoped-credential auth) requires the proxy auth path to exist, so this PR covers the docs/safety portion only.

Refs #100

Summary by CodeRabbit

  • Documentation
    • Expanded Docker setup guidance with clearer security warnings about mounting local credentials.
    • Added stronger notes for shared, unattended, and multi-tenant environments to help avoid exposing billable tokens.
    • Clarified the recommended authentication approach for broader deployments and emphasized that the sample bind-mount is intended for local use only.

…n; note scoped-credential direction

Surfaces the credential-leak risk of bind-mounting a human operator's ~/.claude into the agent container (the agent runs as and bills that person; the token can't be scoped or rotated per consumer) and documents the target: authenticate unattended deployments through a central Claude proxy with a scoped, rotatable per-consumer credential. The bind-mount is now framed as a local-only stopgap.

Removing the mount outright awaits the proxy auth path being wired up.

Refs #100
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📝 Walkthrough

Walkthrough

docs/docker.md receives expanded security guidance in three places: a new warning in the Quick Start section, a rewritten Claude Credentials subsection, and an expanded Security Note/Authentication Direction block — all emphasizing OAuth token leakage risks from ~/.claude bind-mounts and directing unattended/multi-consumer deployments toward a central Claude proxy with scoped, rotatable credentials.

Changes

Docker Credentials Security Documentation

Layer / File(s) Summary
OAuth token risk warnings and proxy credential guidance
docs/docker.md
Adds [!WARNING] blocks in the Quick Start, Claude Credentials, and Security Note/Authentication Direction sections. Warns that mounting ~/.claude exposes a human's subscription OAuth token on shared/unattended hosts, restricts the bind-mount to local single-operator use, and describes authenticating unattended deployments via a central Claude proxy with per-consumer scoped and rotatable credentials.

Estimated code review effort

🎯 1 (Trivial) | ⏱️ ~3 minutes

Possibly related issues

  • developerz-ai/venom.is#30: Directly addresses the same ~/.claude bind-mount pattern and the push toward scoped, rotatable proxy credentials — the documentation changes in this PR reflect exactly that concern.
🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 5
✅ Passed checks (5 passed)
Check name Status Explanation
Description Check ✅ Passed Check skipped - CodeRabbit’s high-level summary is enabled.
Title check ✅ Passed The title clearly matches the doc update: it warns about host ~/.claude token leakage and points to scoped credentials.
Docstring Coverage ✅ Passed No functions found in the changed files to evaluate docstring coverage. Skipping docstring coverage check.
Linked Issues check ✅ Passed Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request.
Out of Scope Changes check ✅ Passed Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request.
✨ Finishing Touches
🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
  • Create PR with unit tests
  • Commit unit tests in branch docs/docker-no-host-claude-mount-100

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@OGtwelve OGtwelve merged commit d6b4a1c into main Jun 30, 2026
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@OGtwelve OGtwelve deleted the docs/docker-no-host-claude-mount-100 branch June 30, 2026 04:36
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