[Security] Fix CodeQL alert #34: Deserialization of user-controlled data

[colin-d-fried]

Summary

Fixes CodeQL alert #34: Deserialization of user-controlled data

Field	Value
Severity	critical
File	vulnerable_deserialization.py
CWE	CWE-502
Alert	CodeQL Alert #34

Fix Applied

See the diff for the specific secure coding change applied.

Fixes #36

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Note

High Risk
Changes request deserialization behavior and removes the pickle import while other code paths still call pickle.loads, which can cause runtime failures and leaves other unsafe deserializations unchanged.

Overview
Updates vulnerable_deserialization.py to stop using pickle.loads on raw POST body data in the /load route, switching to json.loads and replacing the pickle import with json.

Other routes and helpers still call pickle.loads (now without importing pickle), so the PR likely introduces NameError at runtime and does not address remaining user-controlled deserialization sites.

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[cursor]

Cursor Bugbot has reviewed your changes and found 1 potential issue.

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[cursor]

Removed pickle import but kept pickle usage

High Severity

The import pickle statement was removed and replaced with import json, but pickle.loads() is still called on line 20 in restore_session(). This will cause a NameError at runtime when the /session endpoint is hit. Additionally, the security fix is incomplete — this endpoint still deserializes user-controlled data with pickle, which was the exact vulnerability the PR aims to fix.

 

[devin-ai-integration]

Devin Review found 1 potential issue.

View 2 additional findings in Devin Review.

[devin-ai-integration]

🔴 Removed import pickle but pickle is still used in multiple places, causing NameError at runtime

The PR replaces import pickle with import json but only migrates one of the six pickle.loads() call sites to json.loads(). The remaining five usages at lines 20, 29, 40, 50, and 53 will raise NameError: name 'pickle' is not defined at runtime. This breaks the /session endpoint, /import endpoint, deserialize_object(), and both DataProcessor methods.

Prompt for agents

In vulnerable_deserialization.py, the `import pickle` was removed on line 1 and replaced with `import json`, but pickle is still referenced on lines 20, 29, 40, 50, and 53. Either:
1. Add `import pickle` back (line 1) alongside `import json` to restore the remaining pickle usages, OR
2. Migrate ALL pickle.loads() call sites to use json.loads() (or another safe deserialization method) to complete the intended security fix.

Option 2 is strongly recommended since pickle.loads on untrusted input is a remote code execution vulnerability. Replace pickle.loads() with json.loads() at lines 20, 29, 40, 50, and 53, adjusting for the fact that json.loads expects str/bytes of JSON, not pickle byte streams.

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