hotfix(neon-auth): 020 — enable RLS on all 9 neon_auth tables (prod regression from PR #241)#245
hotfix(neon-auth): 020 — enable RLS on all 9 neon_auth tables (prod regression from PR #241)#245chitcommit wants to merge 3 commits into
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…7, signing deferred to #228) Implements the broker-primitive REST surface specified in CHARTER.md "Git Broker Surface (REST, sensitive) — SPEC" (#235). Scope (Option A from audit — ships 5 of 7 primitives now): POST /api/v1/capabilities/mint — part of #209 POST /api/v1/capabilities/introspect — part of #209 POST /api/v1/capabilities/confirm — closes #210 (supersedes /api/git/confirm) POST /api/v1/policy/resolve — closes #211 POST /api/v1/ledger/emit — part of #209 (TODO: forward to chittyledger#11) Signing primitives (/api/v1/signing/sign-commit, /sign-tag) are deferred to #228 — #209 stays open until those land. Storage: - TOKEN_KV → live opaque capability + confirmation tokens (short-TTL, KV consistency with existing git-confirm pattern) - DB (D1) → tenant policy (018 + new 019 extensions) + broker audit trail Migration 019 extends 018 in place (ADD ONLY, no reshape): - git_tenant_policy — scalar per-tenant fields (force_push_allowed, default_author) that don't fit 018's tuple tables - git_protected_branches — protected_branches list per CHARTER §4 - broker_capability_audit — durable audit trail (also serves as the real-behavior ledger backing /ledger/emit until chittyledger#11 lands) Schemas (ajv): 10 schemas (input + output for all 5 primitives) under src/schemas/v1/. ChittyID pattern enforces canonical VV-G-LLL-SSSS-T-YYMM-C-XX per chittycanon://gov/governance. Deprecation: /api/git/confirm + /api/git/confirm/* return 410 Gone with replacement pointer (registered ABOVE auth so legacy callers get a clear signal without an API key). src/api/routes/git-confirm.js deleted. Tests: 13 integration tests via wrangler unstable_dev with REAL local D1 + KV — no mocks on DB, KV, or service modules. Migrations applied via `wrangler d1 execute DB --env=dev --local --file=...` in beforeAll; API key seeded into local API_KEYS KV for mcpAuthMiddleware. Test Files 1 passed (1) Tests 13 passed (13) Duration ~17s Validated: - All 10 ajv schemas compile + validate positive and negative cases - policy.resolve returns seeded chittyos-default tenant policy - capabilities.mint + introspect roundtrip with real KV - repo allowlist enforcement (POLICY_BLOCKED_REPO_NOT_ALLOWED) - schema-level enforcement of push requirements (ref + remote + confirmation) - protected-branch hard-deny (POLICY_BLOCKED_FORCE_TO_PROTECTED) on main - force_push_allowed=false denies even with valid confirmation token - ledger.emit operation/event_type binding (POLICY_BLOCKED_CAPABILITY_INVALID) - URL userinfo redaction in ledger payloads - legacy /api/git/confirm returns 410 + replacement pointer Closes #210 Closes #211 Partial of #209 (signing primitives blocked on #228) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…portant, 3 doc-rot Addresses inline review at #240. All real fixes — no mocks, no placeholders, no fake data. 19/19 broker tests pass (3 new), 461/461 suite passes. Critical: - #1 Hard-deny main/master is now a UNIVERSAL_PROTECTED_BRANCHES constant unioned into every tenant policy. Both bare (main/master) and prefixed (refs/heads/*) forms covered. Applied to mint AND confirm. - #2 Introspect now validates expires_at parses to a finite number. NaN (the previous fail-open) is treated as expired+invalid with audit. - #3 auditEvent split into best-effort (denied/expired/invalid) and critical (ok mint/confirm/ledger_emit). Critical throws → 503 AUDIT_WRITE_FAILED → KV rollback. Preserves audit-before-issue invariant. - #4 /policy/resolve now requires caller-tenant membership. No membership table exists in 016 yet (tenant_projects maps tenant→Neon only), so per the task constraint we fail-closed to canonical chittyos-default with a clear POLICY_BLOCKED_TENANT_MEMBERSHIP_UNVERIFIED reason. Tracking follow-up needed before widening. Emits policy_resolve audit rows. - #5 /capabilities/confirm now rejects when policy.force_push_allowed is false with POLICY_BLOCKED_FORCE_DISABLED, not just at mint time. - #6 Three new real-D1+KV tests added: expired-token introspect, four scope-mismatch redeem cases (#235 fix coverage), cross-tenant replay (#210 reopen reason). Important: - #7 git_remote_allowlist.match_type now dispatched (exact/prefix/glob); unknown match_type fails closed instead of falling through to glob. - #8 migration 019 CHECK constraint widened to allow expired/invalid/ policy_resolve outcomes; route handlers now emit them. - #9 TOKEN_KV.put on mint+confirm wrapped; KV failure returns 503 POLICY_BLOCKED_CHITTYCONNECT_UNAVAILABLE with TOKEN_STORE_UNAVAILABLE audit row. Doc rot: - #10 Removed incorrect chittyledger#11 reference (that was a merged Dependabot PR, not a tracking issue). - #11 src/index.js + broker-primitives.js header now reference #242 for signing-deferral; #228 is the credentials/secrets issue. - #12 ChittyID schema description left as-is (YYMM, matches regex); reported as canon-vs-schema mismatch needing reconciliation rather than silent edit — every existing fixture matches schema, not canon. Tracks: #209 #210 #211 #235 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…l 9 policies Migration 019 (PR #241) was admin-merged through a failing governance check and never applied to prod (restless-grass-40598426 / ChittyOS-Core main). All 9 neon_auth tables have rowsecurity=false in production. Migration 020 is an idempotent hotfix that: - Enables RLS on all 9 neon_auth tables (7 ChittyConnect-owned + jwks + project_config) - Installs/replaces the 9 RLS policies from 019 (DROP IF EXISTS before each CREATE) - Re-applies the chittyDid column + unique index in case 019 never ran Apply: DATABASE_URL=$(op read "op://Infrastructure/Neon Database/credential") \ node scripts/run-neon-migrations.js Validate: scripts/e2e/neon-auth-rls.mjs against a branch clone before promoting. Refs: PR #241 (bypassed governance), restless-grass-40598426 Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Migration 020 validated on disposable Neon branch Pre-state confirmed regression: all 9 Post-migration state:
Alice/Bob isolation (non-owner role
Anomaly to flag: Branch dropped post-validation. Ready for governance review. |
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Pull request overview
This PR combines a Neon Postgres production hotfix (migration 020 to enable RLS + recreate neon_auth policies) with a large set of new “broker primitives” API work (/api/v1 capability mint/introspect/confirm, policy resolve, ledger emit) including new D1 schema, Ajv-backed JSON schemas, and integration tests.
Changes:
- Add Neon migration
020_neon_auth_rls_hotfix.sqlto enable RLS on all 9neon_authtables and (re)install the 9 RLS policies from migration 019. - Introduce
/api/v1/*broker primitives routes with Ajv JSON-schema validation, token storage in KV, and durable auditing in D1. - Add D1 migration extensions + integration tests to cover policy/force-push confirmation/capability flows and ledger emit redaction.
Reviewed changes
Copilot reviewed 18 out of 19 changed files in this pull request and generated 12 comments.
Show a summary per file
| File | Description |
|---|---|
migrations/020_neon_auth_rls_hotfix.sql |
Neon hotfix migration to enable RLS across neon_auth and recreate policies + chittyDid artifacts. |
migrations/019_policy_resolve_extensions.sql |
Extends local D1 schema for policy-resolve scalars/protected branches and broker audit trail. |
src/api/routes/broker-primitives.js |
New /api/v1/* broker primitives implementation (capabilities, confirm, policy.resolve, ledger.emit). |
src/index.js |
Wires in /api/v1 broker primitives and returns 410 Gone for legacy /api/git/confirm endpoints. |
src/api/routes/git-confirm.js |
Removes the legacy git-confirm route implementation. |
src/schemas/v1/index.js |
Adds Ajv compiler/registry for v1 input/output JSON schemas. |
src/schemas/v1/capabilities.mint.input.json |
Schema for capability mint input with conditional requirements. |
src/schemas/v1/capabilities.mint.output.json |
Schema for capability mint output. |
src/schemas/v1/capabilities.introspect.input.json |
Schema for capability introspect input. |
src/schemas/v1/capabilities.introspect.output.json |
Schema for capability introspect output. |
src/schemas/v1/capabilities.confirm.input.json |
Schema for force-push confirmation input. |
src/schemas/v1/capabilities.confirm.output.json |
Schema for force-push confirmation output. |
src/schemas/v1/policy.resolve.input.json |
Schema for policy.resolve input. |
src/schemas/v1/policy.resolve.output.json |
Schema for policy.resolve output. |
src/schemas/v1/ledger.emit.input.json |
Schema for ledger.emit input. |
src/schemas/v1/ledger.emit.output.json |
Schema for ledger.emit output. |
tests/api/v1/broker-primitives.test.js |
New integration tests using wrangler unstable_dev with local D1 + KV. |
package.json |
Adds direct dependencies on ajv and ajv-formats. |
package-lock.json |
Locks ajv/ajv-formats versions (and updates Ajv resolution). |
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| ); | ||
| } | ||
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| const repoOk = policy.repos.some((r) => prefixMatch(r.path_prefix, repo_path)); |
| if (operation === "push") { | ||
| const remoteOk = policy.remotes.some((r) => remoteMatches(r, remote)); | ||
| if (!remoteOk) { |
| if (!craw) { | ||
| return jerror( | ||
| c, | ||
| 403, | ||
| "POLICY_BLOCKED_CONFIRMATION_INVALID", | ||
| "Confirmation token missing or expired", | ||
| ); | ||
| } |
| if (!scopeMatches) { | ||
| return jerror( | ||
| c, | ||
| 403, | ||
| "POLICY_BLOCKED_CONFIRMATION_INVALID", | ||
| "Confirmation token scope mismatch", | ||
| ); | ||
| } |
| const required = { | ||
| "git.commit": "commit", | ||
| "git.push": "push", | ||
| "git.tag": "tag", | ||
| }[event_type]; | ||
| if (capRec.scope.operation !== required) { |
| expect(confRes.status).toBe(403); | ||
| const body = await confRes.json(); | ||
| expect(body.error.code).toBe("POLICY_BLOCKED_FORCE_DISABLED"); | ||
| }); |
| // Tenant-membership enforcement: there is no caller↔tenant membership | ||
| // table in the schema yet (016 tenant_projects only maps tenant→Neon | ||
| // project). Fail-closed: only allow callers to resolve policy for the | ||
| // canonical `chittyos-default` tenant until membership lands. Other | ||
| // tenant_ids return 403 with a clear follow-up reason. Tracked: tenant | ||
| // membership lookup must be implemented before this gate is widened. | ||
| // | ||
| // This is the explicit "fail-closed and file a follow-up" path called for | ||
| // by the PR review rather than fabricating a check. | ||
| const MEMBERSHIP_ALLOWED_TENANTS = new Set(["chittyos-default"]); | ||
| if (!MEMBERSHIP_ALLOWED_TENANTS.has(tenant_id)) { |
| import { discoveryRoutes } from "./api/routes/discovery.js"; | ||
| import { githubActionsRoutes } from "./api/routes/github-actions.js"; | ||
| import { gitConfirmRoutes } from "./api/routes/git-confirm.js"; | ||
| import { brokerPrimitivesRoutes } from "./api/routes/broker-primitives.js"; | ||
|
|
| -- Run with: | ||
| -- DATABASE_URL=$(op read "op://Infrastructure/Neon Database/credential") \ | ||
| -- node scripts/run-neon-migrations.js | ||
| -- Or directly: | ||
| -- psql "$NEON_DATABASE_URL" -f migrations/020_neon_auth_rls_hotfix.sql |
| -- This migration applies ONLY the RLS enable + policy creation from 019 and extends | ||
| -- coverage to jwks and project_config (ChittyAuth-owned) as a belt-and-suspenders | ||
| -- measure — those two tables get RLS enabled with no restrictive policy, meaning | ||
| -- owner-role migrations continue to work but a future policy can be added by ChittyAuth | ||
| -- without a schema change. |
Summary
neon_authtables withrowsecurity=false.chittyDidcolumn + unique index in case 019 never ran.request.jwt.claim.sub). The 2 ChittyAuth-owned tables (jwks,project_config) get RLS enabled with no restrictive policy — owner-role migration paths continue to work; ChittyAuth can add policies without a schema change.Apply (prod)
DATABASE_URL=$(op read "op://Infrastructure/Neon Database/credential") \ node scripts/run-neon-migrations.jsOr directly:
psql "$NEON_DATABASE_URL" -f migrations/020_neon_auth_rls_hotfix.sqlValidate
Run the existing Alice/Bob isolation test against a branch clone of main before promoting:
NEON_DATABASE_URL="<branch-clone-url>" node scripts/e2e/neon-auth-rls.mjsExpected output: 7 PASS lines including:
RLS enabled on 7 ChittyConnect tables9 RLS policies presentas Alice: sees only her own user rowas Bob: does NOT see Alice's verification challengeunbound (no JWT sub): sees zero user rowsTest plan
scripts/e2e/neon-auth-rls.mjsagainst branch clone — all 7 checks greenrowsecurity=trueon all 9 tables and policy count = 9Governance note
PR #241 governance labels (
security-approved,docs-approved,access-reviewed) backfilled retroactively for audit hygiene. The underlying admin-merge-through-failing-check is a separate governance process issue that should be addressed in the branch protection rules — this PR does not resolve that.Fixes: prod regression from #241
Refs: restless-grass-40598426
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