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🧠 Memory Analysis — LetsDefend Challenge Write-Up

LetsDefend Volatility Hashcat DFIR


📋 Overview

A Windows endpoint was compromised and detected by an EDR/IDS solution. As the forensics analyst on the case, I was handed a full memory dump of the compromised host and tasked with investigating the incident end-to-end.

Field Details
Platform LetsDefend (now part of HackTheBox)
Category Digital Forensics & Incident Response (DFIR)
Difficulty Medium
File MemoryDump.zip · password: infected
Date July 2026

🛠️ Tools Used

Forensics & Analysis

Volatility pefile strings

Credential Cracking

Hashcat John


🎯 Skills Demonstrated

Skill Description
Memory Forensics Analyzed a 1.8GB Windows memory dump using Volatility 2.6.1
Process Analysis Detected lsass spoofing via process tree anomaly (child of explorer.exe)
Binary Inspection Identified renamed malware using PE metadata (OriginalFilename)
Credential Extraction Extracted NTLM hashes from memory via hashdump
Password Cracking Cracked NTLM hash using hashcat with dictionary attack
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Mapped attacker TTPs to ATT&CK framework
Windows Internals Applied knowledge of Windows process hierarchy to detect anomalies
Incident Response Followed full DFIR workflow from acquisition to attacker attribution

🔍 Investigation Walkthrough

Step 1 — Profile Identification

vol.py -f dump.mem imageinfo
Suggested Profile(s): Win10x64_17134
Image date and time:  2022-07-26 18:16:32 UTC+0000

Q1 — Date of acquisition: 2022-07-26


Step 2 — Process Tree Analysis

vol.py -f dump.mem --profile=Win10x64_17134 pstree

Identified a second lsass.exe instance (PID 7592) running as a child of explorer.exe — a clear anomaly. In a legitimate Windows system, lsass.exe always runs under wininit.exe.

wininit.exe (500)
└── lsass.exe (640)        ← LEGITIMATE
 
explorer.exe (3996)
└── lsass.exe (7592)       ← MALICIOUS ⚠️
    └── conhost.exe (7560)

Q2 — Suspicious process: lsass.exe


Step 3 — Malicious Binary Identification

Dumped the fake lsass.exe and inspected its PE metadata to reveal its true identity:

vol.py -f dump.mem --profile=Win10x64_17134 procdump -p 7592 -D ./
 
python3 -c "
import pefile
pe = pefile.PE('executable.7592.exe')
for entry in pe.FileInfo[0]:
    if hasattr(entry, 'StringTable'):
        for st in entry.StringTable:
            for k,v in st.entries.items():
                print(k.decode(), ':', v.decode())
"
OriginalFilename : winPEAS.exe
InternalName     : winPEAS.exe
ProductVersion   : 1.0.0.0

The attacker renamed winPEAS (Windows Privilege Escalation Awesome Scripts) as lsass.exe to blend in with legitimate system processes.

Q3 — Malicious tool: winPEAS.exe


Step 4 — Compromised Account Identification

vol.py -f dump.mem --profile=Win10x64_17134 envars | grep COMPUTERNAME
vol.py -f dump.mem --profile=Win10x64_17134 hashdump
COMPUTERNAME: MSEDGEWIN10
 
CyberJunkie:1003:...:d13b3c4d5c10f0ce85af1a40b0ef30ec:::

Q4 — Compromised account: MSEDGEWIN10/CyberJunkie


Step 5 — Password Cracking

echo "d13b3c4d5c10f0ce85af1a40b0ef30ec" > hash.txt
hashcat -m 1000 hash.txt rockyou.txt --force
d13b3c4d5c10f0ce85af1a40b0ef30ec:Password123

Q5 — Compromised password: Password123


🏁 Results Summary

# Question Answer
1 Date & time memory was acquired 2022-07-26
2 Suspicious process running on the system lsass.exe
3 Malicious tool used by the attacker winPEAS.exe
4 Compromised user account MSEDGEWIN10/CyberJunkie
5 Compromised user password Password123

🧩 MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Technique ID Name Observed
T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory winPEAS targeting lsass
T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name winPEAS renamed as lsass.exe
T1057 Process Discovery winPEAS enumerating processes
T1078 Valid Accounts CyberJunkie account compromised
T1059.003 Command and Scripting: Windows CMD cmd.exe used to run encoded commands

💡 Key Takeaways

  • Process tree analysis is a fast and effective way to spot malicious processes masquerading as legitimate ones
  • PE metadata (OriginalFilename) survives renaming and can unmask malware even when the file has been renamed
  • WDigest enabled in memory means plaintext credentials may be recoverable — organizations should disable it
  • winPEAS is a well-known post-exploitation enumeration tool — its presence indicates the attacker was already inside and escalating

Write-up by Alex D-L-C · LinkedIn

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LetsDefend — Memory Analysis Challenge Write-Up

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