security: CWE-22: Path traversal in Export-TrustCertificate — VC-53778#401
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torresashjiancyber wants to merge 1 commit into
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security: CWE-22: Path traversal in Export-TrustCertificate — VC-53778#401torresashjiancyber wants to merge 1 commit into
torresashjiancyber wants to merge 1 commit into
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…t-TrustCertificate VC-53778
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Summary
This PR fixes a path traversal vulnerability (CWE-22) in
Export-TrustCertificatewhere unsanitized server-suppliedcertificateNamevalues were used directly in file path construction.Finding
CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
The
Export-TrustCertificatefunction (aliasExport-VcCertificate) joined server-returnedcertificateNamefield to the operator's-OutPathparameter without sanitization at three locations:An attacker controlling
certificateNamecould use path traversal sequences (e.g.,../../../etc/passwd) to write files outside the intended output directory, potentially overwriting critical system files.Remediation
Applied fail-closed validation at all three vulnerable sites:
[IO.Path]::GetFileName()This approach:
/,\)app.example.com)Verification
Join-Pathcallsites now use sanitized$safeNamevariable