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Security: TGPSKI/conceit

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Supported Versions

Version Supported
0.1.x

Reporting a Vulnerability

Report privately via GitHub Security Advisory, which allows coordinated disclosure. Please don't open a public issue for a vulnerability.

Include the affected file and line numbers, and a reproduction if you have one.

Trust model

conceit is a single-user build tool. It runs on your workstation, with your privileges, and compiles code it downloads from the internet. The threat model assumes one trusted operator; there is no sandbox between conceit and the rest of your machine.

  • build_cmd is passed to eval, deliberately. Preset composition needs it, and the presets are the point of the tool. The consequence is that BUILD_CMD, PREBUILD_CMD, and BUILD_DIST_CMD execute arbitrary shell as you. Never set them from anything you didn't write, and never run conceit somewhere those can come from a webhook, a CI variable, or a config file someone else can edit.

  • The build is the supply chain. conceit clones from GitHub and installs from PyPI over HTTPS, with no verification beyond git transport security and whatever uv enforces. A compromised upstream repo or package lands compiled code in your venv. That's true of every from-source build — conceit just automates it. Pin hashes in a requirements file if that trade isn't acceptable to you.

  • sudo is used exactly once, in install-cuda-toolkit.sh, to run NVIDIA's runfile installer. Read the script before running it. It builds a temp directory of compiler symlinks and puts it on PATH for that one command; it does not touch your system compiler.

  • Build logs land in /tmp and are world-readable on most Linux systems (/tmp/build-upstream-*.log). Upstream build systems occasionally echo environment values. The log is removed when the build exits, but it exists for the hours in between — set TMPDIR somewhere private if that matters.

  • Patches execute nothing, but they do modify source. make patch-* applies committed diffs to cloned upstream trees before you compile them. Read a patch before trusting it, same as any other diff.

Out of scope

Vulnerabilities in PyTorch, vLLM, llama.cpp, or the CUDA toolkit — report those upstream. conceit builds this software; it doesn't maintain it.

There aren't any published security advisories