feat(analyzer): detect privileged container execution and escape primitives as PE5#214
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CharmingGroot wants to merge 1 commit into
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feat(analyzer): detect privileged container execution and escape primitives as PE5#214CharmingGroot wants to merge 1 commit into
CharmingGroot wants to merge 1 commit into
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…itives as PE5 PE4 detects Docker socket access; PE5 is its CLI counterpart for privileged container execution and escape primitives (docker run --privileged / -v /:/ / --cap-add=SYS_ADMIN, host namespaces --pid/net=host, --device, --security-opt unconfined, nsenter, cgroup release_agent, /proc/<pid>/ns/, unshare --map-root-user) that reach the same host takeover. Mirrors PE4's best-confidence-per-line pass with the documentation-example filter. Signed-off-by: CharmingGroot <ohyes9711@gmail.com>
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Approving — strong additive PE5 (privileged container / container escape) detection: privileged flags, host-root mount, dangerous --cap-add, host namespaces, --device, unconfined, nsenter, the cgroup release_agent escape (CVE-2022-0492 class, 0.95), /proc/<pid>/ns/, and unshare. Per-line best-confidence dedup avoids double-reporting a multi-flag docker run, doc examples are filtered, and existing PE1–PE4 are untouched. Test coverage is excellent.
Non-blocking: --device[=\s]+/dev/ (0.7) will also flag legitimate hardware passthrough (e.g. /dev/nvidia0, /dev/snd); acceptable for a manual-review signal at that confidence, but worth keeping an eye on for FP noise.
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Summary
PE4 (#189) detects Docker socket access. This adds PE5, its CLI counterpart: privileged container execution and container-escape primitives that reach the same host takeover through
docker runflags and kernel interfaces. Verified undetected on v2.3.5 in #213.Changes
static_patterns_privilege_escalation.pygainsPE5_PATTERNS(--privileged, host root mount-v /:,--cap-add=SYS_ADMIN, host namespaces--pid/net=host,--device,--security-opt …=unconfined,nsenter, cgrouprelease_agent,/proc/<pid>/ns/,unshare --map-root-user) and a best-confidence-per-line PE5 pass that mirrors PE4, with the documentation-example filter applied. PE5 findings are HIGH.Testing
12 new tests cover each primitive (privileged, host root mount, cap-add, host namespaces, nsenter, release_agent, unshare), multi-flag dedup (one finding per line), a benign
docker runnegative, and a markdown documentation-example exclusion.make formatandmake lintpass;uv run pytest -m "not integration and not provider"reports 999 passed, 0 failed.Closes #213