feat (4/5): spec-correct WinRM HTTP/HTTPS transport + connection-oriented auth#23
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irvingouj@Devolutions (irvingoujAtDevolution) merged 3 commits intoJun 23, 2026
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…ed auth Over plain HTTP, SSPI message sealing is used (application/HTTP-SPNEGO-session- encrypted). Over HTTPS, TLS provides confidentiality so the body is sent plain (application/soap+xml) and authentication is connection-oriented (RFC 4559): the connection is authenticated once during the handshake (the first operation rides the SPNEGO challenge legs) and every subsequent operation reuses that authenticated connection. requires_sspi_sealing() is therefore true only for plain HTTP. Key points: - SSPI INTEGRITY (sign) is requested unconditionally; CONFIDENTIALITY (seal) only when sealing. INTEGRITY over HTTPS lets the server trust the connection and produces the NTLM MIC / SPNEGO mechListMIC. - EPA channel binding (tls-server-end-point): learned from the server cert after a 401 and applied on a restarted auth sequence. - AlreadyComplete is handled consistently across all four transports (tokio direct, gateway, sync, web). - Fail fast on terminal auth rejection (401 -> PwshCoreError::Auth), try_join! so a failed handshake short-circuits, and the non-interactive client exits non-zero on failure / clean on success (command_completed is authoritative). - Basic over plain HTTP is refused unless --http-insecure is given.
…lding Add the 10-case transport_auth_matrix asserting the WinRM rule against a real server: HTTP+SSPI seals; HTTPS+SSPI is unsealed (TLS); Basic refused over plain HTTP unless forced, allowed (unsealed) over HTTPS. Helpers: sealed() detects the multipart/encrypted envelope, connected() detects pipeline completion. Also makes the shared e2e scaffolding auth-aware: e2e_pwsh_config gains default_auth_method(); native_pty_matrix and pty_harness use it (the default DC refuses Basic over HTTP), and fall back to the standard e2e host/creds out of the box.
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test (5/5): transport × auth × sealing e2e matrix
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Stack 4 of 5 — base:
stack/03-writeprogress-nil(stacked on #22).Makes the WinRM transport/auth spec-correct:
application/HTTP-SPNEGO-session-encrypted).application/soap+xmlwith connection-oriented auth (RFC 4559) — the connection is authenticated once
during the handshake (first op rides the SPNEGO legs), then reused for every op.
only when sealing — this is what lets the server trust the unsealed HTTPS connection
(and yields the NTLM MIC / SPNEGO mechListMIC).
tls-server-end-point) learned from the server cert.AlreadyCompletehandled consistently across all four transports (tokio/gateway/sync/web).PwshCoreError::Auth),try_join!so a failed handshakeshort-circuits, and the non-interactive client exits non-zero on failure / clean on
success. Basic over plain HTTP refused unless
--http-insecure.Verified end-to-end against a real DC.