Chore bump contract versions due to bytecode changes

[Dargon789]

Summary by Sourcery

Add Merkle tree–based signature support to IthacaAccount and update the wrapped signature format and tests accordingly.

New Features:

• Support verifying Merkle tree–based digests by wrapping a root signature and Merkle proof in IthacaAccount signatures.

Enhancements:

• Extend the wrapped signature encoding to include a flag indicating Merkle-based verification and bump the IthacaAccount EIP-712 version to 0.5.11.

Tests:

• Add fuzz tests for Merkle-based signature validation, including invalid digests, tampered proofs, and wrong roots, and update existing test helpers and gas simulation tests to the new signature format.

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Project	Deployment	Actions	Updated (UTC)
legion	Ready	Preview, Comment	Apr 11, 2026 1:56pm

[sourcery-ai]

Reviewer's Guide

Adds Merkle tree–based signature wrapping/verification support to IthacaAccount, updates the wrapped-signature format to include a merkle flag, adjusts all test helpers and call sites accordingly, and introduces fuzz tests for Merkle signature validation while bumping the account contract version.

Updated class diagram for IthacaAccount Merkle signature support

classDiagram
    class IthacaAccount {
        +unwrapAndValidateSignature(bytes32 digest, bytes signature) bool isValid
        +unwrapAndValidateSignature(bytes32 digest, bytes signature) bytes32 keyHash
        -_verifyMerkleSig(bytes32 digest, bytes signature) bool isValid
        -_verifyMerkleSig(bytes32 digest, bytes signature) bytes32 keyHash
        +getNameAndVersion() string name
        +getNameAndVersion() string version  "0.5.11"
    }

    class MerkleProofLib {
        <<library>>
        +verifyCalldata(bytes32[] proof, bytes32 root, bytes32 leaf) bool
    }

    class LibBytes {
        <<library>>
        +loadCalldata(bytes data, uint256 offset) bytes32
        +truncatedCalldata(bytes data, uint256 newLength) bytes
    }

    class EfficientHashLib {
        <<library>>
        +sha2(bytes32 input) bytes32
    }

    class ECDSA {
        <<library>>
        +recoverCalldata(bytes32 digest, bytes signature) address
    }

    class IIthacaAccount {
        <<interface>>
    }

    class EIP712 {
    }

    class GuardedExecutor {
    }

    IthacaAccount ..|> IIthacaAccount
    IthacaAccount --|> EIP712
    IthacaAccount --|> GuardedExecutor

    IthacaAccount ..> MerkleProofLib : uses
    IthacaAccount ..> LibBytes : uses
    IthacaAccount ..> EfficientHashLib : uses
    IthacaAccount ..> ECDSA : uses

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File-Level Changes

Change	Details	Files
Introduce Merkle-based wrapped signature verification path in IthacaAccount and extend unwrapAndValidateSignature format.	Import MerkleProofLib and add internal _verifyMerkleSig that decodes (proof, root, rootSig) from calldata using assembly and verifies the digest against the Merkle root via MerkleProofLib.verifyCalldata, then validates the root with unwrapAndValidateSignature Update unwrapAndValidateSignature encoding contract comment to include an extra bool merkle flag, adjust trailer parsing to read two flag bytes (prehash and merkle), and branch to _verifyMerkleSig when the merkle flag is set before falling back to direct key-based verification	src/IthacaAccount.sol
Update wrapped signature construction in tests to include the new merkle flag byte and keep non-Merkle paths compatible.	Modify P-256, secp256k1, multi-sig, and helper intent-signature builders to append an extra uint8(0) merkle flag after the existing prehash byte Update all test scenarios that build junk or simulation signatures to include the new trailing merkle flag byte so length and parsing match the contract expectations	test/Base.t.sol test/Orchestrator.t.sol test/SimulateExecute.t.sol
Add fuzz test coverage for Merkle-based signatures and adjust EIP-712 domain decoding to ignore removed fields.	Import a Merkle implementation for testing, construct randomized Merkle trees over digests, and test valid proofs, invalid digests, tampered proofs, and tampered roots through unwrapAndValidateSignature using the new Merkle signature encoding Simplify eip712Domain destructuring in tests to only read verifyingContract, ignoring removed name/version fields now that the domain type hash is fixed	test/Account.t.sol
Bump IthacaAccount contract version string to reflect bytecode/signature format changes.	Update eip712NameAndVersion to return version 0.5.11 instead of 0.5.10	src/IthacaAccount.sol

Possibly linked issues

• Porto.sh #46: They both concern adding Merkle wrapped signature support, updating wrapped signature layout, tests, and bumping the account version.

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[mergify]

⚠️ The sha of the head commit of this PR conflicts with #50. Mergify cannot evaluate rules on this PR. Once #50 is merged or closed, Mergify will resume processing this PR. ⚠️

[sourcery-ai]

Hey - I've found 1 issue, and left some high level feedback:

• In _verifyMerkleSig, the inline assembly that decodes abi.encode(bytes32[] proof, bytes32 root, bytes rootSig) is quite brittle; consider either adding explicit comments asserting the expected ABI layout (head/tail offsets) or using a small abi.decode shim to reduce the chance of subtle offset bugs when this tuple changes.
• Now that unwrapAndValidateSignature interprets the last two bytes as prehash and merkle flags, it may be clearer and safer to define these as a dedicated flags byte/enum or bitmask rather than two raw trailing bytes, so future flag extensions can be made without changing the wrapping format again.
• If nested merkle signatures are not an intended feature, consider guarding in _verifyMerkleSig against rootSig itself being marked as merkle (e.g., via a format/version byte) to avoid accidental recursive merkle verification paths in unwrapAndValidateSignature.

Prompt for AI Agents

Please address the comments from this code review:

## Overall Comments
- In `_verifyMerkleSig`, the inline assembly that decodes `abi.encode(bytes32[] proof, bytes32 root, bytes rootSig)` is quite brittle; consider either adding explicit comments asserting the expected ABI layout (head/tail offsets) or using a small `abi.decode` shim to reduce the chance of subtle offset bugs when this tuple changes.
- Now that `unwrapAndValidateSignature` interprets the last two bytes as `prehash` and `merkle` flags, it may be clearer and safer to define these as a dedicated flags byte/enum or bitmask rather than two raw trailing bytes, so future flag extensions can be made without changing the wrapping format again.
- If nested merkle signatures are not an intended feature, consider guarding in `_verifyMerkleSig` against `rootSig` itself being marked as `merkle` (e.g., via a format/version byte) to avoid accidental recursive merkle verification paths in `unwrapAndValidateSignature`.

## Individual Comments

### Comment 1
<location path="src/IthacaAccount.sol" line_range="493-502" />
<code_context>
+    function _verifyMerkleSig(bytes32 digest, bytes calldata signature)
</code_context>
<issue_to_address>
**issue (bug_risk):** The ABI decoding for `signature` in `_verifyMerkleSig` does not match `abi.encode(bytes32[] proof, bytes32 root, bytes rootSig)` layout and will read the wrong words.

The assembly currently assumes the `bytes` payload starts directly with `[proofLength, proof..., root, rootSigLength, rootSig...]`, but `abi.encode(bytes32[] proof, bytes32 root, bytes rootSig)` uses standard tuple encoding with an inner header:

- At `signature.offset` you first have the `bytes` length `L`; the ABI data starts at `dataOffset = signature.offset + 0x20`.
- The first three words at `dataOffset` are: offset to `proof` (0x20), `root` value, and offset to `rootSig` (0x60). The actual `proof` array and `rootSig` bytes are in the dynamic region after this header.

Given that:
- `proofOffset := add(signature.offset, calldataload(signature.offset))` points to the end of the outer `bytes`, not the start of `proof`.
- `root := calldataload(add(signature.offset, 0x20))` reads the `proof` offset, not `root`.
- `rootSigOffset := add(signature.offset, calldataload(add(signature.offset, 0x40)))` also ignores `dataOffset` and the inner layout.

You’ll need to:
- define `let dataOffset := add(signature.offset, 0x20)`;
- read the proof offset, `root`, and rootSig offset relative to `dataOffset`;
- then derive `proof.length` / `proof.offset` and `rootSig.length` / `rootSig.offset` from those.

Otherwise `MerkleProofLib.verifyCalldata` and `unwrapAndValidateSignature(root, rootSig)` operate on corrupted calldata, invalidating the verification logic.
</issue_to_address>

Fix all in Cursor

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[gemini-code-assist]

Code Review

This pull request introduces Merkle tree-based signature verification to the IthacaAccount contract, allowing a single root signature to authorize multiple digests. The implementation adds a _verifyMerkleSig internal function and updates unwrapAndValidateSignature to handle a new merkle flag in the signature suffix. Review feedback identifies high-severity security risks in the assembly-based decoding of Merkle signatures, specifically the absence of input length validation and bounds checks for offsets, which could lead to reading arbitrary calldata. There is also a documentation discrepancy regarding the signature encoding format that needs to be addressed.

[snyk-io]

✅ Snyk checks have passed. No issues have been found so far.

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✅	Open Source Security	0	0	0	0	0 issues

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[mergify]

⚠️ The sha of the head commit of this PR conflicts with #50. Mergify cannot evaluate rules on this PR. Once #50 is merged or closed, Mergify will resume processing this PR. ⚠️