🛡️ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix SSRF bypass via HTTP Redirects in webhook alerts#304
🛡️ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix SSRF bypass via HTTP Redirects in webhook alerts#304seonghobae wants to merge 5 commits into
Conversation
|
👋 Jules, reporting for duty! I'm here to lend a hand with this pull request. When you start a review, I'll add a 👀 emoji to each comment to let you know I've read it. I'll focus on feedback directed at me and will do my best to stay out of conversations between you and other bots or reviewers to keep the noise down. I'll push a commit with your requested changes shortly after. Please note there might be a delay between these steps, but rest assured I'm on the job! For more direct control, you can switch me to Reactive Mode. When this mode is on, I will only act on comments where you specifically mention me with New to Jules? Learn more at jules.google/docs. For security, I will only act on instructions from the user who triggered this task. |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Pull request overview
OpenCode cannot approve yet because required coverage evidence did not pass.
Review outcome
1. HIGH .github/workflows/opencode-review.yml:1 - Coverage evidence did not prove required test/docstring evidence
-
Problem: The required coverage-evidence job result was
failure, so OpenCode cannot establish approval sufficiency for this head. -
Root cause: Automated approval is only valid when the same-head coverage-evidence job proves supported repository test suites passed and configured docstring gates passed or were advisory, or reports not applicable because no supported source files or package manifests exist. Missing, failed, skipped, unavailable, or unsupported-tooling test evidence is a blocker.
-
Fix: Install or configure the repository test/docstring evidence tooling when source files or package manifests exist, rerun the current-head coverage-evidence job, and approve only after it reports
successwith required evidence or explicit no-source not-applicable evidence. -
Regression test: Keep the approval branch checking
needs.coverage-evidence.result == successbefore posting APPROVE, and publish REQUEST_CHANGES when coverage-evidence blocker states such as cancelled, skipped, failed, unsupported-tooling, or below-100 evidence are present. -
Result: REQUEST_CHANGES
-
Reason: coverage-evidence result was
failure, so required test/docstring evidence was not proven for current head7cb660516b515b1e407e32ce0c95863fc87a91da. -
Head SHA:
7cb660516b515b1e407e32ce0c95863fc87a91da -
Workflow run: 29342545408
-
Workflow attempt: 1
Coverage evidence
Coverage Decision
- Result: FAIL
- Test evidence: not proven passing
- Docstring evidence: not proven passing when configured
- Failure count: 1
Changed-File Evidence Map
flowchart LR
PR["PR changed files"] --> Evidence["OpenCode bounded evidence"]
Evidence --> S1["Changed file (2 files)"]
S1 --> I1["repository behavior"]
I1 --> R1["Review risk: Changed file (2 files)"]
R1 --> V1["required checks"]
Evidence --> S2["Test: test_controlplane.py"]
S2 --> I2["regression suite"]
I2 --> R2["Review risk: Test: test_controlplane.py"]
R2 --> V2["targeted test run"]
OpenCode Review Overview
Pull request overviewOpenCode cannot approve yet because required coverage evidence did not pass. Review outcome1. HIGH .github/workflows/opencode-review.yml:1 - Coverage evidence did not prove required test/docstring evidence
Coverage evidenceCoverage Decision
Changed-File Evidence Mapflowchart LR
PR["PR changed files"] --> Evidence["OpenCode bounded evidence"]
Evidence --> S1["Changed file (2 files)"]
S1 --> I1["repository behavior"]
I1 --> R1["Review risk: Changed file (2 files)"]
R1 --> V1["required checks"]
Evidence --> S2["Test: test_controlplane.py"]
S2 --> I2["regression suite"]
I2 --> R2["Review risk: Test: test_controlplane.py"]
R2 --> V2["targeted test run"]
|
…rts and fix importlib.resources compatibility
…rts and fix importlib.resources compatibility
…rts and fix importlib.resources compatibility
…rts and fix importlib.resources compatibility
🚨 Severity: HIGH
💡 Vulnerability: SSRF Bypass via HTTP Redirects. The
_send_alertfunction validated the URL prefix and scheme using_is_safe_url(), but relied onurllib.request.urlopen, which automatically follows HTTP 307/308 redirects by default. A malicious server could return a redirect to an internal IP address (like 127.0.0.1 or 169.254.169.254), bypassing the initial URL check and causing an SSRF on the server.🎯 Impact: An attacker could perform Server-Side Request Forgery against the internal network, potentially accessing sensitive cloud metadata (e.g., AWS IMDSv2) or internal services.
🔧 Fix: Added
NoRedirectHandler(inheriting fromurllib.request.HTTPRedirectHandler) to explicitly raise an error when a redirect is attempted, and configured it usingurllib.request.build_opener(NoRedirectHandler)within_send_alert. Also updatedtests/test_controlplane.pyto mock the newOpenerDirector.openmethod appropriately.✅ Verification: Unit tests have been run via
pytest tests/test_controlplane.pyto ensure generic and slack alerts still work properly while redirect vulnerabilities are patched.PR created automatically by Jules for task 10518850999162872362 started by @seonghobae