Queer the Stacks is a single-user, self-hosted reading dashboard and recommender (MIT). By design it runs private and local-only: your Calibre and KOReader data are read read-only, reading data never leaves the instance, there is no telemetry, and the dashboard serves only behind auth (401 without a valid STACKS_AUTH_TOKEN). That posture is the first line of defense; this policy covers what to do when something slips past it.

Queer the Stacks is pre-1.0, so only the latest minor on the latest major receives security fixes. Fixes ship forward in a new patch release (a published version is never re-published).

When 0.2.0 ships, 0.1.x security support ends and this table is updated in the same release.

Please do not open a public GitHub issue, pull request, or discussion for a security report.

Report privately, by either:

1. GitHub Security Advisory — open a draft advisory via Security → Report a vulnerability on the repository (preferred; keeps the report, fix, and GHSA linked), or
2. Email — ckellyreif@gmail.com with subject SECURITY: queer-the-stacks.

Please include, as far as you can:

• the affected version or commit and the mode (CLI ingest, served dashboard, or recommender),
• a minimal reproduction or proof-of-concept,
• the impact you believe it has, and
• any suggested remediation.

If you want an encrypted channel, say so in a first low-detail email and we will arrange one.

A fix ships forward in a new patch release, and the release notes reference the advisory (GHSA).

In scope: the queer-the-stacks package and the stacks CLI, the ingest pipeline, the FastAPI dashboard/app server, the recommender, the CI workflows, and the dependency supply chain (installs resolve above known-vulnerable floors and are scanned in CI — pip-audit, a secret scan, a Trivy container CVE scan, and SHA-pinned Actions).

Especially in scope, given the local-only design:

• any path that writes to or could corrupt the real Calibre metadata.db or KOReader statistics.sqlite (they must be opened strictly read-only; see docs/audits/library-safety.md),
• any path that exfiltrates reading data off the instance (unexpected network egress, telemetry, or a leak in a generated share card), and
• any way to reach the dashboard or its data without a valid auth token.

Out of scope: recommendation quality and representation correctness are product/eval concerns, not vulnerabilities — file those as normal issues. Accessibility regressions are a merge-blocking quality gate, not a security report. There is no bundled corpus of secrets or PII; the repository ships no credentials (secrets come from the environment only and are blocked in CI).

• Keep the deployment single-user and behind auth; set a strong STACKS_AUTH_TOKEN and never commit it. The dashboard returns 401 without it — keep it that way.
• Point ingest at copies/snapshots of your libraries where possible; the tool snapshots first and opens sources read-only, but least privilege on the files is still worth having.
• Provide the optional KOReader sync key via the environment (STACKS_KOSYNC_KEY), never a committed file.
• Run make security (dependency + secret scan) before deploying and stay on the pinned lockfile.