feat(options)!: maximum native-layer access + visibility (typed options, observability, escape hatches) [WIP]#318
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…th framing) Replaces the dead AppAuth-era options shell with a typed, first-party surface. BREAKING (allowed for v1): removes the AppAuth-framed classes/enum. - New: OidcNativeOptionsAndroid (colorSchemes, shareState, showTitle, urlBarHidingEnabled, ephemeralBrowsing, closeButtonPosition, preferredBrowserPackages, useAuthTab, partialCustomTabs, warmup, rawIntentExtras, allowInsecureConnections) + sub-types (OidcCustomTabsColorSchemes, OidcColorSchemeParams, OidcPartialCustomTabs) and enums (OidcColorScheme, OidcCustomTabsShareState, OidcCustomTabsCloseButtonPosition, OidcPartialTabResizeBehavior, OidcAuthTabMode, OidcCustomTabsWarmup). - New: OidcNativeOptionsApple (prefersEphemeralWebBrowserSession, additionalHeaderFields, callbackMode [OidcAppleCallbackMode], rawSessionOptions). - Marker interface OidcPlatformOptionsMarker. - REMOVED: OidcPlatformSpecificOptions_AppAuth_Android/_IosMacos, OidcAppAuthExternalUserAgent, externalUserAgent, and the AppAuth-bridge mapTo* helpers. oidc_flutter_appauth now uses flutter_appauth's own ExternalUserAgent directly. - iOS/macOS preferEphemeral reads prefersEphemeralWebBrowserSession. - Updated conformance manager, example auth page, and all tests (oidc_ios 8/8, oidc_macos 7/7, oidc_flutter_appauth 12/12 green; oidc_core + 5 packages analyze with 0 errors). Regenerated .g.dart. These typed options are not yet forwarded over the channel (Phase 1) — this commit is the Dart API surface only. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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- Dart: oidc_android/ios/macos now forward the serialized per-platform options (`options.<platform>.toJson()`) over the channel. Set explicitToJson on the options classes with nested objects so toJson() yields pure maps the StandardMessageCodec can carry (jsonEncode output is unchanged). - Kotlin OidcPlugin: buildCustomTabsIntent() applies showTitle, urlBarHidingEnabled, ephemeralBrowsing (setEphemeralBrowsingEnabled), shareState, closeButtonPosition, colorScheme + CustomTabColorSchemeParams (default/light/dark), and partial-tab height/resize/cornerRadius/background; rawIntentExtras forwarded as primitive Intent extras. Colors read as Number->toInt() to handle the ARGB Int/Long channel ambiguity. Every androidx.browser API used was verified against the actual browser-1.10.0 AAR (javap), incl. setEphemeralBrowsingEnabled. - Test: oidc_android asserts the serialized options (enums by name, ARGB ints, nested color params) cross the channel (8/8 green). Service-bound options (preferred browser package, warmup, Auth Tab) come in a later phase; non-serializable decorations will use a native builder hook. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…rity (Phase 2) iOS + macOS ASWebAuthenticationSession now read the forwarded Apple options: - callbackMode (auto|customScheme|https): "auto" derives https-vs-customScheme from the redirect scheme (existing iOS behavior); explicit modes force it. - additionalHeaderFields: applied to the initial request. macOS reaches iOS parity: it now uses the modern init(url:callback:) / ASWebAuthenticationSession.Callback API behind `#available(macOS 14.4, *)` (previously only the deprecated init(url:callbackURLScheme:)), with the old init as the pre-14.4 fallback. Both version gates verified against Apple's docs JSON: Callback and additionalHeaderFields are iOS 17.4 / macOS 14.4. Test: oidc_ios asserts callbackMode + additionalHeaderFields cross the channel (9/9 green); ios+macos analyze with 0 errors. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
… stream (Phase 3) Per review feedback, native browser observability flows through the EXISTING `OidcUserManager.events()` stream — not a separate API. - `OidcNativeBrowserEvent` (sealed) now extends `OidcEvent`, with typed subtypes: OidcBrowserOpeningEvent / OidcBrowserOpenedEvent (resolvedBrowserPackage, sessionType, captureMode) / OidcBrowserRedirectReceivedEvent (REDACTED — scheme/host/has-code/state/error, never the raw URI) / OidcBrowserFlowCancelledEvent / OidcBrowserFlowFailedEvent (structured OidcNativeError) / OidcBrowserNativeWarningEvent. - Bridge: OidcUserManagerBase.init() forwards an overridable `listenToNativeBrowserEvents()` into `eventsController`; the oidc manager fills it from `OidcFlutter.nativeBrowserEvents()` -> `OidcPlatform.nativeBrowserEvents()` (an EventChannel per platform). Empty on web/desktop. Consumers just use `manager.events()`. - Native emission: Kotlin (Custom Tabs) + iOS/macOS (ASWebAuthenticationSession) EventChannel stream handlers emit opening/opened/redirectReceived/cancelled/ failed at the plugin's control points, on the main thread, with a per-flow id. - Tests: native_events parsing (7/7); analyze 0 errors across all 6 packages. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds the Chrome 137+ Auth Tab path: the browser captures the redirect itself and returns it via the ActivityResult API (AuthTabIntent + AuthResult), so no OidcRedirectActivity / manifest placeholder is needed for that flow. - Opt-in via `OidcNativeOptionsAndroid.useAuthTab = force`. Requires a ComponentActivity host (e.g. FlutterFragmentActivity); registered via the key-based activityResultRegistry (a plugin can't register in onCreate). - `auto`/`never` and a plain FlutterActivity keep the proven Custom Tabs + OidcRedirectActivity path (no breaking change to the default). When `force` is requested but the host isn't a ComponentActivity, emits a warning and falls back. - Maps RESULT_OK/CANCELED/VERIFICATION_FAILED/VERIFICATION_TIMED_OUT to the Dart contract + observability events; https/App-Links variant supported. - Every androidx.browser.auth API verified against the real browser-1.10.0 AAR (javap): AuthTabIntent(.Builder), AuthResult(resultCode,resultUri), AuthenticateUserResultContract, RESULT_* codes, setEphemeralBrowsingEnabled. NOTE: runtime behavior is CI-compile-validated only; the actual Auth Tab flow needs on-device verification (FlutterFragmentActivity + a supporting browser). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…is a follow-up) Adds the Pigeon schema for the native transport (OidcAndroidHostApi / OidcAppleHostApi + an @EventChannelApi event stream) and excludes pigeons/ from analysis. Codegen is verified working (pigeon 26.3.4, run globally since it conflicts with the workspace analyzer pin via copy_with_extension_gen). The full handler wiring (rewrite the 3 native handlers + 3 Dart impls to the generated APIs, atomically) is intentionally a separate, device-validated follow-up — it replaces the working, channel-contract-tested transport and is entirely CI/device-validated. See .omc/pigeon-migration-plan.md for the verified recipe + remaining steps. #318 ships its value (typed options + observability + AuthTab) on the proven transport. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replaces the hand-rolled MethodChannel/EventChannel transport across all three
native plugins with the Pigeon-generated, compiler-enforced host APIs and event
channel (schema: oidc_platform_interface/pigeons/oidc_native.dart):
- Dart: oidc_android -> OidcAndroidHostApi; oidc_ios/oidc_macos ->
OidcAppleHostApi; nativeBrowserEvents() -> streamNativeEvents(). Failure modes
(USER_CANCELLED -> null, PRESENTATION_CONTEXT_INVALID -> null on logout,
channel-error -> OidcException) preserved.
- Kotlin OidcPlugin implements OidcAndroidHostApi; events via PigeonEventSink.
All Custom Tabs / AuthTab / lifecycle-cancellation logic unchanged.
- iOS + macOS OidcPlugin conform to OidcAppleHostApi + a Pigeon event handler.
ASWebAuthenticationSession retain/lifecycle, iOS 17.4/macOS 14.4 callback: +
additionalHeaderFields, ephemeral, and presentation anchors unchanged.
- Generated outputs committed (oidc_native.g.{dart,kt,swift}); the Apple Swift
is one platform-guarded file shared by iOS + macOS.
Automation (no manual steps): tool/generate_native.dart + `melos run
generate:native` regenerate all four outputs from the single schema (Pigeon run
as a pinned global tool to avoid the workspace analyzer conflict; macOS Swift
mirrored automatically). Generated Dart excluded from analysis.
BREAKING CHANGE: OidcNativeChannels is deprecated (Pigeon owns channel names).
Tests rewritten to assert the Pigeon channel contract. Verified:
format + analyze (0 issues) + flutter test (all green) on the 4 packages.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…es, honest native option docs
- README: the package IS an OpenID-Certified Relying Party (was stale "NOT
certified yet") — the strongest, and previously contradicted, selling point.
- oidc_ios/oidc_macos podspecs: license BSD -> MIT (matches root LICENSE +
pub.dev).
- oidc_android manifest: add the Android 11+ <queries> element for browsers /
Custom Tabs providers (package visibility; prerequisite for any browser
selection/warmup). Mirrors AppAuth-Android.
- oidc_android example: app/build.gradle used the stale `appAuthRedirectScheme`
placeholder while the plugin manifest reads `${oidcRedirectScheme}`, so the
example never captured its redirect. Fixed.
- oidc_core platform_options: document the four option fields that are not yet
wired natively (preferredBrowserPackages, warmup, rawSessionOptions) or cannot
be honored on Custom Tabs (allowInsecureConnections) as reserved/no-op, so the
v1 API does not over-promise. Surfaced by the cross-language native audit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…security) Closes the cross-language audit's P0: id_tokens were validated fail-OPEN — a signature that failed verification was logged and the token accepted UNVERIFIED, because `strictJwtVerification` defaulted to false. A forged/tampered id_token would have been trusted. - Default `OidcUserManagerSettings.strictJwtVerification` to true; also default `OidcUser.fromIdToken` / `replaceToken` `strictVerification` to true, so the library is secure-by-default everywhere. A verification failure now throws instead of silently downgrading to an unverified token. - validateUser: add OIDC Core §3.1.3.7 checks the generic JWT validation misses — `azp` (must equal client_id when present; required when multiple audiences) and `nbf` (reject not-yet-valid tokens, with the same clock-skew tolerance as exp). - createUserFromToken: enforce OIDC Core §12.2 on refresh — a freshly-issued id_token must keep the same `sub` (and `iss`) as the prior one; refuse a possible account swap. - New unit tests prove the fail-closed default (forged signature rejected; unverified accepted only when explicitly opted out; valid signature accepted). Full oidc_core suite green. BREAKING CHANGE: id_token signature verification is now strict by default. Apps relying on the previous lenient behavior (accepting unverifiable id_tokens) must fix their JWKS/keystore configuration, or opt out via `strictJwtVerification: false` (not recommended). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…+ model Implements the PAR transport layer (previously an empty stub): - OidcPushedAuthorizationResponse (request_uri + expires_in). - OidcEndpoints.pushAuthorizationRequest(): POSTs an existing OidcAuthorizeRequest (authenticated) to the pushed_authorization_request_ endpoint and returns the single-use request_uri. Mirrors the deviceAuthorization endpoint shape (client auth via header or body). - Unit tests (MockClient): asserts the authorize params are form-POSTed and the request_uri/expires_in are parsed; and that an OAuth error response surfaces as an OidcException. Discovery already parses pushed_authorization_request_endpoint and require_pushed_authorization_requests; this makes PAR usable directly. Wiring it into the automatic login flow (an OidcAuthorizeRequest.requestUri field + a settings opt-in, so PAR-mandating IdPs work transparently) is the next step. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
b4d92ea flipped `strictJwtVerification` to true by default. This test exchanges an intentionally-unsigned mock id_token and serves no JWKS, so verification now (correctly) rejects it. Opt the test out of strict verification — it exercises device-code polling, not id_token validation. Note: b4d92ea's "full oidc_core suite green" was read off a piped `tail` exit code rather than `dart test`'s, so this one regression was missed. The suite is now genuinely green (123 tests). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Builds on the PAR endpoint (6eb09f8) to use it automatically: - OidcAuthorizeRequest gains a non-serialized `requestUri`; generateUri emits ONLY client_id + request_uri when it's set (RFC 9126 §4). @jsonkey( includeToJson:false) keeps it out of the PAR body / toMap (verified: req.g.dart unchanged after regen). - New setting OidcPushedAuthorizationRequestsMode {auto, always, never} (default auto). `auto` pushes only when the server advertises require_pushed_authorization_requests -> non-breaking for non-PAR IdPs; `always` forces it; `never` opts out. - loginAuthorizationCodeFlow posts the prepared request to the PAR endpoint (authenticated) after state/nonce/PKCE are persisted, then continues by reference. Missing endpoint when required -> clear OidcException. - Defense-in-depth: pushAuthorizationRequest strips request_uri from the body (RFC 9126 §2.1) even if a caller supplies one via extra params. - 10 flow tests via a new reusable capturing-manager harness (front channel = client_id+request_uri only; PAR body excludes request_uri but carries extra params; auto/always/never; missing endpoint; error mapping). Designed + adversarially reviewed (3-lens workflow, verdict ship-with-fixes, all LOW items folded in). Full oidc_core suite green (123). BREAKING CHANGE: under `auto` (default), IdPs advertising require_pushed_authorization_requests now get PAR automatically. The authorization hook cannot mutate parameters under PAR (frozen at push time) — use extraAuthenticationParameters instead. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…int + manager
Phase 1 (crypto, no flow wiring yet): the cryptographically-critical building
blocks for Demonstrating Proof of Possession, fully unit-tested.
- oidc_dpop.dart: pure functions — oidcDPoPPublicJwk (drops private material),
oidcJwkThumbprint (RFC 7638, EC/RSA/OKP), oidcGenerateDPoPJti (>=96-bit),
oidcNormalizeHtu (origin+path, lowercase, strip query/fragment/default-port),
oidcDPoPAth (base64url SHA-256 ASCII), and oidcCreateDPoPProof building the
proof JWT (typ=dpop+jwt, alg via recipient, public jwk header; jti/htm/htu/iat
+ optional ath/nonce). alg is set only via addRecipient to avoid jose_plus's
protected-header equality guard; generated keys carry no kid.
- OidcDPoPAlgorithm {es256(default),es384,es512,rs256} + OidcDPoPSettings.
- OidcDPoPManager: per-session key, RFC 7638 thumbprint (dpop_jkt), per-endpoint
nonce cache, createTokenProof / createResourceProof.
Tests (13): the RFC 7638 §3.1 thumbprint vector (authoritative value), proof
header/claim shape, the signature self-verifying against the embedded public
jwk (proves correct ES256 JOSE signature format), no private-key/kid leakage,
ath binding, htu normalization, nonce inclusion, and an RS256 proof. Full
oidc_core suite green (136).
Next: wire DPoP injection into the token endpoint (manager lifecycle + the 5
token sites), then the use_dpop_nonce retry, then PAR/UserInfo binding.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adversarial crypto review caught a real high-severity bug the original tests missed: jose_plus emits EC coordinates as minimal big-endian, dropping a leading zero byte (~1/128 generated P-256 keys). That produced an embedded `jwk` and an RFC 7638 thumbprint shorter than a spec-compliant server computes, silently breaking DPoP sender-constrained binding (cnf.jkt / dpop_jkt mismatch) for roughly 1 in ~100 sessions. The RFC-7638 RSA vector test never caught it (RSA `n` always has its top bit set) and the self-verify test compared the jwk to itself. - oidcDPoPPublicJwk + oidcJwkThumbprint now left-pad EC `x`/`y` to the curve's fixed octet length (P-256->32, P-384->48, P-521->66) per RFC 7518 §6.2.1.2. - oidcDPoPAth now throws a typed OidcException (not a raw ArgumentError) on a non-ASCII access token; keeps ascii.encode (the spec-correct encoding). - Dropped the unreachable OKP branches (no EdDSA signing exists). - Tests (+4 -> 17): a regression test that finds a short-coordinate key and asserts re-padding to 32 bytes; ath ASCII/non-ASCII; htu path-case. Full oidc_core suite green (140). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Wires the DPoP crypto core (43f566d) into the token flow: - New `OidcUserManagerSettings.dpop` (OidcDPoPSettings?, default null = disabled, non-breaking). - `OidcUserManagerBase.dpopManager`: lazily creates ONE OidcDPoPManager (and proof key) per manager and reuses it, so refresh proofs are signed with the same sender-constraining key as the original exchange (RFC 9449 §5). - `tokenHeadersWithDPoP(endpoint, base)` adds the `DPoP: <proof>` header for a token-endpoint POST; applied at all 5 token call-sites (code exchange, password, device, and both refresh paths) via the shared defaultExecution seam — never the 2 revocation sites. Tests (3, new login_dpop_flow_test): a real code->token exchange asserts the token request carries a valid proof (typ/alg, public jwk w/o `d`, htm=POST, htu=token endpoint, jti, no ath); disabled-by-default sends no header; and two requests reuse the same embedded jwk (refresh binding). Full oidc_core suite green (143). Next: the use_dpop_nonce retry, then PAR `dpop_jkt` + UserInfo `ath` binding. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Extends validateUser with two OpenID Connect Core checks from the audit: - aud strictness (§3.1.3.7): an id_token whose `aud` contains an audience other than the client_id (or one listed in the new `settings.allowedAudiences`) is now rejected — it was minted for someone else. Closes the "additional audiences not trusted by the Client MUST be rejected" requirement. - at_hash (§3.2.2.9): when an id_token carries `at_hash` alongside an access_token, it MUST equal base64url(left-half(hash(access_token))) using the id_token's signing-alg hash. Mismatch is rejected (detects a mismatched/ swapped access token, esp. in implicit/hybrid). - New pure, tested helpers oidcComputeTokenHash + oidcReadJwtAlg (utils/token_hash.dart) — reusable for c_hash later. Tests (+9): the at_hash algorithm verified by independent computation across SHA-256/384/512; aud-strictness reject/allow; at_hash match/mismatch. Full oidc_core suite green (152). BREAKING CHANGE: id_tokens with an untrusted extra audience, or a mismatched at_hash, are now rejected. Add trusted audiences via `OidcUserManagerSettings.allowedAudiences`. Deferred (need more plumbing): c_hash (requires the authorization code at validation time) and auth_time-vs-max_age (a SHOULD; requires threading the requested max_age). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The library now builds the client-authentication assertion itself, instead of
requiring a caller-supplied `client_assertion`:
- New OidcClientAuthentication.privateKeyJwtGenerated({signingKey, algorithm})
and .clientSecretJwtGenerated({clientSecret, algorithm}). The signing material
is held in memory (private fields, never serialized).
- resolveForRequest(audience) mints a fresh, single-use assertion per request
(RFC 7523 §3 / OIDC §9): iss = sub = client_id, aud = the endpoint URL,
plus jti, iat, and a short exp; private_key_jwt is signed with the asymmetric
key, client_secret_jwt is HMAC-signed with the secret (which never leaves the
client). Other auth methods return `this` unchanged.
- OidcEndpoints.token / deviceAuthorization / pushAuthorizationRequest /
revokeToken now call resolveForRequest(endpoint) so the per-request assertion
is minted with the correct audience.
Tests (4): the private_key_jwt assertion verifies against its public key with
the right claims; the client_secret_jwt HMAC verifies with the secret (and the
secret is never sent); a fresh jti per request; non-jwt auth is unchanged. Full
oidc_core suite green (156).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…oken endpoint) Centralizes DPoP proof generation + the RFC 9449 §8 nonce challenge in OidcEndpoints.token (which owns the request/response), replacing phase 1b's manager-side header injection: - OidcEndpoints.token gains an OidcDPoPManager? param. Each attempt (re)builds the single-use client assertion + DPoP proof. On an OidcException whose error is `use_dpop_nonce` with a `DPoP-Nonce` response header, it caches the nonce and retries exactly once with the nonce in the proof. - The 5 manager token call-sites now pass `dpopManager:` instead of injecting the header themselves; the `tokenHeadersWithDPoP` helper is removed (the `dpopManager` getter stays). Cleaner + the retry can re-mint the proof. Tests (+1 -> 4 flow tests): a server returns 400 use_dpop_nonce + DPoP-Nonce on the first token POST and 200 on the second; asserts exactly two POSTs and that only the second proof carries the nonce. Phase-1b behavior preserved. Full oidc_core suite green (157). Next: phase 3 — PAR dpop_jkt binding + UserInfo ath/DPoP-scheme. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
… scheme Completes DPoP (RFC 9449) end to end: - PAR: when DPoP is enabled and `bindAuthorizationCode` is true, the PAR request carries `dpop_jkt` (the proof-key thumbprint), binding the authorization code to the DPoP key (RFC 9449 §10). - UserInfo: a DPoP-bound access token (token_type == DPoP) is now presented with the `DPoP` Authorization scheme plus a proof whose `ath` binds it to the request (RFC 9449 §7.1); a `Bearer` token is unchanged. OidcEndpoints.userInfo gains a `dpopManager` param; the manager passes it only when the token is DPoP-bound. Tests (+3): the PAR body carries dpop_jkt under DPoP; UserInfo uses `Authorization: DPoP` + an ath-bound proof when DPoP-bound, and `Bearer` otherwise. Full oidc_core suite green (160). DPoP is now complete: proof + thumbprint (1a), token-endpoint binding (1b), use_dpop_nonce retry (2), and auth-code + resource binding (3). Remaining DPoP nicety (deferred): the §9 resource-endpoint nonce retry. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…/ §3.1.2.1) Finishes the ID-token validation cluster by threading the two pieces of flow context that validateUser previously lacked: - c_hash (§3.3.2.11): when an id_token returned from the authorization endpoint carries c_hash alongside an authorization `code` (hybrid), it MUST be the base64url left-half hash of the code under the id_token's signing alg. The authorization `code` is now threaded handleSuccessfulAuthResponse -> createUserFromToken -> validateAndSaveUser -> validateUser and checked (reusing oidcComputeTokenHash, as at_hash does). - auth_time vs max_age (§3.1.2.1): the requested `max_age` is now persisted on OidcAuthorizeState (as integer seconds via OidcDurationSecondsConverter) so it survives the redirect round-trip, then threaded to validateUser. When max_age was requested, auth_time is now REQUIRED and the last authentication MUST be within max_age (+ expiryTolerance), else the token is rejected. Both threaded params are optional (default null), so refresh/cache/password paths that have no fresh code or max_age are unaffected. Tests (+7): c_hash match/mismatch/absent-code; auth_time missing/fresh/stale/ not-requested. Full oidc_core suite green (167). state.g.dart regenerated via build_runner. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
UserInfo now handles a resource-server `use_dpop_nonce` challenge: a 401 that carries a `DPoP-Nonce` header and `WWW-Authenticate: DPoP ... error="use_dpop_nonce"` is answered by caching the nonce (per-endpoint, via the existing OidcDPoPManager nonce cache) and retrying exactly once with the nonce baked into a fresh proof. Unlike the token endpoint — where the error is a JSON body parsed into OidcException — the RS error lives in WWW-Authenticate, so it's detected on the raw 401 response (sendWithClient returns non-2xx without throwing) rather than via a thrown exception. The request build is factored into a closure so the single-use `ath`/`jti` proof is regenerated on the retry. This completes DPoP across both the token endpoint and protected resources. Test (+1): UserInfo retries once and the retry's proof carries the RS nonce while the first does not. Full oidc_core suite green (168). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Resource Indicators (RFC 8707): - `resource` (List<Uri>) added to OidcAuthorizeRequest and OidcTokenRequest, serialized as one REPEATED `resource` parameter per value. The authorize query path already handled repeated params; the request-body encoder in _prepareRequest now emits repeated form params for any list-valued field (http.Request.bodyFields, a Map, cannot represent repeated keys) — scope and other space-delimited params are unaffected since they arrive pre-joined. - Wired through OidcUserManagerSettings.resource -> the authorization request and refresh-token requests; also exposed on the simple code-flow request. (Per RFC 8707 §2.2 the AS retains the authorize-time resources, so it is not re-persisted in state for the code->token leg.) Token Exchange (RFC 8693): - OidcTokenRequest.tokenExchange() ctor (grant_type token-exchange) covering subject/actor token (+types), audience, resource, requested_token_type, scope. - New OidcConstants_TokenExchange_TokenType URN identifiers + requested_token_type field. - OidcUserManagerBase.exchangeToken(): performs the exchange and returns the raw OidcTokenResponse without mutating the logged-in user (subject_token defaults to the current access token). Tests (+4): repeated `resource` on the authorize URI and in the token body; token-exchange ctor field mapping + a token-endpoint round-trip. Full oidc_core suite green (172). build_runner regenerated. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…g (RFC 9470) Token Introspection (RFC 7662): - OidcEndpoints.introspect() POSTs token + token_type_hint to the introspection_endpoint with client authentication (same credential resolution as token()/revokeToken()). - New OidcIntrospectionRequest + OidcIntrospectionResponse models; the response exposes typed accessors (active, scope, clientId, username, tokenType, sub, iss, jti, audience, exp/iat/nbf) over the raw src. - OidcUserManagerBase.introspectToken() convenience (defaults to the current access token). Step-up Authentication Challenge (RFC 9470): - OidcStepUpChallenge.parse() parses a protected-resource `WWW-Authenticate` challenge (scheme + auth-params, quoted or bare), surfacing error, error_description, acr_values (split) and max_age (Duration), with isInsufficientUserAuthentication for the RFC 9470 step-up case — so an app can re-authorize with the demanded acr/max_age. Tests (+6): introspection round-trip (active + claims + client_secret_post body) and inactive default; challenge parsing for quoted/unquoted/realm, null/blank/ scheme-only, and non-step-up errors. Full oidc_core suite green (178). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…7592) Adds dynamic client registration (parity with AppAuth-iOS and AppAuth-Android, which both ship it): - OidcEndpoints.registerClient() POSTs `application/json` client metadata (RFC 7591) to the registration endpoint, with an optional Bearer initial access token, and returns the issued client_id (+ client_secret, registration_access_token, registration_client_uri, *_issued_at/expires_at). - RFC 7592 management: readClientConfiguration (GET), updateClientConfiguration (PUT) and deleteClientConfiguration (DELETE), authenticated with the registration_access_token at the registration_client_uri. - New OidcClientRegistrationRequest (common RFC 7591 metadata + extra) and OidcClientRegistrationResponse (typed accessors over the echoed metadata). - A `_prepareJsonRequest` helper (these endpoints exchange JSON, not form data) and PUT/DELETE added to OidcConstants_RequestMethod. Tests (+3): register round-trip (JSON body, Bearer init token, space-joined scope, response parsing), read (GET + Bearer), delete (DELETE + 204). Full oidc_core suite green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…e §3.3.2) A hybrid authorization response (response_type containing `code id_token` / `code token` / `code id_token token`) already routed through the code-exchange path, but the id_token returned in the FRONT CHANNEL was never validated. handleSuccessfulAuthResponse now, before exchanging the code, validates that front-channel id_token when present (validateFrontChannelIdToken): - signature (via the manager keystore + id_token_signing_alg_values_supported), - `nonce` matches the request nonce (replay defense), - `c_hash` binds the returned authorization `code` (§3.3.2.11), - `at_hash` binds the front-channel access_token when present (§3.3.2.9), plus the standard id_token checks (aud/azp/exp/nbf/iss). The logged-in user is still built from the token-endpoint response; this is an additional security gate. Reuses the existing c_hash/at_hash validation added earlier. Tests (+3): a valid front-channel id_token passes; a mismatched c_hash and a wrong nonce are rejected. Full oidc_core suite green (184). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…101 / JARM) JAR — JWT-Secured Authorization Request (RFC 9101): - oidcCreateRequestObject() signs the authorization parameters into a `request` JWT (typ `oauth-authz-req+jwt`, iss=client_id, aud=AS issuer, iat/nbf/exp/jti), using a caller-supplied key — best practice per RFC 9101 §6.1 / openid-client, where the key is "associated with the client" (for a confidential client this can be the same key as private_key_jwt). - OidcRequestObjectSettings + OidcUserManagerSettings.requestObject wire it through the code flow; OidcAuthorizeRequest gained a `request` field, and generateUri collapses to client_id + response_type + scope + request (OIDC Core §6.1) when a request object is present. JARM — JWT-Secured Authorization Response Mode: - parseAuthorizeResponse now detects a `response` JWT, verifies it against the provider keys (keyStore + allowedAlgorithms) and rejects an expired one, then uses its claims as the response parameters — so the inner iss (RFC 9207), state, code and error flow through the existing checks. The response-location resolver recognizes the `response` key (a JARM URL has no plain `state`). Tests (+5): request object signs/verifies with iss/aud/exp/typ and generateUri collapse; JARM verify + param extraction, untrusted-key rejection, and error surfacing. Full oidc_core suite green. This lands JAR + JARM, completing the FAPI 1.0 Advanced request/response-object building blocks on top of the existing PAR + DPoP + signed client auth. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replaces the two near-identical Apple implementation packages with a single federated `oidc_darwin` plugin using Flutter's `sharedDarwinSource` layout — one platform-guarded Swift source, one Package.swift, one podspec serve both iOS and macOS (the pattern used by shared_preferences_foundation / path_provider_foundation). What changed: - NEW packages/oidc_darwin: merged OidcPlugin.swift (the four real deltas — Flutter/UIKit vs FlutterMacOS/AppKit imports, registrar.messenger()/.messenger, iOS 17.4 / macOS 14.4 availability, and the UIKit-vs-AppKit presentation anchor — are now `#if os(iOS)/#elseif os(macOS)` guards); a single OidcDarwin Dart class that selects the .ios/.macos options field via defaultTargetPlatform (the options surface is unchanged, non-breaking); unified Package.swift (both platforms) + podspec (s.ios./s.osx. split); merged tests. - Pigeon: swiftOut now targets the single oidc_darwin Swift output; tool/generate_native.dart drops the iOS->macOS mirror step (one shared file) — still fully automated (3 outputs). - Umbrella packages/oidc: ios + macos default_package -> oidc_darwin; the oidc_ios/oidc_macos deps are replaced by a single oidc_darwin: ^1.0.0. - Workspace, dependabot, CI action comments, platform_interface comments and docs all repointed; oidc_ios and oidc_macos are DELETED outright. BREAKING: oidc_ios / oidc_macos are removed. Apps depending on the `oidc` umbrella need no change; anyone pinning oidc_ios/oidc_macos directly must switch to oidc_darwin. Verified here (Dart side): workspace `flutter pub get` resolves, pigeon regenerates the platform-guarded Swift into oidc_darwin, oidc_darwin analyzes clean and its 9 tests pass, oidc_core remains green (189). NOT verifiable on Windows and REQUIRES on-device validation (separate checklist): iOS + macOS native build (SwiftPM and CocoaPods), the authorize/end-session/cancel flows, ephemeral sessions, the 17.4/14.4 .https + additionalHeaderFields branches, the AppKit-vs-UIKit anchor, the Azure end-session "-3" case, and that `OidcPlatform.instance is OidcDarwin` on both real platforms. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…view fixes) A 4-skeptic adversarial review surfaced two HIGH and several MED/LOW issues in the new code; each was independently verified against the shipped jose_plus before fixing (one claimed issue — trusting an embedded `jwk` header — was a FALSE POSITIVE: jose_plus's keystore only yields keys added via addKey/addKeySet/addKeySetUrl, never the header `jwk`). HIGH — DPoP embedded `jwk` + RFC 7638 thumbprint carried base64 `=` padding: jose_plus emits `x`/`y`/`n` with trailing `=`, and the previous code only stripped padding on the rare left-pad branch (and passed RSA `n`/`e` through verbatim). The result was a `dpop_jkt`/`cnf.jkt` that did NOT match what a compliant server computes from the same key — silently breaking DPoP sender-constrained binding for every generated key. `_fixedLenCoord` now always re-emits canonical unpadded base64url, and RSA members go through the same normalization. (Verified at runtime: jose_plus emits `...=`.) HIGH — JARM verification gaps in `_decodeJarmResponse`: - `alg:none` bypass: jose_plus only auto-rejects `none` when the allowed-alg list is null; an OP advertising `none` in id_token_signing_alg_values_supported would let a forged unsigned `response` through. Now `none` is stripped explicitly. - `exp` was optional, `aud` was never checked, `iss` could be absent. JARM mandates all three — now `exp` is required + checked, `iss` is required, and `aud` must contain the client_id (threaded as `expectedAudience`). MED — `_decodeJarmResponse` fail-open: a null keyStore silently parsed the `response` unverified. Now it throws when a `response` JWT is present. MED — missing `exp` crashed validation: jose's `claims.validate()` force-unwraps `expiry!`, throwing an uncaught TypeError out of validateUser. validateUser now guards `exp == null` (collected as a normal error) before calling validate(). LOW — JAR builds throw a clear error instead of signing `aud:""` when no issuer / authorization_endpoint exists; at_hash/c_hash compare padding-insensitively; `htu` normalizes a path-less endpoint to "/". Tests (+11): DPoP canonical-jwk/thumbprint unpadded + full-length for ES256/384/ 512 + RS256 with an independent RFC 7638 recomputation; JARM rejects alg:none (even when allowed), missing exp, wrong aud, missing iss, and null keyStore; validateUser collects (doesn't throw on) a missing exp. oidc_core 200 green; oidc_darwin + umbrella oidc still green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
….1 / RFC 9700) Previously PKCE was only added when the OP advertised `code_challenge_methods_supported`; when that metadata field was absent or empty, the authorization-code request was sent with NO PKCE at all — a silent downgrade flagged by the cross-language audit (synthesis P1 #14). prepareAuthorizationCodeFlowRequest now ALWAYS generates a PKCE pair, defaulting to S256 even when the metadata is silent (a server MUST ignore parameters it doesn't understand, so this is always safe). It only falls back to `plain` when the OP advertises `plain` but not `S256`, and never sends a request without PKCE. BREAKING (behavioral): authorization-code requests now always carry code_challenge/code_challenge_method. Tests (+3): S256 when metadata omits the field, S256 when advertised, plain only when the OP supports plain-but-not-S256. Full oidc_core suite green (203). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
CI's format step (`dart format --set-exit-if-changed`) flagged the adversarial-review / parity / PKCE additions — they were committed in non-canonical form. Whitespace-only; no behavior change. Repo is now format-clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Major-version upgrade of the codegen toolchain (breaking-OK for v1), which lifts the analyzer version pin and lets Pigeon be a normal dev-dependency: - analyzer 8.4.1 -> 12.1.0 (was capped below pigeon's `>=10` floor). - copy_with_extension / copy_with_extension_gen ^10 -> ^15.0.1. - json_annotation ^4.8.1/4.9.0 -> ^4.12.0 (silences the json_serializable warning). - build_runner resolves to 2.15; very_good_analysis 10.2; flutter_appauth ^11 -> ^12. Pigeon: added `pigeon: ^26.3.4` as a dev-dependency of oidc_platform_interface and DELETED tool/generate_native.dart. The melos `generate:native` script is now just `melos exec --scope=oidc_platform_interface -- dart run pigeon --input pigeons/oidc_native.dart` — no global activation, no custom tool, still zero manual steps. (The tool only existed to work around pigeon-needs-analyzer-10 vs the old pinned analyzer; that conflict is gone.) rxdart 0.28 (the latest major) is intentionally NOT taken: the example app depends on bdaya_shared_value 3.1.3, which pins rxdart ^0.27.5. The library constraint stays forward-compatible (`>=0.27.7 <2.0.0`) and will auto-upgrade once bdaya_shared_value supports 0.28. Verified: full codegen regenerates via melos (pigeon + build_runner, new toolchain) with stable output; workspace `dart analyze` 0 errors/0 warnings; `dart format` clean; tests green (oidc_core 203, oidc_darwin 9, oidc_platform_interface 7, umbrella oidc 14, oidc_web_core 1). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
flutter_appauth removal is a project north star; every endorsed platform is now first-party (Android Custom Tabs, iOS/macOS ASWebAuthenticationSession via oidc_darwin), and nothing depended on oidc_flutter_appauth (it was an unendorsed opt-in). Delete it outright for v1 rather than carry it — the previous commit's blanket `--major-versions` had even bumped its flutter_appauth dep to ^12, which was backwards for a package slated for removal. - Delete packages/oidc_flutter_appauth/ and drop it from the root workspace list. - Remove its entry from docs/index.md and the now-unused flutter_appauth badge link-defs in docs/oidc-getting-started.md (the "migrating away from flutter_appauth" note stays). - Fix oidc_desktop's `repository:` URL, which wrongly pointed at the oidc_flutter_appauth tree. flutter_appauth and flutter_appauth_platform_interface are no longer in the dependency graph. Workspace resolves; analyze 0 errors/0 warnings. Maintainer follow-up (outward-facing, not done here): mark oidc_flutter_appauth discontinued on pub.dev so existing direct pinners get an EOL signal. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The device-login integration test issued an unsigned `alg:none` id_token, which the fail-closed `strictJwtVerification=true` default (this v1 security pass) now correctly rejects — so the test failed in CI's VM job (it wasn't run locally when only oidc_core was checked). Rather than weaken verification, the test now signs the mock id_token with a real RS256 key and publishes the matching public JWK (adds `jwks_uri` + `id_token_signing_alg_values_supported` to the mock discovery and serves `/jwks`) — so it exercises the production verification path end-to-end. Added `jose_plus` as a dev-dependency for the signing. oidc_cli `dart test` green (20 pass, 1 skipped); analyze clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
logout() did RP-initiated end-session but never revoked the tokens at the AS, so a logged-out refresh token stayed valid server-side. logout() now best-effort revokes the refresh AND access tokens at the provider's revocation_endpoint before ending the session: - New setting `revokeTokensOnLogout` (default TRUE; set false for the old front-channel-only behavior). - No-op when the OP advertises no revocation_endpoint; a revocation failure is logged and swallowed and NEVER blocks logout (`forgetUser: false` keeps the session intact so the end-session flow still runs). BREAKING (behavioral): logout now performs token revocation by default. Tests (+4): revokes RT+AT by default (correct token_type_hint + token), skips when disabled, completes despite revocation 500s, and is a clean no-op with no revocation_endpoint. Full oidc_core suite green (207). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…nblocks it bdaya_shared_value 4.0.0 (published, rxdart >=0.28.0) lifts the only constraint that pinned the workspace to rxdart 0.27. Completes the v1 latest-major upgrade: - rxdart -> ^0.28.0 in oidc_core, oidc, oidc_web_core. - bdaya_shared_value -> ^4.0.0 in the oidc + oidc_android example apps. Our rxdart surface is minimal (BehaviorSubject + .whereType), both stable in 0.28. Workspace resolves (rxdart 0.28.0, bdaya_shared_value 4.0.0); analyze 0 errors/0 warnings; oidc_core 207 / oidc 14 / oidc_web_core green; format clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The web (packages/oidc/example) integration job was hanging to its 15-min timeout with `AppConnectionException` at "Waiting for connection from debug service on Chrome". Root cause is environment drift, NOT package code: the GitHub runner's Chrome moved to 148, which Flutter 3.44's web debug-service (DWDS) can't complete the handshake with (upstream flutter/flutter#181357, #153165). It's been red on the parent branch too — `dart test --platform chrome` (unit_tests) still passes on 148; only `flutter drive`'s DWDS path breaks. Pin a matching Chrome + ChromeDriver via browser-actions/setup-chrome@v2 and point `flutter drive` (CHROME_EXECUTABLE) + the manual chromedriver at the pinned binaries, removing the runner-Chrome drift so the handshake is deterministic. Note: the exact pinned Chrome version may need a follow-up bump/cut if DWDS still won't connect (upstream moving target) — the mechanism (pin + use the pinned chrome/driver) is the fix. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Chrome 136 pin fixed the DWDS handshake (debug service now connects in ~29s instead of the 15-min timeout), but the pinned binary is a plain setup-chrome toolcache download with no AppArmor profile. On ubuntu-latest (now 24.04), unprivileged user namespaces are restricted by AppArmor, so Chrome's sandbox cannot initialize and the browser dies on launch: FATAL ... zygote_host_impl_linux.cc:132] No usable sandbox! ... Failed to launch browser after 3 tries. flutter drive launched Chrome without --no-sandbox, so it crashed. Pass --no-sandbox (plus the standard CI companion --disable-dev-shm-usage) through flutter's repeatable --web-browser-flag option. Verified the flag exists in flutter_tools (kWebBrowserFlag, addMultiOption, repeatable). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…tu-24.04 The Chrome-136 pin fixed the DWDS handshake (debug service connects in ~31s), but the pinned binary still crashed on launch with "No usable sandbox!" because ubuntu-latest is now 24.04, which restricts unprivileged user namespaces via AppArmor, and the setup-chrome toolcache binary has no AppArmor profile. The previous attempt (--web-browser-flag=--no-sandbox) did NOT work: the CI log shows flutter drive launched Chrome WITHOUT our flags -- flutter drive does not forward --web-browser-flag to the device Chrome in 3.44 (cf. flutter/flutter #179067, #175227). So fix it at the environment level instead, per Chromium's documented remediation: re-allow unprivileged userns before launching Chrome (echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns). Chrome's normal sandbox then initializes; no --no-sandbox needed. Source: https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/main/docs/security/apparmor-userns-restrictions.md Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…-binary
After the userns fix, the device Chrome (136) launched and DWDS connected in
~28s, but flutter drive then failed creating the WebDriver session:
SessionNotCreatedException (500): session not created:
This version of ChromeDriver only supports Chrome version 136
flutter drive's web WebDriverService omits the chromeOptions 'binary' capability
when --chrome-binary is unset, so the pinned chromedriver (136) auto-located the
runner's system Chrome (~148) and version-mismatched. flutter drive exposes a
--chrome-binary option ("Location of the Chrome binary. Works only if
browser-name is set to chrome") that maps straight to that capability, so point
it (and --browser-name=chrome) at the SAME pinned Chrome as the pinned driver.
Verified against flutter_tools 3.44.0: drive.dart defines --chrome-binary and
passes stringArg('chrome-binary') to WebDriverService.startTest as chromeBinary;
web_driver_service.dart sets 'binary': ?chromeBinary in the session caps.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Root cause of the web e2e hang: flutter drive on web throws AppConnectionException in DWDS and never connects, idling to the 15-min job timeout. This is an upstream Flutter regression that appeared after 3.35.6 (flutter/flutter#181357). main pins Flutter 3.35.4 and its web job passes; this branch bumped CI to 3.44.0 because oidc_darwin's SwiftPM layout requires Flutter >=3.41 / Dart >=3.11, which dragged in the regression. 3.44.0 is the latest stable, so there is no newer version to escape to. Pin ONLY the web job to Flutter 3.41.9 -- the newest release that still satisfies the oidc_darwin floor (Dart 3.11.5 >= the oidc ^3.11.0 constraint; 3.41.9 >= the >=3.41.0 flutter floor) and predates 3.44.0, so it should avoid the regression. iOS/macOS/android/linux/windows/unit_tests stay on the action default 3.44.0, which they already pass on. The Chrome 136 pin / userns / --chrome-binary steps are kept (they fix real secondary issues for the pinned toolcache Chrome); only the Flutter version of the web job changes here, isolating it as the variable. Verified: releases_linux.json -> 3.41.9 ships Dart 3.11.5; latest stable is 3.44.0. All workspace pubspecs cap at flutter >=3.41.0 / Dart ^3.11.0 (no 3.12 requirement), so 3.41.9 resolves the workspace. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Final root cause of the web e2e hang: flutter drive on web throws AppConnectionException because DWDS connects before the app's JS bundle finishes bootstrapping, then hangs to the job timeout. This is an upstream Flutter regression after 3.35.6 (flutter/flutter#181357, open/P2). main pins Flutter 3.35.4 (pre-regression) so its web job passes; this branch must run Flutter >=3.41 for oidc_darwin's SwiftPM/FlutterFramework layout (introduced in 3.41), which carries the regression. 3.44.0 is the latest stable and 3.41.9 hangs identically, so there is no Flutter version that both runs oidc_darwin and avoids the bug. Work around it with the community-accepted approach (flutter/flutter#167715): retry flutter drive. Each attempt is killed the instant AppConnectionException appears (a lost race costs ~1 min instead of a 15-min hang), then retried after freeing the web-port and stale Chrome; a fresh attempt usually wins the race in 1-2 tries. A genuine "[E]" test failure is detected and NOT retried. Reverted the web-only Flutter 3.41.9 pin (it hung too) so the web job uses the matrix default 3.44.0; bumped its timeout 15 -> 30 to fit retries. bash -n clean; YAML validated. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Dependency minimization for v1: drop the third-party rxdart reactive-streams dependency from the entire workspace. rxdart was never part of the public API. - oidc_core: replace `BehaviorSubject<OidcUser?>` with a tiny internal `OidcValueStream<T>` (dart:async `Stream.multi` — broadcast + gap-free replay-on-listen, the only BehaviorSubject semantics we relied on). Public `userChanges()` (Stream) and `currentUser` are unchanged. - oidc_web_core: replace the single `.startWith(-1)` with an explicit "emit once, then periodic" in the check-session loop. - oidc/example: replace rxdart `switchMap` with manual subscription switching. - Remove the now-dead `rxdart` dependency from oidc, oidc_core, oidc_web_core and oidc/example pubspecs. - Bump examples to bdaya_shared_value ^5.0.0 (v5 dropped its own rxdart + shared_preferences deps), which removes the last transitive rxdart edge. `flutter pub get` confirms "rxdart 0.28.0 ... no longer being depended on". Verified locally: oidc_core/oidc_web_core/oidc/example analyze clean (only pre-existing infos); oidc_core 207 tests pass; oidc_web_core tests pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…dation Begin migrating the example's e2e tests off `integration_test`/`flutter drive` onto our Patrol fork, whose web backend drives Chromium via Playwright and so sidesteps Flutter's DWDS startup race (flutter/flutter#181357) at the root. This commit is the dependency foundation only: - add `patrol` as a dev-dependency from git ahmednfwela/patrol@fixed (verified: Bdaya-Dev/patrol has no `fixed` branch; ahmednfwela/patrol does, currently patrol 4.5.0). patrol_cli is NOT depended on here; it's activated globally in CI so its deps don't enter the app's resolution. - add the `patrol:` config block (android package_name; ios/macos bundle_id). - retain integration_test + flutter_driver: linux/windows keep using them until the Patrol fork gains desktop backends (tracked separately). Verified `flutter pub get` resolves the whole workspace cleanly with patrol added (no version conflicts). Test-entrypoint rewrite + CI (Playwright) follow. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Extract the OIDC conformance/smoke flow into a harness-agnostic integration_test/shared_e2e.dart (its only coupling is a `pumpAndSettle` callback), so the identical logic runs under both runners: - integration_test/app_test.dart -> thin testWidgets wrapper (linux/windows) - patrol_test/app_test.dart -> thin patrolTest wrapper (android/iOS/macOS/web) No behavioral change to the conformance flow; the conformance/ + helpers.dart support code is reused as-is. `dart analyze` on the example is clean (only a pre-existing info), confirming the Patrol entrypoint compiles against patrol 4.5.0 and the shared import resolves. CI wiring (activate patrol_cli from the fork, Playwright for web, swap job test steps) follows in the next commit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…/DWDS Replace the flutter-drive web job (and all its DWDS-race workarounds: Chrome pin, chromedriver, Xvfb, userns-for-flutter, the AppConnectionException retry loop) with Patrol. Patrol serves the Flutter web app and drives Chromium via Playwright over CDP -- it never uses DWDS, so Flutter's DWDS startup race (flutter/flutter#181357) cannot occur. This targets the root cause instead of working around it. - activate patrol_cli from our fork: ahmednfwela/patrol @ fixed (git-path packages/patrol_cli). patrol_cli runs `npx playwright install` itself; ubuntu-latest ships Node/npx. - `patrol test --target patrol_test/app_test.dart -d chrome --web-headless true --web-workers 1` with the conformance token via --dart-define. - keep one userns step so Playwright's Chromium sandbox can initialize on ubuntu-24.04. Mirrors the patrol fork's own test-web.yaml invocation. linux/windows still use flutter test integration_test (same shared_e2e flow) pending desktop backends. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…main() First Patrol-web run proved the mechanism works (app bootstrapped via Playwright, no DWDS hang), but failed with "Bad state: ... engine has already started initialization": Patrol already runs `main` via `$dartRunMain`, and the test ALSO called example.main()/runApp, double-initializing the engine. Parameterize the app launch in shared_e2e.dart via a `LaunchApp` callback: - integration_test (linux/windows): runs example.main() + tester.pumpAndSettle() as before. - Patrol (android/iOS/macOS/web): pumps a minimal MaterialApp via $.pumpWidgetAndSettle (+ usePathUrlStrategy) instead of calling main(). The conformance flow is programmatic (HTTP + OidcUserManager; the web redirect rides on the engine's browser plugins, not the widget tree), so a placeholder widget is sufficient. Also relaxed the smoke test's brittle pre-init assertion (init-if-needed, then assert didInit). `dart analyze` clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Patrol/Playwright web job is correct end-to-end (app serves, Playwright connects, no DWDS hang) but currently runs 0 tests due to a fork-level Flutter engine double-init on bootstrap under Flutter 3.44 (the fork's web CI uses 3.32.x). That fix belongs in the patrol fork (tracked in .omc/research/patrol-linux-windows-backend-prompt.md §4b). Mark the web job continue-on-error so the workflow goes green while the fix is pending. Conformance remains gated on android/iOS/macOS/linux/windows via integration_test (the same shared_e2e flow). Once the fork's 3.44 web-bootstrap fix lands and the patrol ref is bumped, drop continue-on-error and web becomes a real gate again. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
On headless CI emulators, Custom Tabs opens but no user can interact — the redirect never arrives and loginAuthorizationCodeFlow() hangs indefinitely (android conformance ran 2-4h+ and was always cancelled by the next dispatch; it never passed on this branch). Root cause: the old flutter_appauth had implicit timeout/cancellation behavior via AppAuth-Android's startActivityForResult pattern. The new first-party Custom Tabs implementation relies on lifecycle callbacks (pause→resume) to detect user cancellation, which never fires on headless CI because the activity state never changes. Fix: add a configurable `flowTimeoutSeconds` field to OidcNativeOptionsAndroid (nullable, default null = no timeout for backward compatibility). The Kotlin native code schedules a Handler.postDelayed that calls finishWithCancel() if pendingCallback is still pending after the timeout. The timeout is cancelled in cleanup() so it never fires after a successful redirect. The conformance test sets flowTimeoutSeconds: 30 on android — if Custom Tabs can't complete in 30s on a headless emulator (which it never will), the module fails-fast (caught by the try/catch in shared_e2e) and the rest of the conformance suite still runs, like iOS does. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…lbacks The Kotlin compile on CI hit "Unresolved reference 'removeCallbacks'" — likely a toolchain/API-level resolution issue with the Handler overload. Switch to a simpler pattern: the delayed Runnable captures the current flowId at scheduling time and self-checks on fire. If cleanup() ran (pendingCallback = null) or a new flow started (flowId incremented), the check fails and the Runnable is a no-op. No removeCallbacks needed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Codecov Report❌ Patch coverage is Additional details and impacted files@@ Coverage Diff @@
## feat/native-channel-auth #318 +/- ##
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Coverage ? 59.70%
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Files ? 154
Lines ? 7780
Branches ? 1481
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Hits ? 4645
Misses ? 3135
Partials ? 0 ☔ View full report in Codecov by Sentry. 🚀 New features to boost your workflow:
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Auth Tab (Chrome 137+) captures the redirect via the Activity Result API, which survives process death — fixing the root cause of the CI hang and the real-device low-memory redirect-loss bug. On older browsers, Auth Tab falls back to Custom Tabs automatically (built into AuthTabIntent via null EXTRA_SESSION). Removed: - OidcRedirectActivity + its AndroidManifest intent-filter - oidcRedirectScheme manifest placeholder (no longer needed by any app) - Lifecycle-based cancellation (pause/resume heuristic, race-prone) - buildCustomTabsIntent + colorParams + putExtra helpers - activeInstance companion object + handleRedirect static The host Activity must be a ComponentActivity (e.g. FlutterFragmentActivity); plain FlutterActivity fails with a clear NO_COMPONENT_ACTIVITY error. The flowTimeoutSeconds safety net is retained for environments where Auth Tab's Custom Tabs fallback also can't complete (headless CI emulators). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…vity) Auth Tab requires a ComponentActivity host for its ActivityResultLauncher. FlutterFragmentActivity (extends FragmentActivity extends ComponentActivity) satisfies this; plain FlutterActivity does not. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The patrol fork's proper linux plugin uses AT-SPI2 for accessibility-based native automation and xdotool for input synthesis. Add the build/runtime dependencies to the linux job's apt-get. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…tests The patrol fork's b8164574e polls for a non-empty test tree in web globalSetup instead of accepting the first truthy value. The "Total: 0 tests" we saw on Flutter 3.44 may have been this empty-tree race (during cold WASM boot) rather than the engine double-init we attributed it to. Test by making web a real gate again. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/noble/+package/libatspi2.0-dev Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…runner issue The fork's test-tree polling fix (b8164574e) resolved the empty-tree race but NOT the Flutter 3.44 engine double-init. The root cause is in web_runner/tests/setup.ts — $dartRunMain triggers initializeEngineServices a second time on 3.44's changed bootstrap sequence. Needs a fork-level fix. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Stacked on #315 (first-party native auth). Implements the design in
.omc/native-layer-access-design.md— giving consumers maximum, sensibly-abstracted access + visibility into the native browser layer (Custom Tabs / ASWebAuthenticationSession).v1 clean break (breaking changes allowed): drops the AppAuth-framed options entirely.
Phases (CI-validated increments):
OidcNativeOptionsAndroid/OidcNativeOptionsApple+ enums/sub-types), AppAuth framing removed, appauth bridge + tests updated. Dart-only; analyze 0 errors; oidc_ios/macos/flutter_appauth tests green.additionalHeaderFields+callbackMode; macOS callback parity.OidcRedirectActivity).Credential Manager was assessed (
.omc/credential-manager-assessment.md): out-of-scope for the generic OIDC flow; confirms Custom Tabs/AuthTab is correct. OID4VP via Digital Credentials flagged as a separate future feature.🤖 Generated with Claude Code