Ciphera

Privacy-Preserving Zero-Knowledge KYC for Algorand

Prove identity without revealing it. Zero-Knowledge KYC infrastructure built natively for the Algorand blockchain.

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🔑 What is Ciphera?

Ciphera solves the fundamental Web3 dilemma — How do protocols prevent Sybil attacks and comply with regulations while maintaining the absolute privacy of their users?

Using Groth16 zk-SNARKs, ECIES Encryption, and Shamir Secret Sharing, Ciphera creates a decentralized, privacy-first identity standard for Algorand. Users prove they hold a valid government-issued ID and meet specific criteria (e.g., age ≥ 18, Indian citizen) without ever revealing personal data, biometrics, or addresses — on-chain or off-chain.

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🛑 The Problem

Modern Web3 protocols (DeFi, RWAs, DAOs) face a regulatory trilemma:

Challenge	Description
Compliance vs Privacy	KYC regulations require identity verification, but storing raw identity data on-chain risks breaches and doxxing
Sybil Attacks vs Anonymity	Airdrops and quadratic voting are constantly gamed by bot farms — identifying unique humans without stripping pseudonymity has been impossible
Data Minimization	DPDP (India), GDPR (EU) demand minimal PII collection — storing identity hashes on an immutable ledger violates this permanently

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💡 How Ciphera Solves It

Step	What Happens	Privacy Guarantee
1. Import XML	User loads their government-signed Aadhaar XML directly in the browser	Raw data never leaves the device
2. Generate ZK Proof	Circom/Groth16 circuit proves the signature is valid and user meets criteria	Private inputs destroyed after proof
3. Nullifier	Circuit outputs a unique hash tied to the user's ID + dApp	1 Human = 1 Wallet per dApp (Sybil resistant)
4. On-Chain Registry	Algorand smart contracts verify the proof and store the nullifier	No PII ever reaches the chain
5. Soulbound ASA	User receives a non-transferable "KYC Verified" token	Cryptographically bound to their wallet
6. Court-Order Safety Net	ECIES-encrypted backup only decryptable via 3-of-5 custodian multisig	Privacy preserved even against insider threats

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🏗️ Architecture

Ciphera is composed of four cleanly separated microservices:

Component	Tech Stack	Purpose
widget/	React + Vite + snarkjs	Drop-in UI for users to upload Aadhaar and generate ZK proofs
dashboard/	React + Vite	Custodian management panel
backend/	FastAPI + Python	Off-chain relayer, ECIES broker, Shamir SSS
Ciphera-kyc/	PuyaPy + AlgoKit	Algorand smart contracts (NullifierRegistry, CredentialManager, SMT)
sdk/	TypeScript	ciphera-sdk npm package for JS/TS developers
python-sdk/	Python	ciphera PyPI package for Python developers
projects/circuits/	Circom + snarkjs	ZK circuit — prove KYC validity with PLONK proofs

Data Flow

sequenceDiagram
    participant User as 👤 User (Browser)
    participant Widget as Ciphera Widget
    participant Circuit as ⚙️ ZK Circuit (WASM)
    participant Backend as 🖥️ FastAPI Relayer
    participant Algo as ⛓️ Algorand (PuyaPy)

    User->>Widget: Upload Aadhaar XML & Wallet Secret
    Widget->>Circuit: Generate Groth16 Proof (in-browser)
    note over Circuit: Proves validity of ID & generates Nullifier
    Circuit-->>Widget: Returns ZK Proof & Nullifier
    Widget->>Widget: ECIES Encrypt raw ID data (for Custodian threshold)
    Widget->>Backend: Submit Proof, Nullifier, Encrypted Blob
    Backend->>Backend: Verify ZK Proof (snarkjs)
    Backend->>Algo: Invoke NullifierRegistry.register()
    note over Algo: Verifies uniqueness, stores Box
    Backend->>Algo: Invoke CredentialManager.issue()
    Algo-->>User: Mints "KYC Verified" Soulbound Token

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⛓️ Deployed Contracts (Algorand Testnet)

All core contracts are live. View transactions and box storage on Lora Explorer:

Contract	App ID	Explorer	Purpose
NullifierRegistry	756272073	View ↗	Stores unique ZK nullifiers in Box storage — prevents Sybil attacks
SMT Registry	756272075	View ↗	Sparse Merkle Tree root for revoked credentials
KYC Box Storage	756272299	View ↗	ECIES-encrypted payloads gated by issuer logic
Credential Manager	756281076	View ↗	Core controller interfacing with the ASA
KYCRED ASA	756281102	View ↗	Soulbound, non-transferable KYC Verified token

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📦 SDK — Install in Your Project

# JavaScript / TypeScript
npm install ciphera-sdk

# Python
pip install ciphera

JavaScript Quick Start:

import { CipheraClient } from 'ciphera-sdk';

const client = new CipheraClient();
const status = await client.verifyKYC(userWalletAddress);
if (status.isVerified) { /* grant access */ }

Python Quick Start:

from ciphera import CipheraClient

client = CipheraClient()
status = client.verify_kyc(wallet_address)
print(status.is_verified)

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🚀 Quick Start (LocalNet)

Prerequisites: Docker, AlgoKit, Node.js 18+, Python 3.12+

# 1. Clone & bootstrap
git clone https://github.com/Aditya060806/Ciphera.git
cd Ciphera/Ciphera-kyc/projects/Ciphera-kyc
algokit bootstrap all

# 2. Start local Algorand network
algokit localnet start

# 3. Deploy smart contracts
algokit project run build
algokit project deploy localnet

Start all services (3 terminals):

# Terminal 1 — Widget (User-facing)
cd widget && npm install && npm run dev

# Terminal 2 — Dashboard (Custodian)
cd dashboard && npm install && npm run dev

# Terminal 3 — Backend API
cd backend
pip install -r requirements.txt
uvicorn main:app --reload --port 8000

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🔐 Cryptographic Deep Dive: ECIES Interoperability

One of the hardest engineering challenges is standardizing ECIES payloads between browser JavaScript and server Python:

Challenge	Solution
Shared Point Derivation	eciesjs uses the full 65-byte uncompressed point; Python's cryptography library uses only the X coordinate. Ciphera manually intercepts and applies the full point in Python
AES-GCM IV Length	eciesjs uses a 16-byte nonce (standard is 12-byte). Ciphera explicitly pads the IV slice to 16 bytes on the Python side
MAC Tag Position	Python appends the GCM tag (ct ∥ tag); JS prepends it (tag ∥ ct). Ciphera parses the 109-byte payload mathematically to extract and shift chunks

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🛡️ Court-Ordered Revocation (Threshold Decryption)

In the event of a severe legal mandate:

User's raw ID is ECIES-encrypted in the browser
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Stored in KYC Box Storage (Algorand)
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Custodian Multisig: 3-of-5 custodians must vote
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3 Shamir Secret Shares → reconstruct ECIES private key
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Decrypt payload → revoke SMT leaf → clawback ASA

No single custodian can access private data alone. Without the 3-of-5 threshold, the raw PII is mathematically inaccessible — even to the protocol deployers.

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Built by Aditya Pandey for AlgoBharat Hack Series 3.0

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