Skip to content

Security: 0xPraedico/arasaka

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Supported versions

Version Supported
0.2.x Yes
< 0.2 No

Reporting a vulnerability

Do not open a public GitHub issue for security vulnerabilities.

Please open a private security advisory on GitHub rather than a public issue. This keeps details confidential until a fix is available.

Include in your report:

  • Description of the vulnerability
  • Steps to reproduce
  • Affected versions
  • Potential impact assessment
  • Any suggested mitigations

You will receive acknowledgment within 48 hours. We aim to release a fix within 14 days for critical issues and 30 days for moderate issues.

Note: A dedicated security contact email will be published once the project reaches beta. Until then, GitHub private advisories are the authoritative reporting channel.

Security model

arasaka is a runtime safety layer for AI agents. The threat model assumes:

  • Untrusted LLM output — the LLM is treated as an untrusted proposer. Its output (tool calls, claims, draft) is validated, sandboxed, and policy-checked before execution.
  • Prompt injection — user inputs are sanitized; detect_prompt_injection = true in config.
  • Taint tracking — RAG document content is marked [UNTRUSTED REFERENCE] to prevent it being treated as trusted instructions.
  • SSRF — HTTP tool calls are validated against allowed_domains and block_private_networks.
  • Secret redaction — sensitive values are redacted from traces and logs when redact_secrets = true.
  • Tenant isolation — all stores, memory, and runs are scoped by tenant_id.
  • Approval gates — high-risk tool calls require human approval before execution.

Known limitations

  • Browser toolChromiumoxideBrowserTransport (feature browser) requires Chrome or Chromium installed at runtime. MockBrowserTransport is used in tests and when the feature is disabled.
  • WASM sandboxWasmSandbox (feature wasm-sandbox) evaluates WASM policy modules with fuel limits. It is a policy-enforcement gate, not a general-purpose sandboxed execution environment.
  • Container sandboxDockerContainerSandbox (feature container-sandbox) enforces an image allowlist at preflight. Actual container spawning is delegated to the tool executor.
  • Grounding — citation-based only; no NLI model for semantic entailment checking.
  • OTLP — trace export to collectors is experimental; stdout fallback is the default.

Dependency audit

cargo audit

We recommend running cargo audit as part of your CI pipeline.

There aren't any published security advisories