From eeea2488c34968a0316c7cd97e1b79c5f72ec953 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Colton Willey <colton@wolfssl.com>
Date: Tue, 30 Jun 2026 12:58:10 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] wp_aes_stream: bound CTS input length to prevent int overflow

The CTS encrypt/decrypt helpers cast the block count to int, so an inLen
above 0x7FFFFFFF overflows blocks*AES_BLOCK_SIZE and smashes the stack
copy. Not reachable via EVP_CipherUpdate (its inl is int); guard added as
defense in depth for a caller driving OSSL_FUNC_cipher_update directly.
---
 src/wp_aes_stream.c | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

diff --git a/src/wp_aes_stream.c b/src/wp_aes_stream.c
index 873bc125..38c9f29a 100644
--- a/src/wp_aes_stream.c
+++ b/src/wp_aes_stream.c
@@ -590,6 +590,13 @@ static int wp_aes_stream_doit(wp_AesStreamCtx *ctx, unsigned char *out,
         if (inLen < AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
             ok = 0;
         }
+        /* The CTS helpers cast the block count to int, so an inLen past
+         * 0x7FFFFFFF overflows blocks*AES_BLOCK_SIZE. Not reachable via
+         * EVP_CipherUpdate (its inl is int) - defense in depth for a caller
+         * driving OSSL_FUNC_cipher_update directly. */
+        if (inLen > 0x7FFFFFFFU) {
+            ok = 0;
+        }
         if (ok) {
             if (ctx->enc) {
                 ok = wp_aes_cts_encrypt(ctx, out, in, inLen);