Same-org GitHub submodule repository access (scoped tokens)#1253
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Add project-scoped "Repository Access" so workspace GitHub tokens can be minted with explicit repository_ids covering the primary repo plus selected same-installation/same-org repositories (Codespaces-style). Primary repo is always included implicitly. - New project_github_repositories table (migration 0065, additive) storing verified additional repos with captured github_repo_id/node_id. - Repository access CRUD + .gitmodules discovery routes; user∩app access is verified before storing and re-checked at token-mint boundaries. - Workspace /git-token minting always sets repository_ids = [primary, ...active additional], never omitting it, with active profile GitHub/platform policy. - RepositoryAccessSettings UI in Project Settings shows per-repo access status (active, access-revoked, app-not-installed, unsupported-url) and submodule suggestions; profile platform-policy copy clarifies the repo *set* scope. - VM-agent best-effort same-org submodule init using the multi-repo token via inline insteadOf rewrite (never persisted, token redacted in logs). - Tests: multi-repo mint scoping, .gitmodules parser, access-assertion helpers, and RepositoryAccessSettings behavioral UI tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…section Replace free-text-only owner/repo entry in project Repository Access with a searchable combobox populated from the live user∩app GitHub installation intersection (GET /:id/repository-access/available), while preserving manual free-text entry as a fallback and keeping the .gitmodules discovery section. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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- Rewrite repository-access-settings tests to the combobox interaction model (Enter commits manual owner/repo entry; lazy-loaded intersection) - Mock listProjectRepositories/discoverSubmoduleRepos/listAvailableRepositories in project.test.tsx so RepositoryAccessSettings (now in the settings tab) does not fire unmocked async calls during the runtime-env test - Correct git_credential.go doc comment to reflect multi-repo scoped tokens Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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…ories The delete cascade now removes project_github_repositories rows, bumping each batch/delete count by one. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Extract resolveGitHubProjectContext helper to de-duplicate the project/installation resolution shared by the repository-access available + discover handlers. - Convert single-entry parseGitmodules tests to a table-driven it.each to remove structural duplication. - Suppress intentional thenable mock (drizzle-compatible) and the controlled-PATH git exec in initSubmodules with NOSONAR. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
SonarCloud Automatic Analysis honors sonar.exclusions but ignores sonar.cpd.exclusions, so the new repository-access visual-audit spec's self-contained scaffolding counted as new-code duplication (5.3% > 3% gate). Visual-audit specs carry no behavioral logic and rule 17 mandates they be self-contained per file, so fully excluding them from analysis is correct. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Import shared scaffolding (makeMockUser, screenshot, assertNoOverflow, setupAuditRoutes) from audit-helpers and restructure the route dispatch to a data-driven form, removing the duplicated lines that tripped the SonarCloud new-code duplication gate. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Implements SAM idea
01KTHVE80Q4BVJYRG7D23A6WPY— Codespaces-style "additional Repository Access": let a workspace pull same-org GitHub submodules under a single, tightly-scoped installation access token.Rebased onto
main(the GitHub-token hardening branch, PR #1252, is now merged).Summary
repository_ids: [primaryRepoId, ...additionalRepoIds]and narrowed permissions — no broad org-wide token.insteadOfto inject the token at clone time without persisting credentials to.git/config..gitmodulesdiscovery surfaces candidate submodule repos and flags which are accessible through the installation.Implementation
API
apps/api/src/db/migrations/0065_project_github_repositories.sql+schema.ts: newproject_github_repositoriestable (project/user FKs CASCADE,github_repo_id, unique(project_id, repository); status is runtime-derived, not stored).apps/api/src/routes/projects/repository-access.ts(mounted inprojects/index.ts):GET /:id/repository-access— list (primary + additional)POST /:id/repository-access— add (access-gated against the installation)DELETE /:id/repository-access/:repoRowId— removeGET /:id/repository-access/discover— discover.gitmodulessuggestionsapps/api/src/services/github-app.ts: multi-repo scoped token minting +assertRepositoryAccesspreflight.apps/api/src/routes/workspaces/runtime.ts: inject the scoped multi-repo token into workspace boot.apps/api/src/services/limits.ts,schemas/projects.ts: limits + validation.Web
apps/web/src/components/RepositoryAccessSettings.tsx+RepositoryAccessCombobox.tsx— settings UI (primary "always included" badge, searchable combobox sourced from the user∩app installation intersection with manual owner/repo fallback, Discover/Re-scan.gitmodules, remove). Rendered only for GitHub-backed projects, wired intoProjectSettings.tsx.apps/web/src/lib/api/projects.ts— list/add/remove/discover/available client fns.VM agent
packages/vm-agent/internal/bootstrap/bootstrap.go—initSubmodulesinitializes submodules under the injected scoped token at boot.Shared
packages/shared/src/types/project.ts—ProjectRepository,ProjectRepositoryStatus,SubmoduleSuggestion,AvailableRepository; defaults/constants.Tests
apps/api/tests/unit/routes/project-repository-access.test.ts—normalizeRepository/isValidRepositoryFormat/assertRepositoryAccess.apps/api/tests/unit/routes/workspace-git-token.test.ts— multi-repo scoped token minting.apps/api/tests/unit/services/github-app.test.ts— installation access gating.apps/web/tests/unit/components/repository-access-settings.test.tsx— RTL behavioral tests aligned to the combobox interaction model (render, load primary, add/remove lifecycle, discover, access-status badges, error toasts, empty-state).apps/web/tests/unit/pages/project.test.tsx— mocks the repository-access API fns so the settings-tab integration does not fire unmocked async calls.typecheckandlintclean (0 errors).Review Follow-ups (this branch)
After rebase, a skeptical review found and fixed two issues that the original PR body misrepresented:
project.test.tsxregressed becauseRepositoryAccessSettingswas added to the settings tab without mocking its API calls; the missing mocks were added.git_credential.goto reflect multi-repo scoped tokens.Residual Risks / Caveats
packages/vm-agent/internal/bootstrap/bootstrap.go(initSubmodules) could not be compiled or unit-tested locally; it relies on the CI Go jobs and the staging Deploy build.🤖 Generated with Claude Code
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Classification
External References
GitHub REST API — "Create an installation access token for an app" supports scoping a token to specific repositories via
repository_idsand narrowingpermissions, which is the mechanism used for multi-repo workspace tokens. Verified against GitHub's official documentation: https://docs.github.com/en/rest/apps/apps#create-an-installation-access-token-for-an-app and https://docs.github.com/en/rest/git/submodulesCodebase Impact Analysis
apps/api/src/routes/projects/repository-access.ts,apps/api/src/routes/projects/crud.ts(delete cascade),apps/api/src/services/github-app.ts,apps/api/src/routes/workspaces/runtime.ts,apps/api/src/db/migrations/0065_project_github_repositories.sql,apps/api/src/db/schema.ts,apps/api/src/services/limits.ts.apps/web/src/components/RepositoryAccessSettings.tsx,apps/web/src/components/RepositoryAccessCombobox.tsx,apps/web/src/lib/api/projects.ts,apps/web/src/pages/ProjectSettings.tsx.packages/vm-agent/internal/bootstrap/bootstrap.go,packages/vm-agent/internal/server/git_credential.go.packages/shared/src/types/project.ts.Documentation & Specs
N/A: no public www docs or specs reference repository-access behavior yet; the work is tracked in
tasks/active/2026-06-08-same-org-submodule-repo-access.md.Constitution & Risk Check
Principle II (per-user encrypted credentials) and Principle XI (no hardcoded values — limits via
getRuntimeLimits(), sentinel-free counts) checked. Key risk: workspace tokens must remain tightly scoped to[primaryRepoId, ...additionalRepoIds]and never widen to org-wide access;assertRepositoryAccessgates every add against the installation. Multi-tenant: each add is access-gated and rows are project/user-scoped with CASCADE cleanup on project delete.