diff --git a/taptopay/src/main/java/com/payabli/sdk/taptopay/attestation/device/DeviceAssertion.kt b/taptopay/src/main/java/com/payabli/sdk/taptopay/attestation/device/DeviceAssertion.kt
index 20628060..ba103428 100644
--- a/taptopay/src/main/java/com/payabli/sdk/taptopay/attestation/device/DeviceAssertion.kt
+++ b/taptopay/src/main/java/com/payabli/sdk/taptopay/attestation/device/DeviceAssertion.kt
@@ -32,8 +32,8 @@ internal class DeviceIdentity(
 /**
  * The proof-of-possession headers `/activate` requires, and `/config` after it.
  *
- * The server re-derives what was signed from [timestamp] alone: `clientDataHash = SHA256(UTF8(timestamp))`,
- * and the signature is checked over that against the public key stored at attestation. **So [timestamp] must
+ * The server re-derives what was signed from [timestamp] alone, as `SHA256(UTF8(timestamp))`, and checks the
+ * signature over that digest against the public key stored at attestation. **So [timestamp] must
  * be the exact string the signer signed, byte for byte.** That is why it is carried as a string rather than
  * an instant formatted here: a second formatting of the same moment can differ in fractional digits or offset
  * spelling, and the failure would surface as a signature mismatch with nothing pointing at the cause. The
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ internal class DeviceIdentity(
  * helper is `internal` to that module, so this is the same rule stated again rather than a second rule.
  */
 internal class DeviceAssertion(
-    /** Base64 of the DER ECDSA signature over `SHA256(UTF8(timestamp))`. */
+    /** Base64 of the DER ECDSA signature over `UTF8(timestamp)`, which the algorithm hashes once. */
     val assertion: String,
     /**
      * The signing key's identifier, matched against the attestation row. Derived from the key, not its alias.
diff --git a/taptopay/src/main/java/com/payabli/sdk/taptopay/attestation/device/DeviceAssertionSigner.kt b/taptopay/src/main/java/com/payabli/sdk/taptopay/attestation/device/DeviceAssertionSigner.kt
index c94b86de..88451faf 100644
--- a/taptopay/src/main/java/com/payabli/sdk/taptopay/attestation/device/DeviceAssertionSigner.kt
+++ b/taptopay/src/main/java/com/payabli/sdk/taptopay/attestation/device/DeviceAssertionSigner.kt
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
 package com.payabli.sdk.taptopay.attestation.device
 
 import com.payabli.sdk.core.devicekey.DeviceKey
-import java.security.MessageDigest
 import java.time.Clock
 import java.time.format.DateTimeFormatter
 import java.time.format.DateTimeFormatterBuilder
@@ -35,6 +34,10 @@ internal class DeviceAssertionSigner(
     /**
      * An assertion for one call, over a timestamp minted now.
      *
+     * **The timestamp bytes go to the signer unhashed.** `SHA256withECDSA` applies the one hash the server
+     * verifies against; pre-hashing here would sign the hash of a hash, which verifies against nothing the
+     * server computes and is refused as an assertion failure.
+     *
      * Never cached: the server's window is two minutes, and a reused assertion is a replay of a proof that was
      * only ever good for the request it was made for.
      */
@@ -43,7 +46,7 @@ internal class DeviceAssertionSigner(
         // One call, so the signature and the identity that labels it describe the same key. Taken separately
         // a replacement between them would send a signature the service cannot verify against the row that
         // identity selects.
-        val signed = deviceKey.sign(clientDataHash(timestamp))
+        val signed = deviceKey.sign(timestamp.toByteArray(Charsets.UTF_8))
         return DeviceAssertion(
             assertion = Base64.getEncoder().encodeToString(signed.signature),
             keyId = signed.identity,
@@ -52,21 +55,7 @@ internal class DeviceAssertionSigner(
         )
     }
 
-    /**
-     * What the signature is taken over: `SHA256(UTF8(timestamp))`.
-     *
-     * The digest is the input to the signing algorithm, which hashes it again, so the value the server checks
-     * is a signature over the hash of this digest. That is what the sibling platform does, where the same
-     * digest is handed to a platform attestation API that hashes it in turn, and this platform matches it for
-     * Phase 1 rather than reading the wording the other way. The target design signs a server-issued value
-     * instead and is a separate change.
-     */
-    private fun clientDataHash(timestamp: String): ByteArray =
-        MessageDigest.getInstance(DIGEST).digest(timestamp.toByteArray(Charsets.UTF_8))
-
     private companion object {
-        const val DIGEST = "SHA-256"
-
         /**
          * ISO-8601 in UTC with exactly three fractional digits.
          *
diff --git a/taptopay/src/test/java/com/payabli/sdk/taptopay/attestation/device/DeviceAssertionSignerTest.kt b/taptopay/src/test/java/com/payabli/sdk/taptopay/attestation/device/DeviceAssertionSignerTest.kt
index 5798c0a3..d926a7b9 100644
--- a/taptopay/src/test/java/com/payabli/sdk/taptopay/attestation/device/DeviceAssertionSignerTest.kt
+++ b/taptopay/src/test/java/com/payabli/sdk/taptopay/attestation/device/DeviceAssertionSignerTest.kt
@@ -84,19 +84,19 @@ class DeviceAssertionSignerTest {
         // an assertion failure with nothing naming the timestamp.
         assertTrue(
             "the signature does not verify over the timestamp that was sent",
-            verifies(assertion, sha256(assertion.timestamp)),
+            verifies(assertion, assertion.timestamp.toByteArray()),
         )
     }
 
     @Test
-    fun `the signed bytes are the digest of the timestamp, not the timestamp`() {
+    fun `the signed bytes are the timestamp, not its digest`() {
         val assertion = signerAt(1785931200).sign(DEVICE_ID)
 
-        // The digest goes to the signer, which hashes it again. Matching the sibling platform, which hands the
-        // same digest to an attestation API that hashes it in turn. Signing the timestamp directly verifies
-        // just as cleanly on this side and is refused by the server.
-        assertEquals(sha256(assertion.timestamp).toList(), key.signed.single().toList())
-        assertNotEquals(assertion.timestamp.toByteArray().toList(), key.signed.single().toList())
+        // `SHA256withECDSA` applies the hash the server verifies against. Handing it a digest instead would
+        // sign the hash of a hash, which verifies on this side against the same double hash and is refused by
+        // the server as an assertion failure.
+        assertEquals(assertion.timestamp.toByteArray().toList(), key.signed.single().toList())
+        assertNotEquals(sha256(assertion.timestamp).toList(), key.signed.single().toList())
     }
 
     @Test
@@ -129,8 +129,8 @@ class DeviceAssertionSignerTest {
         // returns two different signatures over identical input is the provider's nonce strategy, and a
         // deterministic ECDSA provider would fail this while the signer stayed correct.
         assertEquals(2, key.signed.size)
-        assertTrue(verifies(first, sha256(first.timestamp)))
-        assertTrue(verifies(second, sha256(second.timestamp)))
+        assertTrue(verifies(first, first.timestamp.toByteArray()))
+        assertTrue(verifies(second, second.timestamp.toByteArray()))
     }
 
     @Test