diff --git a/crates/openab-core/src/discord.rs b/crates/openab-core/src/discord.rs
index 5a21a71bf..38f4ccef4 100644
--- a/crates/openab-core/src/discord.rs
+++ b/crates/openab-core/src/discord.rs
@@ -1018,6 +1018,7 @@ impl EventHandler for Handler {
 
         let dispatcher = self.dispatcher.clone();
         let stt_cfg = self.stt_config.clone();
+        let gate_router = self.router.clone();
 
         tokio::spawn(async move {
             // Best-effort echo before the agent reply so the user can verify STT.
@@ -1032,6 +1033,35 @@ impl EventHandler for Handler {
 
             let sender_id = sender.sender_id.clone();
             let sender_name = sender.sender_name.clone();
+
+            // Shared ingress trust gate (L3 identity). Redundant-but-matching with
+            // Discord's own user check that already ran pre-dispatch, so it cannot
+            // deny anything already admitted (non-regressive). L2 (channel/thread/DM)
+            // stays in the adapter for Discord — its registry entry is L2-open.
+            //
+            // Bots are skipped here: Discord's `is_denied_user` has a `!is_bot`
+            // bypass (bot admission is handled separately by allow_bot_messages +
+            // trusted_bot_ids), and the shared L3 gate is human-identity only.
+            // Running it on bots would wrongly drop trusted bot-to-bot messages
+            // when allow_all_users=false (multi-agent). See PR #1270 review F1.
+            // Phase 1c makes this authoritative and removes the scattered check.
+            if l3_gate_applies(sender.is_bot) {
+                let decision = gate_router.gate_incoming(
+                    "discord",
+                    &thread_channel.channel_id,
+                    is_dm,
+                    &sender_id,
+                );
+                if !decision.is_allowed() {
+                    tracing::info!(
+                        sender = %sender_id,
+                        channel = %thread_channel.channel_id,
+                        ?decision,
+                        "discord message denied by trust gate"
+                    );
+                    return;
+                }
+            }
             let sender_json = serde_json::to_string(&sender).unwrap();
             let thread_key = dispatcher.key("discord", &thread_channel.channel_id, &sender_id);
             let estimated_tokens = crate::dispatch::estimate_tokens(&prompt, &extra_blocks);
@@ -2898,6 +2928,16 @@ fn is_denied_user(
     !is_bot && !allow_all_users && !allowed_users.contains(&user_id)
 }
 
+/// Whether the shared L3 identity gate (`AdapterRouter::gate_incoming`) should run
+/// for this sender. Bots bypass L3 — mirroring [`is_denied_user`]'s `!is_bot`
+/// bypass — because bot admission is a separate concern (`allow_bot_messages` +
+/// `trusted_bot_ids`), and L3 (`allowed_users`) is a human-identity allowlist.
+/// Running L3 on bots would wrongly deny mode-admitted/trusted bots when
+/// `allow_all_users=false` (multi-agent). See PR #1270 review.
+fn l3_gate_applies(is_bot: bool) -> bool {
+    !is_bot
+}
+
 /// Returns `true` if a bot message should bypass the `allow_bot_messages` mode check.
 /// A trusted bot that @mentions this bot is treated the same as a human @mention —
 /// it can pull the bot into a thread regardless of the `allow_bot_messages` setting.
@@ -3904,6 +3944,15 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(!is_denied_user(true, false, &allowed, 999));
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn l3_gate_skips_bots_admits_humans() {
+        // Regression guard (#1270 F1): the shared L3 identity gate must NOT run
+        // for bots — mirrors is_denied_user's !is_bot bypass. Otherwise trusted /
+        // mode-admitted bots would be denied when allow_all_users=false.
+        assert!(!l3_gate_applies(true)); // bot → gate skipped
+        assert!(l3_gate_applies(false)); // human → gate applies
+    }
+
     // --- Trusted bot mention bypass tests ---
     // A trusted bot @mentioning this bot bypasses allow_bot_messages mode,
     // treating the mention the same as a human @mention.
diff --git a/src/main.rs b/src/main.rs
index 25cc3db3f..e96bfa5e6 100644
--- a/src/main.rs
+++ b/src/main.rs
@@ -293,6 +293,26 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
                 ),
             );
         }
+
+        // Discord: gate L3 (identity) only via the shared gate. Discord's L2 is
+        // richer than the flat allowed_channels model (threads are admitted by
+        // *parent* channel, DMs by allow_dm), so we leave channel/DM enforcement
+        // in the adapter and set L2 open here. L3 mirrors the resolved
+        // [discord].allow_all_users/allowed_users, so the gate agrees with
+        // Discord's existing user check (behavior-preserving). L2 + dispatch-path
+        // privatization for Discord follow once the richer channel model lands.
+        if let Some(d) = &cfg.discord {
+            reg.insert(
+                "discord",
+                TrustConfig::new(
+                    Some(true), // L2 open — Discord's own channel/thread/DM logic still applies
+                    Vec::<String>::new(),
+                    Some(true),
+                    Some(config::resolve_allow_all(d.allow_all_users, &d.allowed_users)),
+                    d.allowed_users.clone(),
+                ),
+            );
+        }
         reg
     };