What happened
The review agent identified a medium-severity logic gap in the two-pass review strategy merged in agents#190. The finding appeared across 4 review cycles (29450129540, 29581605242, 29587202043, 29588521329) and was escalated from low to medium severity. Step 3f instructs the orchestrator to modify context packages for security and correctness sub-agents when triage results exist, but step 3c makes the security sub-agent's dispatch conditional. A large PR can trigger triage and classify files as security-critical (via governance path patterns like skills/**) without step 3c selecting the security dimension sub-agent. Step 3f would then reference a context package for an unselected sub-agent. The finding was never addressed across 2 fix iterations and was merged unresolved.
What could go better
The review agent demonstrated strong analytical value by identifying this cross-step logic gap and escalating its severity across cycles. However, the finding was not acted upon before merge — the fix agent ran twice after the finding was reported but did not address it, and the human merged with the known gap. The practical severity is debatable: since the orchestrator is an LLM interpreting natural-language instructions, it may handle the gap gracefully by skipping context modification for unselected sub-agents. But explicit handling would make the behavior deterministic rather than relying on implicit LLM reasoning. Confidence: medium — the logic gap is real in the instruction text, but the runtime impact depends on orchestrator behavior.
Proposed change
In skills/pr-review/SKILL.md, add a guard to step 3f: when triage results classify files as security-critical, the orchestrator should check whether the security sub-agent was selected in step 3c before modifying its context package. Two options: (1) auto-include the security sub-agent when security_critical_files is non-empty (as the review agent suggested), ensuring triage results always reach a security-focused reviewer; or (2) explicitly state that step 3f's security-prioritized context applies only to sub-agents that were selected in step 3c, and skip the security context modification if the security sub-agent was not dispatched. Option 1 is more robust since it ensures security-critical files always get dedicated security review.
Validation criteria
On the next review of a PR where security triage classifies files as security-critical but the security sub-agent is not in the default dimension set (step 3c), the orchestrator should either auto-include the security sub-agent or explicitly skip its context modification without error. Verify by reviewing the review agent's behavior on the next 3 large-PR reviews (50+ files) for correct triage-to-dispatch-to-context flow.
Generated by retro agent from #190
What happened
The review agent identified a medium-severity logic gap in the two-pass review strategy merged in agents#190. The finding appeared across 4 review cycles (29450129540, 29581605242, 29587202043, 29588521329) and was escalated from low to medium severity. Step 3f instructs the orchestrator to modify context packages for
securityandcorrectnesssub-agents when triage results exist, but step 3c makes thesecuritysub-agent's dispatch conditional. A large PR can trigger triage and classify files as security-critical (via governance path patterns likeskills/**) without step 3c selecting thesecuritydimension sub-agent. Step 3f would then reference a context package for an unselected sub-agent. The finding was never addressed across 2 fix iterations and was merged unresolved.What could go better
The review agent demonstrated strong analytical value by identifying this cross-step logic gap and escalating its severity across cycles. However, the finding was not acted upon before merge — the fix agent ran twice after the finding was reported but did not address it, and the human merged with the known gap. The practical severity is debatable: since the orchestrator is an LLM interpreting natural-language instructions, it may handle the gap gracefully by skipping context modification for unselected sub-agents. But explicit handling would make the behavior deterministic rather than relying on implicit LLM reasoning. Confidence: medium — the logic gap is real in the instruction text, but the runtime impact depends on orchestrator behavior.
Proposed change
In
skills/pr-review/SKILL.md, add a guard to step 3f: when triage results classify files as security-critical, the orchestrator should check whether thesecuritysub-agent was selected in step 3c before modifying its context package. Two options: (1) auto-include thesecuritysub-agent whensecurity_critical_filesis non-empty (as the review agent suggested), ensuring triage results always reach a security-focused reviewer; or (2) explicitly state that step 3f's security-prioritized context applies only to sub-agents that were selected in step 3c, and skip the security context modification if the security sub-agent was not dispatched. Option 1 is more robust since it ensures security-critical files always get dedicated security review.Validation criteria
On the next review of a PR where security triage classifies files as security-critical but the security sub-agent is not in the default dimension set (step 3c), the orchestrator should either auto-include the security sub-agent or explicitly skip its context modification without error. Verify by reviewing the review agent's behavior on the next 3 large-PR reviews (50+ files) for correct triage-to-dispatch-to-context flow.
Generated by retro agent from #190