Hi — I'm working on OM World, a protocol for a decentralized intent economy. DCT's framing — trustless delegation primitive for multi-agent systems where an agent can cryptographically delegate a provably attenuated subset of its authority — is the cleanest articulation of object-capability discipline applied to autonomous agents I've seen recently.
1. Attenuated subset construction. "Provably attenuated" can mean (a) attenuated against a declared schema (subset of declared scopes), (b) attenuated against a runtime check (always-stricter constraints), or (c) attenuated cryptographically (predicate that mathematically implies the parent's predicate). Which form does DCT use, and what does the verifier do when checking?
2. Recipient binding for sub-delegations. When A delegates to B, must B be named at delegation issuance (point-to-point), or can A issue a bearer delegation B presents to any verifier (capability-style)? Each has different leak-vs-flexibility properties.
3. Revocation propagation through the tree. If A revokes B's delegation, what happens to delegations B previously issued to C and D — cascade-revoke (clean, requires A to know the tree), persist until expiry (leak), or rely on B to re-propagate revocation (B might be offline)? Object-capability literature has answered this many ways; curious where DCT lands.
Happy to share OM World's Mandate spec — the "trustless delegation primitive" framing is exactly the foundation we want, and the comparison would benefit both sides.
Hi — I'm working on OM World, a protocol for a decentralized intent economy. DCT's framing — trustless delegation primitive for multi-agent systems where an agent can cryptographically delegate a provably attenuated subset of its authority — is the cleanest articulation of object-capability discipline applied to autonomous agents I've seen recently.
1. Attenuated subset construction. "Provably attenuated" can mean (a) attenuated against a declared schema (subset of declared scopes), (b) attenuated against a runtime check (always-stricter constraints), or (c) attenuated cryptographically (predicate that mathematically implies the parent's predicate). Which form does DCT use, and what does the verifier do when checking?
2. Recipient binding for sub-delegations. When A delegates to B, must B be named at delegation issuance (point-to-point), or can A issue a bearer delegation B presents to any verifier (capability-style)? Each has different leak-vs-flexibility properties.
3. Revocation propagation through the tree. If A revokes B's delegation, what happens to delegations B previously issued to C and D — cascade-revoke (clean, requires A to know the tree), persist until expiry (leak), or rely on B to re-propagate revocation (B might be offline)? Object-capability literature has answered this many ways; curious where DCT lands.
Happy to share OM World's Mandate spec — the "trustless delegation primitive" framing is exactly the foundation we want, and the comparison would benefit both sides.