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Protect buyers when a marketplace (or local) plugin is installed and runs on their Bridge/SaaS tenant. Companion to intake verification in GodMode-Marketplace#3 (GitHub Actions as verify VMs).
Marketplace CI smoke + optional Copilot review raise the floor but cannot guarantee benign runtime behavior (time bombs, env-gated exfil, abuse of allowed APIs against real tenant data).
Part of track-b / marketplace trust. Related: #112 (coding isolation), #172 (VM-grade coding jobs; different surface), #96 (kill switches).
Installed plugin code today: loads into the Bridge Node process for that deployment. That is a different trust boundary than the coding terminal jail and different from "we smoke-tested once on GitHub."
True plugin runtime sandbox: isolate plugin execution on the buyer hub (separate process/container/VM per plugin or per tenant plugin host). Strongest, most expensive. Not required to ship Marketplace#3.
Goal
Protect buyers when a marketplace (or local) plugin is installed and runs on their Bridge/SaaS tenant. Companion to intake verification in GodMode-Marketplace#3 (GitHub Actions as verify VMs).
Marketplace CI smoke + optional Copilot review raise the floor but cannot guarantee benign runtime behavior (time bombs, env-gated exfil, abuse of allowed APIs against real tenant data).
Part of track-b / marketplace trust. Related: #112 (coding isolation), #172 (VM-grade coding jobs; different surface), #96 (kill switches).
Clarifications (product)
Protection stack
pluginRef/ artifact digest (no floatingmain)Acceptance (first slice: design + pin + threat note)
pluginRef/ digest for Official/Community plugin installs (fail closed on drift)Out of scope (this issue)