diff --git a/draft-klrc-aiagent-auth.md b/draft-klrc-aiagent-auth.md
index 66e2ba0..373bfab 100644
--- a/draft-klrc-aiagent-auth.md
+++ b/draft-klrc-aiagent-auth.md
@@ -327,7 +327,7 @@ When using the Identity Assertion JWT Authorization Grant {{OAUTH-JWT-ASSERTION}
 OAuth Identity and Authorization Chaining Across Domains ({{OAUTH-ID-CHAIN}}) provides a general mechanism for obtaining cross-domain access that can be used whether an identity assertion like a SAML or OpenID Connect token is available or not. The Identity Assertion JWT Authorization Grant {{OAUTH-JWT-ASSERTION}} is optimized for cases where an identity assertion like a SAML or OpenID Connect token is available from an identity provider that is trusted by all the OAuth authorization servers as it removes the need for the user to re-authenticate. This is typically used within enterprise deployments to simplify authorization delegation for multiple software-as-a-service offerings.
 
 ## Human in the Loop
-An OAuth authorization server MAY conclude that the level of access requested by an Agent requires explicit user confirmation. In such cases the authorization server SHOULD either decline the request or obtain additional authorization from the User. An Agent, acting as an OAuth client, may use the OpenID Client Initiated Backchannel Authentication (CIBA) protocol. This triggers an out-of-band interaction allowing the user to approve or deny the requested operation without exposing credentials to the agent (for example a push notification requesting the user to approve a request through an authenticator application on their mobile device).
+An OAuth authorization server MAY conclude that the level of access requested by an Agent requires explicit user confirmation. In such cases the authorization server SHOULD either decline the request or obtain additional authorization from the User. An Agent, acting as an OAuth client, can use the OpenID Client Initiated Backchannel Authentication (CIBA) protocol ({{OpenIDConnect.CIBA}}). This triggers an out-of-band interaction allowing the user to approve or deny the requested operation without exposing credentials to the agent (for example a push notification requesting the user to approve a request through an authenticator application on their mobile device).
 
 Interactive agent frameworks may also solicit user confirmation directly during task execution (for example tool invocation approval or parameter confirmation). Such interactions do not by themselves constitute authorization and MUST be bound to a verifiable authorization grant issued by the authorization server. The agent SHOULD therefore translate user confirmation into an OAuth authorization event (e.g., step-up authorization via CIBA) before accessing protected resources.
 
@@ -423,6 +423,10 @@ The authors would like to thank:
 # Document History
    \[\[ To be removed from the final specification ]]
 
+  -03
+
+   * Include reference to CIBA (see https://github.com/PieterKas/agent2agent-auth-framework/issues/131)
+
   -02
 
    * Add Aaron Parecki from Okta as co-author.