codex_oauth.py reads unverified JWT claims for security decisions and uses REFRESH_CMD.split() instead of shlex.split()

[tg12]

Summary

codex_oauth.py reads a ChatGPT/Codex OAuth access token from ~/.codex/auth.json and decodes it client-side using a hand-rolled base64 JWT parser (_decode_jwt_claims) with no signature verification. The token is then forwarded as a Bearer credential to https://chatgpt.com/backend-api/codex. Expired token detection relies solely on the exp claim in the unverified JWT payload.

Evidence

providers/codex_oauth.py, _decode_jwt_claims() (lines ~65–72):

def _decode_jwt_claims(token: str) -> dict:
    try:
        payload = token.split(".")[1]
        payload += "=" * (-len(payload) % 4)
        return json.loads(base64.urlsafe_b64decode(payload).decode("utf-8"))
    except Exception:
        return {}

_is_expiring() trusts the decoded exp claim directly:

def _is_expiring(token: str, skew: int = 120) -> bool:
    claims = _decode_jwt_claims(token)
    exp = claims.get("exp")
    if not isinstance(exp, (int, float)):
        return False
    return time.time() >= (exp - skew)

_account_id() similarly trusts the chatgpt_account_id from the unverified payload:

def _account_id(token: str):
    claims = _decode_jwt_claims(token)
    auth = claims.get("https://api.openai.com/auth") or {}
    return auth.get("chatgpt_account_id")

This chatgpt_account_id is set as the ChatGPT-Account-ID request header sent upstream.

Additionally, _best_effort_refresh() runs REFRESH_CMD.split() as a subprocess:

def _best_effort_refresh() -> None:
    if not REFRESH_CMD:
        return
    try:
        subprocess.run(REFRESH_CMD.split(), timeout=25,
                       capture_output=True, check=False)
    except Exception:
        pass

REFRESH_CMD defaults to "codex login status" but is configurable via UC_CODEX_REFRESH_CMD. A value like UC_CODEX_REFRESH_CMD="sh -c 'malicious command'" would execute arbitrary shell commands (though .split() prevents shell injection in the default case, a command containing spaces in its arguments would be incorrectly split).

Why this matters

1. JWT tampering is undetected: a compromised ~/.codex/auth.json with a forged exp claim (set far in the future) would never trigger a token refresh, allowing a stale or revoked token to be used indefinitely.
2. Account ID forgery: a forged chatgpt_account_id in the JWT payload is forwarded as the ChatGPT-Account-ID header, potentially impersonating another account if OpenAI trusts this client-side value.
3. Refresh command injection: if UC_CODEX_REFRESH_CMD contains arguments with embedded spaces (e.g., "mycommand 'arg with space'"), .split() will corrupt the argument list, causing the refresh to silently fail.

Root cause

Using client-side JWT claim reading for security decisions (token validity, account identity) without signature verification. JWT signatures exist precisely to prevent client-side tampering; skipping verification defeats this.

Recommended fix

1. Remove the custom _decode_jwt_claims / _is_expiring logic. Instead, always attempt the API call and let the upstream return a 401 to trigger re-authentication.
2. If client-side expiry checking is desired for UX, document that it is best-effort only and never use the decoded account ID as a security-critical value.
3. Replace REFRESH_CMD.split() with shlex.split(REFRESH_CMD) to correctly handle quoted arguments.
4. Add a warning if UC_CODEX_REFRESH_CMD is set to a non-default value.

Acceptance criteria

• Token expiry is not solely determined by the unverified JWT payload, OR code is documented as best-effort with a comment explaining the limitation.
• shlex.split replaces REFRESH_CMD.split().
• No security decision (beyond UI hints) relies on the unverified chatgpt_account_id claim.

Suggested labels

security, bug

Priority

P2

Severity

Medium — the attack requires write access to ~/.codex/auth.json (same user), which limits practical impact; however, the account ID forwarding is a correctness issue even without an attacker.

Confidence

Confirmed — code is explicit; JWT signature verification is absent.

[devin-ai-integration]

Fixed in #28 (merged): REFRESH_CMD is now parsed with shlex.split (posix-aware) so quoted paths aren't split on internal spaces, and the JWT decode is documented as best-effort/unverified -- a cosmetic account-id/exp routing hint only, never an authorization decision (authority is enforced upstream by Codex).