From 8d47596825a4d58183f062990134f2143ef410b3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: CharmingGroot Date: Wed, 24 Jun 2026 17:21:27 +0900 Subject: [PATCH] docs(mcp): document HTTP transport trust model The HTTP transport ships without authentication. Callers that bind to a routable interface should sit the server behind an authenticating proxy. Documents this constraint in the README security callout. Closes #191 Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 Signed-off-by: CharmingGroot --- README.md | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 0da5bdd..ab4589c 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -254,6 +254,18 @@ Register it with Claude Code via: claude mcp add skillspector -- skillspector mcp ``` +> **Security — HTTP transport trust model** +> +> The HTTP transport ships **without authentication**. Any caller that can +> reach the port can invoke `scan_skill`. Over stdio or `127.0.0.1` this is +> the same trust boundary as the CLI. If you bind to a routable interface: +> +> - Sit the server behind an authenticating reverse proxy (e.g. nginx + mTLS) +> before exposing it externally. +> - Local paths and `file://` URLs are **automatically rejected** over HTTP to +> prevent unauthenticated callers from reading arbitrary host files. Only +> remote Git and `.zip` URLs are accepted. + ## Vulnerability Patterns SkillSpector detects **68 vulnerability patterns** across 17 categories: