��# Issue 11: Add Counter Overflow Detection and Logging
Problem
u32 counters can overflow at 4B+ tokens without detection. No audit trail of overflow attempts.
Solution
- Add overflow check before incrementing in
record_token and record_vote
- Return
CounterOverflow error when limit reached (u32::MAX)
- Emit structured error event with ballot ID and current count
- Prevents silent data corruption
Implementation Tasks
Note for Contributors
Complete Issue #2 (error handling) first to have the ContractError enum framework in place. While overflow at 4B tokens is unlikely in practice, this guard is critical for production robustness and prevents silent data corruption. When counter reaches u32::MAX, block further increments and return an explicit error (don't allow wrapping). Emit an error event that includes the ballot ID and current count for audit trail. Consider this a hard limit that cannot be exceeded � future enhancements might use u64 counters if larger counts are needed. Test edge cases at MAX-1, MAX, and attempted MAX+1.
��# Issue 11: Add Counter Overflow Detection and Logging
Problem
u32 counters can overflow at 4B+ tokens without detection. No audit trail of overflow attempts.
Solution
record_tokenandrecord_voteCounterOverflowerror when limit reached (u32::MAX)Implementation Tasks
if count == u32::MAX return Err(CounterOverflow)record_tokenandrecord_voteCounterOverflowto ContractError enumNote for Contributors
Complete Issue #2 (error handling) first to have the ContractError enum framework in place. While overflow at 4B tokens is unlikely in practice, this guard is critical for production robustness and prevents silent data corruption. When counter reaches u32::MAX, block further increments and return an explicit error (don't allow wrapping). Emit an error event that includes the ballot ID and current count for audit trail. Consider this a hard limit that cannot be exceeded � future enhancements might use u64 counters if larger counts are needed. Test edge cases at MAX-1, MAX, and attempted MAX+1.